

OUTLINES OF
JAINA PHILOSOPHY

MOHAN LAL MEHTA

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OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY

THE ESSENTIALS OF JAINA ONTOLOGY
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD

By

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October 1954

DEDICATED TO
MY REVERED TEACHERS
PANDIT DALSUKH MALVANIA
AND
DOCTOR CHANDRA DHAR SHARMA
WITH ESTEEM AND AFFECTION

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

The profundity and vastness of Jaina literature are conceded by all, but there still remains a huge field unexplored with great potentialities, deserving the attention of enthusiastic research scholars. The ever increasing interest evinced by scholars all over the world in the tenets of Jainism has made it imperative to bring out more and more publications in English on the various aspects of Jainology. The principles of *syadvada* and non-violence have especially engaged the attention of erudites who by the application of these principles are devising ways and means to cure the ills of Humanity. Jainism with its synthetic approach to all the mundane problems tries to solve them systematically. The scientific exploitation of the Jaina literature is still in its embryonic stage. We trust with very keen interest that scholars, in future, would endeavour to devote their time and attention for the advancement of knowledge and culture by undertaking research in Jainology.

The publication of this Volume is undertaken by the Society in furtherance of one of its objectives, viz., the propagation of *Right Knowledge*. Our thanks are due to Shri Mohan Lal Mehta who, by writing this book, provides the students of philosophy with a simple and lucid introduction to the fundamentals of Jain philosophy. Our efforts would be sufficiently rewarded if the academic world would appreciate the publication.

We take this opportunity of recording our grateful thanks to Shriman B. P. Wadia, the Founder-President of the Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore, for his magnanimity in favouring us with an illuminating foreword for this book, despite the multifarious calls on his valuable time. We express our sincere thanks to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, and Professor N. A. Nikam for having gone through the press copy in advance and for having favoured us with their candid opinion about the book which we publish with this volume. Our appreciative thanks are due to Dr. L. S. Dorasami, Honorary Secretary of the Indian Institute of Culture, for giving us valuable suggestions and continued co-operation in connection with the activities of our Society.

We also thank the printers, W. Q. Judge Press, for their hearty co-operation.

JAIN MISSION SOCIETY

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FOREWORD

In this work the outlines of Jain philosophy are drawn by Shri Mohan Lal Mehta, M.A., Shastracharya, a research scholar of the Parshwanath Vidyashrama at the Banaras Hindu University. He was one of the contributors of papers to the "Mahavira Jayanti Week" arranged in April 1954 at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, under the joint auspices of the Institute and the Jain Mission Society, Bangalore.

His study of "The Essentials of the Jain Doctrine of Karma," discussed at the Institute on April 18th, covered most of the points made in the important concluding chapter of this book, which deals with the doctrine of Karma. A careful study of this chapter supplements our knowledge of this profound doctrine gained from other sources; it points to links which remain obscure in other expositions of the great Law; and above all it in some measure facilitates the task of application by the aspirant to higher living. By removing obscurations the Jain points of view reveal to the understanding some important psychological propositions.

The book not only is informative for the general reader but also will prove valuable to the student of different religions and philosophies.

The Jains have made great contributions to Indian architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry and music. The wonderful temples and shrines on Mount Abu, the Belur Temple, the colossal statue of Gomateswara at Sravana Belgola in Mysore State and much of the finest poetry in Kannada are owed to the Jains. Jain authorship is claimed also for the sacred *Kural* as well as the celebrated *Amara-Kosha*. The popular grammar *Namal* by Pavanandi is also Jain.

The 1951 Census of India shows the Jains today to form less than half of one per cent of the population of the country, but they are found in every State. Jains represent a factor of importance in the discharge of the *Vaishya Dharma*—a contribution of value in modern India. In this age of ruthless competition the Jains set an example in acceptance of obligations to society, in their charities and in their support of projects for sharing with others the insights of their great teachers, through the printed word, as in the "Sacred Books of the Jainas," of which several volumes have appeared.

Between the philosophy and ethics of Jainism and of Hinduism as well as of Buddhism there is a striking similarity. There are also great similarities in temple architecture and even in temple rites between the Jains and their Hindu neighbours. But, whereas the Hindus bow before images of their Gods and Goddesses, the Jains pay their homage to statues of Tirthankaras or Jinas, who have attained the Great Perfection towards which all men are expected to strive. In this respect the Jains, like the Buddhists, are nearer to the Traditional Doctrines of the ageless *Bodhi Dharma* than are their brethren.

The invocation which every pious Jain repeats daily, bowing to East, West, South, North, is this:

I bow to the Arhats. I bow to the Siddhas. I bow to the Acharyas.
I bow to the Upadhyayas. I bow to all the Sadhus in the world.

And in the *Avashyaka Sutra* there is this prayerful submission: "I forgive all souls. Let all souls forgive me. I am in friendship with all. With none I am in enmity."

The Jains have in common with the Zoroastrians and the Buddhists a tradition of a long line of Enlightened Ones, Guides and Teachers of mankind. These Tirthankaras belonged to the Kshatriya caste and yet they taught, age after age, the philosophy of Non-Violence. Round *Ahimsa* the entire body of Jain doctrines revolves. The *Bij*, the seed, of the moral philosophy of Jainism is in the single sentence of the *Sutra Kritanga* that by harming no creature a man reaches the Great Peace of Enlightenment.

Twenty-three of these Jinas or Tirthankaras are recognized and these stretch far back of Vardhamana, the 24th and last, more widely known as Mahavira, the Man of Dauntless Energy, who lived in the 6th century B.C. This was the great age when not only Gautama Buddha taught in India, but also Lao-Tzu and Confucius in China, the last of the Zarathushtras in Iran, and Pythagoras in Greece. Some information about the Cyclic Appearance of these 24 Tirthankaras and Their achievements is to be found in the *Kalpa Sutra* of the Jain Canon. They are the Awakened Ones who "preach the unparalleled Wisdom."

Taking as his theme the doctrine of Jain philosophy, it is natural that Shri Mehta's approach should be the intellectual one. No adequate consideration of Jainism, however, can ignore its lofty ethics. The ethical teachings are to be found in these scholarly pages under the more technically philosophical headings.

Jain ethics is perhaps the most valuable contribution which Jainism can make to modern thought.

How greatly the modern world would profit, for example, by adopting the attitude of *Syadvada*, with its open-minded recognition that judgments resting on different points of view may differ without any of them being wholly wrong!

A legitimate corollary of this doctrine of the relativity of judgment, to which Shri Mehta devotes a chapter, would seem to be that, as between religions also, the complete truth can be found only in their combined views, after that which is false in each of them has been sifted out. The serious comparison of the ancient world religions is sure to yield universal ethics and truths common to them all.

The special mission of the Jains of today, in this respect, is a dual one:

(1) Not only should there be respectful tolerance of other creeds and

religions but also genuine appreciation of the teachings these enshrine and intelligent recognition of their importance. A careful and dispassionate study of other religions and philosophies will show to the devout Jains how fine, how broad and deep are the teachings of Mahavira, who followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors, the Noble Tirthankaras who as Warrior Souls taught the great truth of *Dharma-Yuddha*, the Righteous War, the Greatest of All Wars, perpetually going on in everyone between the man of sin and the Man of Spirit.

(2) The second aspect of that mission is setting the example of truly Peaceful Living to others who are taking the false attitude of the militant religiose. India today sorely needs the synthesizing influence in matters religious and the grand doctrine of "Resist Not Evil," of *Ahimsa* or Non-Violence, of Gandhiji's *Satyagraha* or "the Hold of the True." The individual Jain who lives the life of moral and mental *Ahimsa*, as taught by all the Great Ones, in addition to his physical plane observances, is uplifting not only his own community but also his whole nation.

One of the most practical features of Jain ethics is the reasonable recognition that human beings are at very different stages on the evolutionary journey, which all are making through many lives on earth, and that what is expected of them should be correspondingly graded. Reincarnation, the twin of the doctrine of Karma, is clearly enunciated in Jainism.

Soul-progress calls for a self-imposed discipline very different from the false asceticism of torturing and maiming the body.

The four lines of the perfect square offer to the Jain a model of right living.

"Learn the true road leading to final deliverance. (1) Right Knowledge, (2) Faith, (3) Conduct, (4) Austerities."

Study of the philosophy of the Jinas purifies and gives birth to real Faith, without which human conduct can be neither true nor noble. Conduct energized by good desires leads to the Land of the Gods; but the conduct resulting from desirelessness leads to Liberation and for this the fourth step becomes necessary. For all men the first three are requisite; the fourth is especially meant for the aspirant and the devotee.

All Jains are expected to live by certain ethical principles, such as these very significant ones in the *Uttaradhyayana Sutra*:

He should not speak unasked and asked he should not tell a lie; he should not give way to anger; he should be indifferent to the pleasant and the unpleasant. He should subdue the self so difficult to subdue. Happiness in this world and the next is his.

And one must guard oneself against the five tormentors of the Soul—Pride, Sense-enjoyment, Lust, Gossip and Restless Sleep. (*Magadhi Shloka*).

Jainism instructs its votaries to observe the duty of limiting voluntarily one's wealth.

The Jain is taught to value the body at its true worth. It is an instrument of learning and experience, to be trained and used. And so the warning:

One who has identified his own self with the body in which it is encased, is extremely afraid of death, seeing therein his own destruction and separation from friends. (*Samadhi shataka*)

Control of the animal in man is stressed but non-injury to all is unequivocally proclaimed:

With the three means of punishment—thoughts, words, deeds—you shall not injure living beings. (*Jaina Sutra*)

And active service with a spiritual flavour is recommended:

He who, seeing one thirsty, hungry or pained, is pained in mind and through pity assists him, shows compassion. (*Pravachana-sara*)

The *Sramana*, the Jain Sadhu, emerging from the ranks of the laymen, has to have instruction on the fourth step—asceticism, austerities. The moral precepts and the examples of men who are practising *Sramanas* stir the hearts of laymen also to practise some austerities, leading some of them to become *Sramanas*.

These austerities are external and internal. The external ones are six: (1) Fasting; (2) Starvation; (3) Begging; (4) Abstinence from tasty foods; (5) Bodily penance; (6) Solitary domicile. Six also are the internal ones: (1) Expiation of sins; (2) Humility; (3) *Guruseva*—service of the teacher; (4) Study; (5) Meditation; (6) Reposeful steadfastness. [*Nirgrantha-Pravachana*]

The duty of the *Sramana* and the Practitioner is to preach, but the *Uttaradhyayana Sutra* warns that "clever talking will not work salvation."

Pre-eminently important among these ethical teachings is their stress upon *Ahimsa*, or non-injury, in its fullest possible application. This doctrine of Non-Violence and the practice of "Resist Not Evil" are taught in very many places. We shall quote only one:

Subdue wrath by forgiveness. Conquer vanity by humility. Overcome fraud by honesty. Vanquish greed through contentment. (*Dasha-vaikalika Sutra*)

But the following reveals a very striking insight into the Law of Universal Causation; and the instruction is applicable to many things, including Capital Punishment:

Beings which kill others should not be killed in the belief that the destruction of one of them leads to the protection of many others.
(*Purushartha Siddhyupaya*)

In his book, *The Essential Unity of All Religions*, an excellent volume not only for the general reader but also for the student of all faiths, Dr. Bhagavan Dasji of Banaras gives "a valuable text," rendered by him in verse form:

Thus we enjoin on you, thus do we say,
Thus we believe, thus we proclaim to all:
No living thing should be slain anywhere,
Nor ordered forcibly this way or that,
Nor put in bonds, nor tortured any way,
Or treated violently otherwise;
Because you are that same which ye would slay,
Or order here and there against his will,
Or put in prison, or subject to pain,
Or treat with violence; *ye are that same*;
The self-same Life doth circulate in all.

He explains:

Of course this is the extreme ideal, for renunciant ascetics. It has to be modified, in practice, for "householders," in Jainism as in all other religions, on the incontrovertible principle, that "Duty varies with circumstance."

The Foreword has been given this particular turn with a view to drawing the reader's attention to the profundity of the ethical teachings of Jainism, which very naturally flow from its philosophical and scientific doctrines. It is hoped that this may attract the attention of the layman, who often holds the view that the ethics of a religion is unrelated to its metaphysics.

The Jain chronology, like the chronology of the Hindus, deals in long cycles and the ages in which the great Tirthankaras appeared go back and back to the dawn of the Human Race. Like pre-Vedic Bodhism it appears that there was also a pre-Vedic Jina Wisdom.

The writings which have descended to us from the remotest antiquity have still the power to quicken the spiritual aspirations and to inculcate such noble precepts as are safe guides to human happiness and enlightenment. Among these writings those of the Jains hold an important place. They have contributed valuable threads to the closely woven fabric of Indian and world thought.

B. P. WADIA

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE,
BASAVANGUDI, BANGALORE
26th October 1954

PREFACE

My object in preparing the present treatise has been to make a humble and honest contribution to one of the most significant systems of Indian Philosophy, viz., Jainism. The system is, of course, too vast to be adequately treated in a single treatise, and, consequently, I have tried to restrict myself to the general features thereof. I have made an attempt to present the outlines of Jaina Philosophy on the basis of original Prakrit and Sanskrit texts in such a manner as to make the presentation interesting, intelligible, and easy.

The treatise is divided into six chapters. The first chapter has been devoted to a brief survey of the conception of reality from the stand-points of Idealism, Realism, and Jainism. The general features of the six fundamental substances recognized by Jaina Philosophy have been elaborated in a simple and comprehensive manner bearing in mind the non-absolutistic implication of thought. The nature of soul has thoroughly and critically been examined in the second chapter. The third chapter has been devoted to the conception of matter. What are the different forms of matter according to Jainism; what is the nature of atom and molecule; what is the relation between matter and soul; how many kinds of bodies are there; what is the nature of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade, heat, light, etc.; all these questions have been answered in this chapter. In the fourth chapter I have dealt with the theory of knowledge. The Canonical as well as Logical conception of knowledge has been discussed in it. The fifth chapter is on the relativity of judgment. The nature of seven-fold judgment and the theory of *naya* have been precisely presented in this chapter. The sixth chapter deals with the doctrine of karma which is of immense importance from the ethical standpoint. The doctrine of *gunasthāna* has also been included in this chapter, since it is invariably associated with the conception of karma. I am sure this work will give an introductory idea of Jain Philosophy.

The credit for this work, I must confess, goes to the teachings, blessings, affection, and inspiration of my revered teachers Pandit Dalsukh Malvania and Dr. Chandra Dhar Sharma. I am very much grateful to Syt. Prithvi Raj Jain, Dr. Nathmal Tatia, and Professor M. A. Venkata Rao who kindly read the whole manuscript and gave their valuable suggestions. I am especially indebted to the Jain Mission Society, Bangalore, who very kindly arranged for the publication of this work.

MOHAN LAL MEHTA

JAINASHRAMA
Banaras Hindu University
15th August 1954

TRANSLITERATION

Vowels

अ,	आ,	इ,	ई,	उ,	ऊ,	ऋ,	ऌ,
a,	ā,	i,	ī,	u,	ū,	r̄,	l̄,
ए,	ऐ,	ओ,	औ,	अं,	अः		
e,	ai,	o,	au,	am̄,	aḥ or ah		

Consonants

क,	ख,	ग,	घ,	ङ			
k,	kh,	g,	gh,	ṅ			
च,	छ,	ज,	झ,	ञ			
c,	ch,	j,	jh,	ñ or n			
ट,	ठ,	ड,	ढ,	ण			
ṭ,	ṭh,	ḍ,	ḍh,	ṇ			
त,	थ,	द,	ध,	न			
t,	th,	d,	dh,	n			
प,	फ,	ब,	भ,	म			
p,	ph,	b,	bh,	m			
य,	र,	ल,	व,	श,	ष,	स,	ह
y,	r,	l,	v,	ś,	ṣ,	s,	h

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTION OF REALITY

IT WILL perhaps not be wrong to say that the entire metaphysical world is divided into idealism and realism. No metaphysical thought crosses the boundaries of these two hemispheres. If we desire to study quite sincerely the essential features of philosophy, we will have to establish a keen contact with the development of idealism and realism. Without a comprehensive, complete, and systematic study of these two isms, we cannot grasp the essence of philosophy whether it be Western or Eastern. Although it seems that idealism and realism represent two apparently different lines of approach to the philosophy of life and the universe, yet, a tendency to reconcile them is not absent. It has begun in recent years to be thought that the difference between these two currents is not so much in their goal as in their presuppositions and methods of approach. With this simple observation, we, now, proceed to explain the theory of idealism as it stands.

IDEALISM.

Some thinkers maintain that a theory is often called idealistic in so far as it underestimates the temporal and spatial aspects of the real universe. Some philosophers are convinced without doubt that the term idealism has been used to cover all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe.¹ Others hold that according to idealism, spirit is the *terminus ad quem* of nature.²

'Idealism as we understand it, is the belief or doctrine according to which thought is the medium of the self-expression of Reality or to put it from the other side, Reality is such as must necessarily express itself through the ideal or ideals that are organic to the knower's intellectual equipment which may be called thought or reason.'³

¹ Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, p. 1.

² Idea of God, p. 200.

³ Self, Thought and Reality, p. 45.

According to this definition of idealism, the mind of man is taken to be the organ through which Reality expresses itself; and if it is certain that man alone has the capacity to interpret experience through intellectual ideals, then it follows that it is man alone that can be an organ to Reality. He possesses a unique position in the determination of the universe.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

Some laymen as well as philosophers define idealism as a doctrine which openly or secretly seeks to establish that the whole choir of heaven and earth is unreal. Now, the first thing which we should bear in mind is that idealism does not take away the reality of anything which is considered as real by commonsense or science. Far from subtracting anything which is considered as real by commonsense or science idealism adds to the reality of the things in so far as it alone makes it clear that things have still many other significant aspects of their life than those which are revealed to commonsense or to science. To put it in the words of Bosanquet: 'Certainly for myself, if an idealist were to tell me that a chair is really not what we commonly take it to be, but something altogether different, I should be tempted to reply in language below the dignity of controversy.'¹ In the same way, a philosophy must stand self-condemned if it thinks that the electronic constitution of matter or the inner structure of the material particles is a mere figment. The philosophers like Berkeley (who says that '*esse est percipi*', i.e., to exist is to be perceived) etc. are not idealists in the strict sense of the term idealism. They may be given the name of subjective idealists who think that perception is the real cause of external objects. They reduce Existence or Reality to mere perception which position is absolutely wrong according to the real definition of idealism in which the mind only determines the objects and does not create them. Determination and creation are two different things. What needs emphasis at this place is that true idealism has never disputed the existence of the external world. Green remarks: 'The fact that there is a real external world of which through feeling we have a determinate experience and that in this experience all our knowledge of nature is implicit, is one which no philosophy disputes. What Mr. Spencer understands by 'idealism', is what a raw undergraduate understands

¹ Contemporary Philosophy, p. 5.

by it. It means to him a doctrine that 'there is no such thing as matter', or that 'the external world is merely the creation of our own minds', a doctrine expressly rejected by Kant, and which has had no place since his time in any idealism that knows what it is about.¹

Now, the point is quite clear. There is no difference between the idealistic and the realistic creeds in so far as the reality of the material world is concerned; for both there is an external world which is not the creation of our own minds. The defect, as the idealists hold, of realism lies in the fact that it does not realize the universe in its completeness.

The conclusion of what we have discussed so far is as follows: Though the things we know do not depend for their existence on the fact that somebody knows them, and so in this sense they are independent of the knowing mind, yet, all the determinations of the things are discovered only in the knowledge-relation, so that the things which are referred to in our explanations of the facts are necessarily determined in certain specific ways. Hence, to insist that we can know only phenomena is not to degrade the things into mind-dependent appearances; it is merely to indicate that things are what we know them to be. And we know only by bringing them into relation to things other than themselves, and it follows consequently that to refer a fact to a thing-in-itself that cannot be determined in any way is to admit that the fact cannot be explained at all.² It is only through [consciousness that the world exists for us at all, though, of course, it is not created by our own consciousness.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF IDEALISM

After giving the definition of idealism, we, now, proceed to the various types thereof. There have been idealistic views in Western philosophy, some making thoughts or ideas to be eternal reals composing the world of transcendental realities preceding but somehow determining the world of phenomena, some others making thought or idea to be the pre-condition of phenomenal existence, while the others conceiving spirit as the ultimate creative reality

¹ Works, I., p. 386.

² Self, Thought and Reality, pp. 86-7.

creating the world of subject and object by its own self-differentiation. The first of these types is Platonic, the second that of Berkeley and Kant, and the last that of Hegel and his followers.

PLATONIC IDEALISM

Plato conceived Reality as consisting of an organized realm of ideas, each of which enjoys immutability and eternity. This organized realm of the eternal and immutable ideas is real in the sense that there are independent entities not depending upon mind, either finite or infinite. They are the real metaphysical forces, remaining at the back of and somehow determining our empirical world of thoughts and things as their imperfect imitations. Hence, our world of experience is only phenomenal and unreal. It comes into existence and passes out of it. It is somehow determined by the ideas which are universal and eternal. The idealism of Plato is objective in the sense that the ideas enjoy an existence in a real world independent of any mind. Mind is not antecedent for the existence of ideas. The ideas are there whether a mind reveals them or not. The determination of the phenomenal world depends on them. They somehow determine the empirical existence of the world. Hence, Plato's conception of Reality is nothing but a system of eternal, immutable, and immaterial ideas.

IDEALISM OF BERKELEY

Berkeley may be said to be the founder of idealism in the modern period, although his arrow could not touch the point of destination. According to Locke (the predecessor of Berkeley), substance was regarded as a seat of qualities some of which are primary in the sense that they are objective and others are secondary in the sense that they are not in objects but in our minds, i.e., subjective. Berkeley rejected this two-fold division on the basis that if secondary qualities are what they are by means of perception or idea, the primary qualities are no less dependent on the same perception. A quality whether primary or secondary must be cognized by our perception. All the things which are composed of qualities both primary and secondary must be regarded as such only when they are perceived as such. In other words, the existence of things must be determined by perception or idea: *Esse est percipi*. This type of Berkeleian idealism may be regarded as subjective idealism. According to Berkeley, it is the individual mind that determines the existence of external objects. In his later

writings, he faced a horrible difficulty of dualism regarding his doctrine of '*esse est percipi*'. For the emergence of perception the existence of external objects independent of mind is necessary. Without an external and independent object no perception is possible. To overcome this difficulty Berkeley established a new doctrine in his later works which is known as '*esse est concipi*'. In this new doctrine he placed the word 'conception' in place of 'perception' meaning thereby 'to exist is to be conceived'.

IDEALISM OF KANT

Kant's idealism is a direct result of his epistemological position adopted in his Critique of Pure Reason. He points out that knowledge or intelligible experience is a complex product of the elements of sensibility and understanding. Pure knowledge, i.e., *a priori* is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. But our judgments are always *a posteriori* because they are derived from experience. Sensations originate from an unknown world of things-in-themselves but must be organized into a systematic whole by the forms of intuition, i.e., space and time and by the categories or the fundamental concepts of understanding such as substance, causality, and the like. The forms and categories are *a priori* because our judgments presuppose the existence of these forms and categories. Experience is never possible without the existence of these transcendental laws of judgment. Thus, it is our understanding that makes nature, according to Kant. The idealism of Kant, therefore, consists in this that the world of our knowledge is an ideal construction out of sense-manifold to which alone the forms and categories of understanding are confined and, therefore, is commonly known as objective idealism. It is subjective in the sense that knowledge does not reach out to the world of things-in-themselves: *ding an sich*. He argues that Reality cannot be grasped by our knowledge because our judgment is conditional, relative, and partial. We cannot know a thing as it is but we know it as our experience reveals. Hence, the Kantian *ding an sich* is unknowable by our experience. His view of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception is more important as regards the unity of knowledge. All knowledge presupposes the Synthetic Unity of Pure Apperception because unless there is a Synthetic Unity, no knowledge is possible. This idea of the Synthetic Unity of Pure Apperception leads Kant quite near the conception of soul which is not accepted by him outwardly.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM OF HEGEL

The fundamental question before Hegel was: What must be the nature and characteristic of the ultimate principle of the universe in order to explain by it the origin, growth, and development of mind and nature, their mutual relations, as well as the questions of science, philosophy, ethics, art, and religion. He found the ultimate principle of his fundamental question in Absolute Spirit, Reason, Thought, or Idea. This Absolute Idea of Hegel is not static but a dynamic spiritual principle as it is with Fichte who after Kant established the world-view of Absolute Idealism on his conception of Absolute Ego. But his Absolute Ego was a moral principle satisfying man's craving for moral values alone, while Hegel took it in a more pronounced and comprehensive form. In his principle of Absolute Idea thinking and being coincide, or what is thinking finds its expression in being, for thinking involves an object of thought. It cannot be in *vacuo* (vacuum). 'The world consists of both mind and nature, subject and object, self and not-self. Thus, the world of mind and nature is the heterisation of the Absolute Thought for its thinking, so that the laws of its thinking are also the laws of being. Hegel, thus, seems to reserve for his Absolute an immutable and inexhaustible being which always transcends its heterisation or the world of becoming.'¹ It shows that the Absolute Idealism of Hegel is Monistic Spiritualism, i.e., in the shape of one spiritual reality as the source and foundation of all external objects as well as individual thoughts. In other words, the Absolute Idealism of Hegel may be called Objective Idealism. Thought, according to Hegel, is a self-developing reality which develops through the contradiction of the subject and the object, through the clash of the opposites—the thesis and the anti-thesis; and ultimately overcomes this dualism not by negating it but by correcting it.

BRADLEY ON IDEALISM

Following the intellectual lead of Hegel, Bradley starts his enquiry and finds that the revelation of the intellect can acquaint us with the fact that the categories of substance, attributes, causality, etc.; the forms of time and space—all these limited abstractions are riddled with contradictions. He finds that the external relations are meaningless to the conception of the Unity of Reality and the

¹ Principles of Philosophy, p. 107.

internal relations. Though consistent with the intellectual conception they cannot be applied to the Absolute Reality which is non-relational. Therefore, Bradley thinks that the proper organ for grasping the Absolute Reality is not intellect but the whole of mental life which is constituted by intellect, feeling, and will. He, therefore, describes his Absolute as identified with Experience. Human experience is a piece of Transcendental Experience and can approximate it when it has learnt to transcend the limitations of intellect. The Absolute of Bradley, therefore, is to be felt, experienced, or realized and not to be known by our simple intellect.

The implication of Bradleian Idealism is that intellect is an important factor of consciousness and cannot ordinarily be prevented from grasping and modifying Reality under its own qualifications of categories and relations. But it fails to grasp Reality itself, which is a non-relational whole. Therefore, intellect which grasps Reality in some conditional and partial aspects, must be transcended if we are not to remain satisfied with partial realities or 'appearances' as Bradley calls them. Reality is to be apprehended by Transcendental Experience. The ordinary world of our experience in the form of individuality and diversity is the realm of appearances. Reality is something transcendental which transcends all the empirical experiences of external objects. The objects of external world are only appearances as experienced by our ordinary intellect, not Reality itself in its Absolute Form. Hence, the external objects and finite concepts are only appearances, not the Absolute Reality.

IDEALISTIC ATTITUDE OF BOSANQUET

Following almost the same line of thought as that of Bradley, Bosanquet has come to conceive of Reality as a logical or rational whole which he calls 'Individual'. He laid emphasis on the faculty of intellect or reason but did not reject the objective order of things. While explaining the nature and functions of thought, Bosanquet says: 'The essence of thought is not in a mental faculty, but in the objective order of things. We bring the two sides together if we say, it is the control exercised by Reality over mental process.'¹

Thought, as Bosanquet conceives it, has for its goal the 'Whole'. It is by its very nature, compelled to construct. As he puts in his

¹ Life and Philosophy in Contemporary British Philosophy, 1st Series, p. 61.

own words: 'Implicit in all the modes of experience which attracted us throughout, it is now considered in its own typical manifestations, in which the idea of system, the spirit of the concrete universal, in other words, of individuality, is the central essence.'¹ On this very fundamental basis he defines error as simply an inadequate determination without a system, which leaves alternative possibilities open, i.e., dependent on unknown conditions.² Bosanquet, therefore, thinks that it is intellect when pursued in its fullest capacity that comprehends or constructs the whole of Reality. He not only maintains this but lays emphasis on the unity of values also. 'Totality expresses itself in value, which is . . . the concentration and focus of Reality in its essence as real, as a positive centre which is a solution of contradictions...'³ The Idealism of Bosanquet, thus, establishes the monism of the Spirit which is at once the unity of experience and the unity of values. The ultimate Spirit is the 'Real Thing'. This spirit is nothing but the totality of existence and the unity of values. Thus, the external world is nothing more than the Spirit as a unity of experience and the unity of values. The Spiritual Idealism propounded by Bosanquet is Monistic in character.

After giving an introductory account of Western Idealism we, now, come to the Idealistic Schools of India. Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta are the most important and dominant schools of Indian Idealism. An attempt would be made to give the outlines of these schools in a concise form.

MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

According to this school, Reality is beyond the four categories of thought.⁴ Human intellect cannot grasp reality. Whatever we grasp is the *prapañca*, and not the *paramārtha*. If we put this idea in the technical language of Buddhism, we can say that the human knowledge is confined to the *samvṛti-satya*, i.e., to the phenomenal reality. It is unable to grasp the *paramārtha-satya*, i.e., the noumenal reality. The phenomenal reality is *svabhāva-śūnya*, i.e., devoid of Self-Existence. The noumenal reality is *prapañca-*

¹ Life and Philosophy in contemporary British Philosophy, 1st Series, p. 63.

² *ibid.* p. 67.

³ *ibid.* p. 73.

⁴ *Catuṣkoṭivīnirmuktān tattvaṃ mādhyaṃikā viduḥ.*

śūnya, i.e., devoid of plurality. Some scholars are of the view that the word *śūnya* is synonymous with Nihilism and they draw the conclusion that the school of Mādhyamika Buddhism is nihilistic. According to the opinion of other scholars, this conception is not correct. They are of the opinion that the word *śūnya* must be interpreted in the sense of *svabhāva-śūnya* and *prapañca-śūnya*. As it is remarked by an eminent exponent of the system: 'The Buddha preached Reality (*dharma*) considering the two types of Truth. The first type is the Phenomenal Truth and the second one is the Noumenal Truth.'¹ The empirical world is the phenomenal reality, while the Ultimate Truth is the noumenal reality. 'The Ultimate Truth is intuitional, peaceful, devoid of plurality, indeterminate, and one. This is the nature of Reality.'²

YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

This school is generally known as Vijñānādvaita Vāda. According to it, as is generally believed, only Momentary Ideas are real. It is only because of this belief that the system is regarded as Subjective Idealism. But this view is not correct. The doctrine of Momentary Ideas is tenable only in the case of phenomenal reality. The conception of momentariness is necessary to reach the Ultimate Reality. If the phenomenal reality is not conceived as momentary, our approach to the Highest Reality is not possible.

The Highest Reality is the Universal Consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) according to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. The Reality which is grasped by the four categories of thought is only phenomenal.³ The Highest Reality is unchanging, calm, and permanent. It is beyond the four categories of thought.⁴ It is beyond the duality of subject and object.⁵ By mere analysis we cannot grasp Reality. Thus, it is indescribable and devoid of any explanation.⁶

¹ Mādhyamika-kārikā, XXIV. 8.

² *ibid.*, XVIII. 9.

³ Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 188.

⁴ *Catuṣkoṭivivirmukta*.

⁵ *Grāhyagrāhakavivirmukta*.

⁶ Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 116.

Though sometimes the Laṅkāvatāra appears to support the doctrine of crude subjectivism, yet really it is pregnant with deeper expressions which forbid us to draw such a conclusion. The external world is the creation, not of the individual consciousness, but of the Absolute Consciousness.¹ All, except Consciousness, is unreal. Consciousness alone is the established truth preached by the Buddha. All the three worlds are the result of discrimination or thought-relations. No external object exists in reality. All that is, is Consciousness.²

NON-DUALISTIC IDEALISM OF ŚAṅKARA

In the philosophy of Śaṅkara the Ultimate Reality is *Brahman* or Self. He maintains that the transcendental ground of experience is the Self. The Self is not momentary but permanent, not changing but changeless, not finite but infinite, not limited and conditional but unlimited and unconditional. The existence of the Self is self-proved (*svayaṃ siddha*) and cannot be denied. It is always conscious.

Now, there arises a question: If the Self is changeless and permanent, what about the reality of the external world? Śaṅkara recognises three grades of Reality.³ The external objects of our ordinary experience have only a *vyāvahārikasattā* (empirical reality), the objects appearing in dreams and illusions enjoy only a *prātibhāsikasattā* (illusory appearance), and the *Brahman*, i.e., the Absolute has the *pāramārthikasattā* (Ultimate Reality). The *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* existences are real from a lower stand-point. The Ultimate Reality is the Highest Reality which is devoid of all differences and contradictions. This Reality is further described as '*prapañcasya ekāyanam*,' i.e., the basis of the whole world including the things, the senses, and the mind.⁴ Or again it is described as the '*bhūmā*' which, though it is the ground of every thing, does not itself stand in need of a ground or support; it is *apraṭiṣṭhita* and *anāśrita*.⁵ The Self is not affected by the appearance of the duality of subject and object. It is pure consciousness running through all the appearances. It is

¹ Indian Philosophy (Dr. C. D. Sharma), p. 145.

² Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 186.

³ Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 25.

⁴ Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I, 4; VI, 19.

⁵ Chāndogya-upaniṣad, VII, 24, 1.

indescribable by the categories of thought. It can only be realised by intuition where there is no dualism of the subject and the object, the knower and the known. The subject-object-dualism is ultimately reduced to pure consciousness which is nothing but bliss. Our intellect cannot grasp the Ultimate Reality because it is Absolute and Infinite, while our intellect is limited and finite. We cannot know *Brahman* but we can become *Brahman*. 'He who knows *Brahman*, becomes *Brahman*.'¹ The appearance of the external world and of the individual souls is due to ignorance or nescience (*avidyā*). At the time of the realisation of the Self it automatically disappears.

Idealism, as we have seen, emphasises the existence of spiritual, mental or intellectual reality. Some of the idealists say that the Ultimate Reality is nothing but Universal Spirit. Some are of the opinion that the Ultimate Reality is Universal Idea or Intellect. Others lay emphasis on the Subjective Conception. Any how, the idealists do not believe in an external existence or a material reality independent of spirit, consciousness, intellect, or idea. It does not matter much whether they believe in the Universal Intellect or in the Individual Mind.

REALISM

The general conception of Realism is that whatever is, is real in the sense that it exists and functions independently of any mind and its interference whatsoever. The mind may or may not be present there. Its existence is quite indifferent to the Real. Realism seems to represent the most primitive and natural tendency of thought to which what is outside, is first to appeal. It takes the clear and distinct view of Reality as it appears. In Western Philosophy, as we find, the first Greek philosophers were realists making either water or air or fire to be the Ultimate Principle of the world existing independently of the mind, and the world with all its complex contents was supposed to owe its origin and growth to this Principle.

ARGUMENTS FOR PHYSICAL EXISTENCE

When the Realist says that there is an existence of physical objects independent of intellect or idea, can he give any arguments to prove his statement? Can he give any reasons why we should

¹ *Brahma vid brahma eva bhavati*,

believe that the external objects exist? He presents the following arguments to prove it¹:

1. The existence of physical objects can be inferred from sense-data as their cause. If there is no physical object, how can sensation be possible? Every thing which exists must have a cause. The sensation exists, therefore it must have a cause and this cause is nothing but sense-datum in the shape of physical objects. The similarity of the sense-data of one person to those of another, when both are perceiving the same object, is a good reason for believing in physical objects as their common cause. As Russell writes: 'What reason, then, have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects? ...Although different people may see the table slightly differently, still they all see more or less similar things when they look at the table... so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent object underlying all the different people's sense-data.'²

2. It is simpler than any other hypothesis. A man of common-sense can understand the theory of the existence of external objects more easily than any other theory of the Idealists. Its details are answerable to a simple mathematical treatment.

3. We have a strong propensity to believe that there is Physical Reality of external objects. What the plain man believes about the table is that it is a square, brown, hard object which he sees existing now and which goes on existing, being brown and square and hard when no one is perceiving it. If you tell him that it is nothing of the sort, that the squareness, brownness, and hardness disappear when he shuts his eyes and reappear when he opens them, that they are not parts of the Real Table at all, and that the Real Table has no colour, texture, shape, and weight, but only some qualities which neither he nor even the greatest philosopher can even imagine, he will not understand you and certainly will have no strong propensity to believe what you say. He won't believe if you say that it is like a dream where although, there are no physical objects still we see or enjoy them. Because he knows that our dream is contradicted when we get up but the valid knowledge of waking life is not contradicted afterwards. Even our dream is not quite unreal because it has some impressions of our waking life which is quite real.

¹ Nature of the World, p. 125.

² Problems of Philosophy, p. 32.

There are other arguments as well that prove the independent existence of physical objects. The intellect discovers but does not make concepts. In the language of James, concepts are not merely functions of the intellect, they constitute a 'coordinate realm' of Reality. Philosophy must then recognise many realms of Reality which mutually interpenetrate. Intellect is an organ, not of 'fabrication,' but of 'discernment', a power men have 'to single out the most fugitive elements of what passes before them... aspect within aspect, quality after quality, relation upon relation. The action of the mind is not creative. Its ideas are not of its own making but rather of its own choosing. It is essentially a selective agency, 'a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.' The sense-organs select from among simultaneous stimuli, attention is selective from among sensations, morality is selective from among interests. To reason is to guide the course of ideas.

Thus, the Realists do not regard only one Reality as valid. They establish the theory of the reality of physical objects independent of and entirely different from any mind, intellect, experience, consciousness, individual, or spirit. Consciousness is different from its object. The object of a sensation is not the sensation itself.

The nature of consciousness is quite different from the nature of material objects. Consciousness is the essence of spirit, i.e., mind, while material objects exist outside the mind. How can these two absolutely different realities be identical? If 'Consciousness Alone' is real, what necessity is of the existence of external objects? Why should an external object prove itself as an obstacle in the production of knowledge? If consciousness itself is non-blue, what is the necessity of an external object? If consciousness itself is blue, what is the necessity of an external object? If 'Consciousness Alone' is real, there would be no difference between the state of dream and the state of waking life, inasmuch as it is the External and Objective Reality that makes a distinction between the two.

DIFFERENT TRENDS OF REALISM

We, now, proceed to consider the problems whether Realism takes the existent to be numerically one, two, or many. Realism would be Monistic, Dualistic, or Pluralistic according to its view of the numerical strength of the existent. If it believes in one

material reality, it would be called Monistic Realism. If it takes the existent to be two, it would fall in the category of Dualistic Realism. If it admits Reality to be more than two, it would be called Pluralistic Realism. Similarly, some other types of Realism would be dealt with according to their specific characteristics.

MONISTIC REALISM

The primitive Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, in so far as they each thought one or other of water, air, or fire to be the One Indivisible stuff of Reality, were Monistic Realists. To them all things as the physical objects, the mind, the life, and the rest were the products of any one of these stuffs. Thus, consciousness was considered to be merely a product of matter.

DUALISTIC REALISM

It regards the mental and the physical worlds as two distinct and independent realities. The monistic trend changed its attitude and began to believe in 'life' as a separate and distinct reality. Empedocles believed in the psychical forces over and above the four elements of earth, fire, air, and water. Anaxagoras admitted 'nous' or 'mind' as the central principle of movement and change. Plato and Aristotle may be said to have indulged in Dualism inspite of their insistence on the reality of the world of Ideas or Forms. Aristotle was, perhaps, more pronounced in his Dualism than Plato.

In modern philosophy, it was Descartes who gave a distinct turn to Realism. To him matter and mind are independent existences each having a characteristic diametrically opposed to the characteristic of the other. This Dualism appeared in Locke in a somewhat different shape in his distinction between cogitative and non-cogitative substance. Although, Kant was an idealist in his noumenal outlook, still he became guilty of a Double Dualism—Epistemological Dualism between sense and understanding and Ontological Dualism between mind and noumenal world of things-in-themselves.¹

PLURALISTIC REALISM

The primitive Greek Philosophers were satisfied with one indivisible matter as the basic principle of all that is in the universe.

¹ Principles of Philosophy, p. 91.

The later Greek thinkers like Democritus and others could not satisfy their impulse of curiosity in this fashion. They thought that the visible objects of the universe are many and independent of one another, and each such object can be divided further and further till we come to a point beyond which our division cannot go. Such units of material objects, which they call 'atoms' must be the ultimate physical principles of the universe. From these 'atoms' all else (including minds) have been derived. They are the only reals, self-sufficient, self-existent, and indivisible; and independent of the minds which originate from them. This type of Realism can be called 'Pluralistic Material Realism' or 'Atomic Realism.'

PRAGMATIC VIEW OF REALISM

Pragmatism means, in the broadest sense, the acceptance of the categories of life as fundamental. Perry remarks that it is the 'bio-centric' philosophy. The Pragmatist means by life, not the imaginary or ideal life of any hypothetical being, not the 'eternal' life or the 'absolute' life but the temporal, operative life of animals and men, the life of instinct and desire, of adaptation and environment, of civilization and progress. The whole 'experimentalist' tendency in English science and philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pragmatist theory that truth is achieved by the trying of hypotheses. This tendency of Pragmatic Realism is mainly directed against Absolutism.

It regards idea as an exercising force of the function of 'meaning.' To quote Perry, an idea is whatever exercises the function of 'meaning.' Any thing may be an idea, provided you mean with it; just as any thing may be a weapon, provided you do injury with it. An idea is what an idea does. In this sense ideas are 'modes of conceiving' the given, a 'taking it to be' this or that. It is a virtual access to an immediate experience of that which it means. By ideas, Pragmatism does not mean 'Platonic essences' but the modes of an individual's thinking. The Pragmatist conceives Reality in the terms of intellectual process and circumstances.

CONCEPTION OF NEO-REALISM

Neo-Realism believes that the world is existent and is independent of mind. However, it does not appear exactly in the same form as the Dualistic Realism of Hamilton, who makes no

provision for any mediation of ideas between mind and nature. While Neo-Realism insists like other Realists that things are independent, it also asserts that when things are known, they become immediate objects of knowledge. These immediate objects of knowledge are technically called 'sensa.' So things are nothing else than 'sensa' in a certain relation. The Neo-Realist does not postulate mind as a self-conscious substance. He conceives mind as a cross-section of the physical world. Neo-Realism seems to be an ally to Naturalism and Pragmatism as it accepts like Naturalism the truth of the results of physical science and like Pragmatism the practical and empirical character of knowledge.¹ Let us, now, turn to a brief discussion of the conception of knowledge recognised by Neo-Realism.

(a) THEORY OR IMMANENCE

The Neo-Realist suggests by his Theory of Immanence that things and minds are not to be regarded as two independent realities but rather as 'relations' into which knowledge as a fact must necessarily enter. As has been observed by Perry: 'Instead of conceiving of Reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships.'²

(b) THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE

The suggestion of the Theory of Independence is that things are directly experienced, and that in the act of direct experience the things remain as they are without being affected by experience. Experience gives us immediate knowledge of things as they are presented to it but does not determine them.

From the above statement it follows that according to the Theory of Independence, things being independent of one another, the relations which exist amongst things are also external and real, and not subjective and internal. Just as things are outside of mind, so is the relation. This view is quite similar to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the external existence of relations.

THEORY OF CRITICAL REALISM

If all knowledge were immediate grasp of things then there remains no provision for distinction between true and false

¹ Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 271.

² *ibid.*, p. 311.

knowledge. Such being the case no one would be allowed to deny illusions, hallucinations, and differences in the degrees of accuracy in knowledge. The Critical Realist removes this difficulty. The contention of the Critical Realist is that in our perception things do not enter directly into our consciousness, but only through the mediation of certain elements partly subjective and partly objective, which make the sense-data into the actual objects of perception. These elements are partly of the nature of the subject and partly that of the object and intervene between the subject and the object, as logical entities. These entities are called 'character-complex' or 'essence'. The object cannot be apprehended immediately as it is, and this accounts for the distinction between true and false knowledge, between truth and error, and for illusions and hallucinations and degrees of accuracy in knowledge.

The Critical Realist further maintains that things have their independent existence and are not known in their entirety but only in their partial character. Our knowledge of things is determined by our interest which selects certain qualities of things in preference to the rest. Things are not entirely unaffected by our experience as the Neo-Realist holds.

SELECTIVE AND GENERATIVE REALISM

The Selective hypothesis holds that the sense-datum is not an effect which is produced or part-produced by the sense-organ. The function of the sense-organ is to 'select' which sense-datum we perceive. Thus, If I see an object as red while a colour-blind person sees it as green, the truth is that both red and green are present in the object; but my retina selects the red for me to see and shuts out the green, while the colour-blind person's retina selects the green for him to see and shuts out the red. The outside world actually has all the qualities which can ever be perceived in it by any organism.

The Generative hypothesis holds that the existence of data is physiologically conditioned. The sense-datum is the effect of two joint causes, viz., the physical object and the sense-organ. Thus, a colour is actually produced by the interaction of the physical object and the organ of sight. If this hypothesis is taken to be true, there will exist no colour when there is no eye. Similar conclusions follow as regards the data of the other senses. Hence,

according to this theory, sense-data exist only when they are being perceived.

Thus, the Selective theory says that a physical object has all the qualities which we or any other existing or possible organism ever has or ever will perceive in it. The Generative theory says that it has none of the qualities which any actual or possible organism ever did or ever will perceive in it.

REALISTIC CURRENTS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

Indian Realism can be classified into two broad divisions: Orthodox Realism and Heterodox Realism. That school which believes in the Vedic Testimony is called Orthodox and that which does not regard the Vedic Authority as valid is called Heterodox. In the following paragraphs we propose to give a brief account of the Orthodox schools of Realism.

PŪRVA-MĪMĀNSĀ SCHOOLS

Both the schools, *viz.*, Bāṭṭha and Prābhākara believe in two independent Realities. Regarding these schools we do not easily find any reference in the *Sūtras* that directly points out the problem of Realism. But a close study of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra in which it is indicated that knowledge is produced when the sense-organ comes in contact with the object, shows quite clearly that the writer believes in the separate and independent existence of knowledge from objects. In the Bhāṣya of Sabara also we find that while criticising the view of the Śūnyavādins, Sabara says that the Objective Reality is quite independent of knowledge which in its turn really depends upon the External Reality for its occurrence. Later on, both the schools of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara discussed this problem at great length in their respective works. Thus, it is right to say that both the schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā are of realistic nature.

SĀṆKHYA SCHOOL

It also falls in the category of Realism. It points out clearly that there are two ultimate entities, *viz.*, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* both of which are eternal and different from each other. *Puruṣa* is nothing but consciousness (*cit*) while *Prakṛti* is unconscious (*jāda*).¹ *Puruṣa* is spectator (*draṣṭṛ-sākṣin*) and enjoyer (*bhokṭṛ*), while *Prakṛti* is what is seen and enjoyed (*drśya* and

¹ Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 11

bhogya). From this account it is evident that *Puruṣa* is consciousness or spirit, whereas *Prakṛti* is physical existence. *Prakṛti* is further manifested into different forms¹ with which we are not concerned here. In short, the Sāṅkhya system believes in two Realities which are independent of and different from each other.

RĀMĀNUJA'S POSITION

According to Rāmānuja, the Conscious Substance (*cit-tattva*) is knower and is the substratum of knowledge (*jñāna*). Both are eternal and inseparably connected together.² *Jñāna* is all pervading. It is immaterial (*ajāda*) and of self-revealing nature. It is capable of contraction and expansion (*saṅkoca* and *vikāśa*). It illumines things as well as itself,³ but it cannot know itself. The Physical Substance is divided into three kinds (1) that which possesses immutable existence (*sattva*) only; (2) that which has all the three qualities (*guṇas*); (3) and that which does not possess any one of the three qualities (*guṇas*). It is eternal.⁴ It is distinct from knowledge and is free from consciousness.⁵ It is subject to change.⁶ Both the Realities, *viz.*, Consciousness and Unconscious objects are eternal and independent. Although Rāmānuja believes in the qualified monism, still, he is quite clear in his view when he says that both these substances will never become one with *Brahman*. The individual souls can become similar to *Brahman*, not same with *Brahman*. The Physical objects will never become identical with *Brahman*. Hence, according to his view, the universe is of realistic nature.

POSITION OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

It is needless to say that the joint system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that spirit and matter are two independent substances. It believes in seven categories of Reality. Matter which is an important factor in the concept of Realism has been shown as eternal, non-momentary, and cognisable through one or more means of valid cognition. Now, we pass on to the Heterodox schools of Realism.

¹ Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 21.

² Tattva-traya, p. 17.

³ *ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 41, 45.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶ *Vikārāśpadam*.

VAIBHĀṢIKA AND SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

The Vaibhāṣika school belongs to the sect of Sarvāstivādins. The very name of this sect shows that it believes in the separate and independent existence of the objective world. Both the external and the internal existences in the shape of matter and knowledge are real.¹ Both of them are momentary.

According to the Sautrāntika School of Buddhism, there is an external world which is as much real as knowledge itself. Although the objective world is independent of knowledge or intellect, yet, it is not cognised through direct perception. The Sautrāntikas hold that the existence of the external world (*bāhyārtha*) is inferred from the various forms of knowledge which forms would not have otherwise existed. In other words, they believe that knowledge assumes various forms which lead us to infer the existence of an external world corresponding to them.²

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, knowledge, consciousness, or intellect is formless, while it has forms according to the Sautrāntikas. The former believes in the direct perceptibility of the outside world, while the latter holds it to be entirely inferential. The Vaibhāṣika system may be called 'Direct Momentary Realism.' The Sautrāntika School may be named as 'Indirect Momentary Realism.'

CĀRVĀKA SCHOOL

According to the Cārvāka, consciousness is not a separate Reality. He holds that Reality consists of the objective world only which is constituted by the four *Mahābhūtas* (Primary Elements), viz., earth, water, fire, and air. Consciousness is merely a by-product of the peculiar amalgamation of the above-mentioned *Mahābhūtas*,³ although none of them possesses it separately. This school does not believe in anything which is neither a *bhūta* nor a *bhautika* (product of the *bhūtas*). This system of Realism is purely materialistic.

¹ History of Indian Logic, p. 247.

² Guṇaratna's Commentary on Saḍdarśana-samuccaya, p. 47.

³ Saḍdarśana-samuccaya, p. 306.

JAINISM

After dealing with the views of the idealists and realists as regards the nature of Reality we, now, propose to proceed to the comparative study of the nature of Reality according to Jainism. How far does Jainism differ in the conception of Reality from Idealism and how far does it join hands with it? What difference it holds from Realism and what type of similarity it has with the realistic view? What is the ultimate nature of Reality according to the school of Jainism? What is the conception of substance, attribute, and modification? How many substances are real from different points of view? What is the nature of those substances and how are they related? What is the conception of oneness and maniness of the substances? All these questions and the like are to be discussed.

NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

All the philosophical problems are centred in the conception of Universe. No school of thought denies the existence of the Universe but each tries to prove it by its own point of view. In the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, a question is asked by Gautama in connection with the conception of Universe. Lord Mahāvīra replied in a direct manner. The conversation is as follows :

Gautama : " O Lord ! what is this Universe ? "

Mahāvīra : " Gautama ! the Universe is composed of the five extensive substances. They are the Medium of Motion, the Medium of Rest, Space, Soul, and Matter."¹

In this conversation Time is not regarded as a separate substance but is included in both the conscious and non-conscious substances. In some chapters of the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, Time is mentioned as a separate entity.² This two-fold classification shows that in the early days of Lord Mahāvīra, there were two schools of thought in Jainism. One believed in the existence of the five extensive substances and the other conceived the Universe as composed of the six substances. This latter school added Time as a separate and independent entity to the five extensive existences without regarding it as an extensive reality. It conceived

¹ *Bhagavati-sūtra*, XIII, 4, 481.

² *ibid.*, XXV, 2-4.

Time as non-extended. This is a rough estimate of the conception of Universe in the Jaina canons.

NATURE OF REALITY

The Jaina thinkers have mentioned the words 'sat', 'tattva', 'artha', 'padārtha', and 'tattvārtha' as synonyms for the word Reality. They generally did not make any distinction among substance, reality, existence, etc. The other Indian systems did not do so in the same sense. In the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra all the six, viz., substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherent relationship are called *padārthas* but the term *artha* is reserved only for three *padārthas*, viz.: substance, quality and action.¹ The Naiyāyikas call the sixteen principles by the name 'sat.'² The Sāṅkhya system regards *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* as *tattvas*. In spite of being a school of Realism, Jainism did not make any difference among Reality, Existence, Substance, Object, etc.

According to Umāsvāti, the definition of Reality is 'sat', i.e. existence.³ He did not use the term 'tattva' but he used the word 'dravya,' i.e., substance for Reality. We have already seen that there is no difference between substance and reality. Reality is substance and substance is reality. In this way, the primary and essential criterion of Reality is Existence or *sattā*. That which exists is real. In other words, Existence is Reality or Reality is Existence. Considering from this point of view, it can be asserted that 'All is one because all exists.'⁴ This view is taken to be very much similar to that of the Upaniṣads. In the Jaina canons there are some references that indicates this view. As we find in the Sthānāṅga-sūtra : 'One Soul.' 'One Universe.' etc.⁵ This conception of oneness is considered to be valid only from the view-point of the 'Saṅgrahanaya.' This view-point of the Jainas reaches near the Absolute Idealism of Indian philosophy and the 'Experience' of Bradley. Our intellect cannot describe this Reality in whole. It can be realised by intuition which is possessed by an omniscient self. Both the conscious and non-conscious substances are the attributes of this Reality,

¹ Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, I, 1, 4 ; VIII, 2, 3.

² *Sacca khalu ṣoḍaśadhā vyūḍhamupadeśyate*—Nyāya-bhāṣya I, 11.

³ *Sat dravyalahṣanam*, V, 29 (Digambara tradition).

⁴ *Tattvārtha-sūtra bhāṣya*, I, 35.

⁵ *Ege āyā ; ege loe*.—Sthānāṅga-sūtra, I, 1 ; I, 4.

according to Jainism. Existence is neither 'Consciousness Alone' nor 'Matter Alone'. When we analyse Reality in this fashion, our stand-point comes in clash with the Absolute Idealism and the Absolute Materialism. The Jainas hold that Existence is all inclusive. If you say that it is nothing but Pure Consciousness, you commit a blunder. If you describe it as Pure Matter, you are guilty. It is neither sheer consciousness nor pure matter. Consciousness and non-consciousness both of them are included in it.

CHARACTERISTICS OF 'SAT'

Umāsvāti defines *sat* as possessing origination, decay, and permanence.¹ When a substance, conscious or unconscious, originates without leaving its own nature, it is called origination. As for instance, jar originates from clay without leaving the nature of clay. Decay is the name of leaving the former mode. As for example, clay leaves its former mode when it becomes a jar. Permanence is the essential characteristic of a substance which remains unchanged in both the conditions, viz., origination and decay. It is neither created nor destroyed. It is eternal. It is changeless. As for instance, the essential nature of clay remains unchanged among its various modes.²

In the Jaina canons we do not find the word '*sat*' as the criterion of Reality or substance. Only the word '*dravya*' has been used there. As it is mentioned in the Anuyogadvāra-sūtra that the universal criterion of Reality is '*dravya*' (substance) and the particular characteristics of Reality are the *jīva dravya* and the *ajīva dravya*, i.e., the conscious substance and the non-conscious substance.³ Umāsvāti developed this canonical conception of substance into '*sat*' and made no distinction between '*sat*' and '*dravya*'. His language was philosophical rather than canonical. Although he mentioned '*sat*' as the criterion of Reality, yet, he did not define '*sat*' in the same manner as it was defined by the other philosophical systems like the Vedānta school and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. These systems define '*sattā*' as absolutely permanent having no change

¹ *Utpādavyoyadhrauyayuktam sat.*—Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 29.

² Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 30.

³ Anuyogadvāra-sūtra, 123. (*Avisesie davve visesie jīvadavve ajīvadavve ya*).

whatsoever. Umāsvāti also defined 'sat' as permanent (*dhruva*) but his conception of permanence was not that of the absolute permanence. According to him, the criterion of permanence is 'not leaving self-essence'.¹ He explained this definition in the following manner: 'That which neither leaves its existent essence at present nor will leave it in future, is permanent.'² The substance during the period of taking new forms and leaving old ones does not leave its essence. In both origination and decay it remains as it is. Its nature remains unchanged. This immutable nature is called permanence.

Now, there arises a question: How is it possible that a substance which leaves the old mode and takes the new form is permanent? How these two contradictory qualities, viz., change and permanence can remain in the same substance? How is it possible that a permanent existence changes? All these questions seem to be contradictory but really speaking, they are not so. Umāsvāti himself says that this conception of permanence can be understood by the terms 'leaving' and 'not-leaving'.³ That which is left is changed and that which is not left is permanent. The modes are temporary because they are left by the substance. The essential criterion is permanent because it remains unchanged. No substance can be absolutely destroyed. No object is absolutely permanent. The nature of Reality is permanent as well as momentary. Its modes (*ṣaryāyas*) change but the essential characteristic (*dravya*) remains unchanged. Kundakunda also defines Reality (*Sattā*) in the same way.⁴

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

What the Jainas maintain is that the nature of the reals can be understood from experience. It is wrong to admit that any attribute or element that does not belong to the real can be ascribed as belonging to it. This is the fundamental position of almost all the realistic schools.

Our experience tells us that no object is absolutely identical. We experience this also that the differences are not absolutely

¹ *Tadbhāvavyayam nityam*—Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 30.

² 'Yat sato bhāvānnavyeti na vyeṣyati tannityam'.—Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya, V, 30.

³ *Arpitānarṣitasiddheh*.—Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 31.

⁴ *Pancāstikāya*, 8.

scattered. Jainism takes this commonsense-view and maintains that the identity is accepted to be true in the midst of all the varying modes or differences. There is no reason to call in question the reality of the changes or of the identity, as both are perceived facts. Every entity is subject to change and maintains its identity throughout its career. Dispassionate study reveals Reality to be a synthesis of opposites—identity and difference, permanence and change, describability and indescribability, oneness and maniness. The Vedāntins start with the premise that Reality is One Universal Existence and that is Permanent Consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas believe in atomic particulars and momentary ideas, each absolutely different from the rest and having nothing underlying them to bind them together. The Naiyayikas believe both to be combined in an individual, though they maintain that the two characters, i.e., universality and particularity are different and distinct. A real according to them is an aggregate of the universal and the particular, i.e., identity and difference and not a real synthesis. The Jaina differs from them all and maintains that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in a real, which is at once identical with and different from both. Reality is neither a particularity nor a universality in an exclusive manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold.¹ It is Existence. It is 'sattā'. Both identity and difference live in its bosom. They are not different from existence as such. They are in the form of existence or existence is in the form of them. This existence is 'sat'. This 'sat' is called 'dravya'. This 'dravya' is known as 'tattva'. This 'tattva' is described as Reality. This type of Reality is 'tattvārtha' or 'padārtha'.


CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE

After having mentioned the real nature of substance, we propose to proceed to know what types of division it contains. It has already been mentioned that if we look at substance from the view-point of *saṅgraha* (universality) we have only one substance, one reality and that reality is existence. From this stand-point, we make no distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, between universality and particularity, between

¹ Aṣṭa-sahasrī, pp. 147-8.

subject and object, and between one and many. All these differences are covered by 'sat'. Hence, from one point of view, 'Sat' is the only substance. This view-point leads to a form of Monism, inasmuch as it takes note of the thread of unity running through plurality which we find recorded in the earlier works of Jaina philosophy.

If we look at substance from the dualistic view-point, we experience it as composed of *jīva* and *ajīva*. The *jīva* is the enjoyer and the *ajīva* is the enjoyed from the empirical point of view. That which has consciousness is *jīva*; that which has not consciousness is *ajīva*. Dr. Radhakrishnan writes in his famous work 'Indian Philosophy' that which has not consciousness but can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt, is *ajīva*.¹ This statement is not valid. The real criterion of *jīva* and *ajīva* is consciousness and unconsciousness respectively. The Jainas do not mean by *ajīva* that which can be touched, tasted, seen, and smelt. These four characteristics belong to 'pudgala' only which is *rūpin*.² In other words, it is matter which can be touched, tasted, seen, and smelt because matter has gross form. *Ajīva* is not only matter but something more. The medium of motion, the medium of rest, space, and time also fall in the category of *ajīva*. The following table will clearly show the real position :



The last four categories of *ajīva* are formless.³ Hence, they cannot be touched, tasted, seen, and smelt. It is the *rūpin* (having form) only which can be touched etc. Such substance is only 'pudgala'. Therefore, the four characteristics of form can be

¹ Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 314.

² *Rūpīnah pudgalāh*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 5.

³ *Nityāvasthitānyarūpāni*. ibid., V, 4.

ascribed to 'puḍgala' (matter) and not to 'ajīva' as a whole. 'Puḍgala' (matter) is a part of *ajīva*; and it is needless to say that the characteristics of a part cannot be attributed to the whole. Matter is 'ajīva', of course, but this does not mean that 'ajīva' is matter alone. *Ajīva* is something more than matter. Here we want to emphasise the point that the definition of 'ajīva' given by Dr. Radhakrishnan is not correct. The correct and complete criterion of 'ajīva' is unconsciousness. Hence, from the dualistic point of view, the conscious substance is *jīva*, while the unconscious substance is *ajīva*.¹

CANONICAL CONCEPTION OF CLASSIFICATION

In the Bhagavati-sūtra substance is classified into two divisions. These two divisions are the same as we have already discussed. There is a further classification of the *ajīva* substance. Firstly, it is divided into 'rūpin' and 'arūpin'. The 'rūpin' substance is *puḍgalāstikāya* alone. Secondly, the 'arūpin' one is divided into 'dharmāstikāya' (medium of motion), 'adharmāstikāya' (medium of rest), 'ākāśāstikāya' (space), and 'addhāsamaya' (time). The first four 'ajīva' substances, viz., 'puḍgala' (matter), 'dharma' (medium of motion), 'adharmā' (medium of rest), and 'ākāśa' (space) and 'jīva' are called 'astikāya' meaning thereby 'substances having extension'. Here again it should be noted that the term 'extension' is not used by the Jaina in the realistic sense of material extension. The Jaina conception of 'extension' is a unique one. The Jainas do not define the term 'extension' in the same sense as the other realists of India and West do. The Jaina conception of 'extension' (*astikāya*) is as follows :

As these exist, they are called 'asti' by the great Jinas, and because they have many 'pradeśas', like bodies, therefore, they are called 'kāyas'. Hence, these are called *astikāyas* (extensive substances).²

To be more clear, let us understand what is meant by a 'pradeśa'. It has been defined to be that part of space which is covered by one indivisible atom of matter.³ Such 'pradeśas' can contain not only the atoms of matter, but the particles of other

¹ Bhagavati-sūtra, XXV, 2 ; XXV, 4.

² Dravya-saṅgraha, 24.

³ *ibid.*, 27.

substances also (which are also called '*pradeśas*'). Thus, each substance has its own *pradeśas*. Now, '*jīva*', '*puḍgala*', '*dharma*', '*adharmā*', and '*ākāśa*' have many '*pradeśas*', as these consist of many indivisible and inseparable parts. In other words, the particles of these are not separable, but are mixed up or capable of being mixed up. The last substance, viz., '*addhāsamaya*' (time) consists of particles which never mix up, and consequently, each of these particles occupies a particular '*pradeśa*'. Thus, time is said to have a single '*pradeśa*'. Therefore, '*addhāsamaya*' is not an extensive substance. The '*addhāsamaya*' substance is also called '*kāla*'.

Thus, we can broadly divide substance into three categories:

1. That which is purely conscious, and has no form. '*Jīva*' alone is such.
2. That which is unconscious and has got some form. '*Puḍgala*' falls in this category.
3. That which is unconscious and has no form. '*Dharma*', '*adharmā*', '*ākāśa*', and '*addhāsamaya*' are of this category.

Another division is also possible. It consists of '*astikāya*' and '*anastikāya*'.

1. That which has more than one '*pradeśa*' whether they are countable, innumerable, or indefinite is known as '*astikāya*'. '*Jīva*', '*dharma*', '*adharmā*', '*ākāśa*' and '*puḍgala*' constitute this variety.
2. That which has only one '*pradeśa*' is called '*anastikāya*'. Such substance is '*addhāsamaya*' or '*kāla*' alone.

The following tables will clearly show the scheme :





TABLE 2



Almost all the realists of Indian thought except the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas divided Reality into two broad categories. These categories are known as spirit and matter, soul and matter, ideas and matter, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, or subject and object. The materialistic school of Realism is not included in this scheme because it is not dualistic. None of the realists tried to divide Reality exactly in the same sense as Jainism did. So far as consciousness is concerned, Jainism joins hands with the other realists but as regards the conception of non-conscious substance, it differs from them. The Jaina conception of non-conscious substance is not in the sense of matter. It includes some immaterial substances as well.

Jainism holds that there are not only two categories of Reality, viz., consciousness and matter; but there is a third category as well which is unconscious and immaterial. Neither is it necessary that what is unconscious must be material nor is it essential that what is immaterial must be conscious. There can be a third category which is immaterial but unconscious. It should not be forgotten that matter is that substance which has form, i.e., which can be touched, tasted, smelt, and seen. 'Dharma', 'adharmā', 'ākāśa' and 'kāla' are unconscious but immaterial. They cannot be touched, tasted, smelt, and seen.

To sum up: There are six substances according to the pluralistic conception of the Jainas. They are as follows:

1. *Jīvāstikāya*—Extensive, conscious, immaterial substance.
2. *Pudgalāstikāya*—Extensive, unconscious, material substance.
3. *Dharmāstikāya*—Extensive, unconscious, immaterial substance in the form of the medium of motion.
4. *Adharmāstikāya*—Extensive, unconscious, immaterial substance in the form of the medium of rest.

5. *Ākāśastikāya*—Extensive, unconscious, immaterial substance in the form of space.
6. *Addhāsamaya (kāla)*—Non-extensive, unconscious, immaterial substance.

Now, we propose to define each of these substances in detail.

JĪVĀSTIKĀYA

The fundamental characteristic of 'jīva' is 'upayoga'.¹ Because of its formlessness, it cannot be perceived by the sense-organs. It can be known by introspection and inference. Now, what is 'upayoga'? The criterion of 'upayoga' is consciousness. In the technical language of Jainism, this consciousness is called 'bodha'. When this 'bodha' is evolved in a particular fashion, it becomes knowledge. To explain the term 'upayoga' it is further mentioned that 'upayoga' is of two kinds: determinate and indeterminate.² Determinate 'upayoga' is further divided into eight categories. These categories are: *mati-jñāna*, *śruta-jñāna*, *avadhi-jñāna*, *manahparyāya-jñāna*, *kevala-jñāna*, *matijñāna*, *śruta-ajñāna*, and *avadhi-ajñāna (vibhaṅga-jñāna)*. Indeterminate 'upayoga' is divided into four categories. These four categories are: *Caḥsurdarśana*, *acaḥsurdarśana*, *avadhidarśana*, and *kevala-darśana*. According to Jainism, there are indefinite *jīvas* in the universe and each *jīva* has innumerable *pradeśas*.³ It is not all pervasive. 'By contraction and expansion of its *pradeśas*, a soul is capable of occupying varying proportions of the countless *Pradeśas* of the universe, just like the flame of a lamp whose light can fill a small room as well as a big hall.'⁴ As has been observed by Umāsvāti: 'If the space is divided into innumerable parts, the size of a soul can be so small as to occupy one or more of these parts'.⁵ One part should not be confined to one *pradeśa* but it should be taken as having innumerable *pradeśas*, since the innumerability of the spatial *pradeśas* is of innumerable kinds. In special cases the size of a single soul can fill the whole universe. 'By the contraction and expansion of

1 *Upayogo lakṣaṇam. Tattvārtha-sūtra*, II, 8.

2 *Sa dvividhoṣṭacaturbhedah. ibid.*, II, 9.


3 *ibid.*, V, 7-8.

4 *Tattvārtha-sāra*, III, 14.

5 *Asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām. Tattvārtha-sūtra* V, 15.

pradeśas, the soul occupies space like the light from a lamp.¹ It can occupy the smallest possible body, viz., that of a bacterium or the biggest body of a great fish (*mahāmaccha*). The soul becomes equal in extent to a small or a large body by contraction and expansion.² This view about the size of soul is bitterly criticised by the other philosophers of India. No school of Indian philosophy but Jainism regards the soul as equal in extent to a body it occupies.

Such souls are indefinite in number, but there are two broad divisions, viz., worldly souls and liberated souls.³ The worldly souls are further divided into two classes: moving (*trasa*) and non-moving (*sthāvara*).⁴ The moving souls are again divided into five-sensed, four-sensed, three-sensed, and two-sensed *jīvas*. The non-moving souls are divided into five categories: those living in the bodies of earth, water, fire, air, and vegetable. The following table will show the classification:



Those *jīvas* that possess five sense-organs, viz.; those of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing are called five-sensed *jīvas*. Those possessing four sense-organs, viz.; those of touch, taste, smell, and sight are four-sensed. Having three sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, and smell are known as three-sensed souls. Those who possess only two sense-organs, viz., those of touch and taste are called two-sensed *jīvas*. The non-moving *jīvas* possess

1 *Pradeśasamhāravisargābhyām pradīpavat*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 16.

2 *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 10.

3 *Samśārīṇo muktaśca*. Tattvārta-sūtra, II, 10.

4 *ibid.*, II, 12.

only one sense-organ, viz.; that of touch. They are known as *ṣṛīhvikāya*, *aṣṅkāya*, *tejaskāya*, *vāyukāya*, and *vanaspatikāya*. They are in the form of earth, water, fire, air, and vegetable respectively.

PUDGALĀSTIKĀYA

It has already been mentioned that 'pudgala' is nothing but matter. Matter is 'rūṣin'. In other words, it has got touch, taste, smell, and colour. It consists of numerable, innumerable, and indefinite parts according as we consider the different molecular combinations.¹ The indivisible elementary particle of matter is 'anu' (atom). It has got only one *ṣṛadeṣa* because the criterion of *ṣṛadeṣa* itself is based on *anu*. One atom will necessarily occupy one *ṣṛadeṣa*. But it is not necessary that one *ṣṛadeṣa* would always be occupied by one atom only because of the contraction and expansion of atoms in molecules.

Matter is of two varieties: in the form of an atom (*anu*) and in the form of molecules (*skandha*). That substance which is the beginning, the middle, and the end by itself and is indivisible should be known as atom. In other words, atom is the smallest possible part of matter. Atom as a unit is inapprehensible by the sense-organs. It is perceptible only in the form of *skandha* (*ṣṛudgalāstikāya*). Hence, it is the *ṣṛudgalāstikāya* (molecule) which can be touched, tasted, smelt, and seen. That is why *ṣṛudgalāstikāya* is said to be *rūṣin* (having form), not *anu* (atom). Atoms are produced only by division.² When any molecule is dissolved into the smallest possible atoms, the atoms so obtained are called effect-atoms (*kārya-ṣṛaramānu*). Those atoms which cause the formation of four root matters: earth, water, fire, and air are called cause-atoms (*kāraṇa-ṣṛaramānu*). Each and every atom is potentially capable of forming earth, water, fire, or air. According to the Jainas, there are no distinct and separate atoms of earth, water, etc. The school of Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika does not agree with this view.

Skandha is formed in three different ways :

- (1) By *bheda* (division)
- (2) By *saṅghāta* (union)

¹ Niyama-sāra, 35.

² *Bhedādanuh*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 27.

(3) By the combined process of division and union taking place simultaneously.¹

The manifestations of *puḍgala* are found in the form of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade or image, sunshine, and moonlight.²

DHARMĀSTIKĀYA

This substance as the medium of motion is defined by Umāsvāti as permanent, fixed, and without form. *Dharmāstikāya* is only one. It is not capable of moving from one place to another. The whole universe (*loka*) is the place of *dharmāstikāya*.³

Now, what is the nature of this substance? It is helpful in supporting the motion of souls and matter. What does it mean? It means that although the souls and matter have got the capacity of moving, yet, they cannot move unless the medium of motion is present in the universe. The medium of motion does not create motion but only helps them who have already got the capacity of moving. It is the medium through which motion takes place. As for instance, a fish swims in water. Here, water does not create swimming but it only helps the fish that has developed the tendency of swimming. As water helps fish in swimming, the *jīvāstikāya* and *puḍgalāstikāya* are helped by *dharmāstikāya* when the former tend to move. The medium of motion (*dharmāstikāya*) is an immaterial substance possessing no consciousness. It is permanent as well as fixed and one. Every thing can penetrate it without any obstruction. It consists of innumerable 'pradeśas' because the universal space possesses countless spatial units.

ADHARMĀSTIKĀYA

The auxiliary cause of rest to the soul and matter is called the medium of rest (*adharmāstikāya*)⁴. It is a single immaterial substance pervading through the whole of the universe. There are countless points of *adharmāstikāya* as those of *dharmāstikāya*. *Adharmāstikāya* is as helpful with respect to rest as

¹ *Bhedasaṅghātebhya utpadyante*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 26.

² *ibid.*, V, 24.

³ *ibid.*, V, 3, 5, 6, 7, 13.

⁴ *Niyama-sāra*, 30.

dharmāstikāya is regarding motion. As a tree is helpful to a person who is coming from a far distance in the hot sun and wants to have some rest under it, so is the nature of *adharmāstikāya* to help the souls and matter when they take rest. Both these substances have the capability of rest but unless there is the medium of rest, they cannot take rest. Hence, it is called the auxiliary cause of rest, *Dharma* and *adharmā* pervade all the parts of the universe as oil pervades the whole of a mustard seed. The conception of *dharmā* and *adharmā* as the categories of substance is a unique contribution of Jaina philosophy.

ĀKĀŚĀSTIKĀYA

Know that which is capable of allowing space to the *jīvas*, *puṅgala*, *dharmā*, *adharmā*, and *kāla* to be *ākāśa*, according to Jainism. *Ākāśa* is eternal, all pervasive, and all the objects of the universe exist in it and it has no form.¹ It is a single substance having indefinite *pradeśas*. Hence, it is called *astikāya*. *Ākāśāstikāya* is of two divisions: *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. *Loka* is that place in which *dharmā*, *adharmā*, *kāla*, *puṅgala* and *jīva* exist. That which is beyond this *lokākāśa* is called *alokākāśa*.² Jainism believes in two varieties of space. One is called *lokākāśa* or that space in which all other substances exist. This variety of space is called 'universe' in our ordinary language. Jainism does not believe in this universal space only but admits space beyond the universe as well. It holds that the universal space is only *lokākāśa*. There is *alokākāśa* as well which is pure space. In this space, no substance of the universe exists; hence, it is called *alokākāśa*. This division is not in *ākāśa* itself but it is due to its relation with the other five substances. Hence, *ākāśa* is a single substance which has indefinite *pradeśas*. When it is relatively divided into *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*—*lokākāśa* has innumerable *pradeśas*, while *alokākāśa* has indefinite *pradeśas*. Having taken innumerable *pradeśas*, i.e., the *pradeśas* of *lokākāśa* from *ākāśa* as a whole, the remaining *pradeśas* of *alokākāśa* are still indefinite.³ Space is self-supported, while the other substances are not so. They are accommodated in it.

¹ Vardhamāna-purāṇa, XVI, 31.

² Dravya-saṅgraha, 19.

³ Compare :—*Pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate.*

ADDHĀSAMAYA (KĀLA)

Kāla (time) is defined by Nemicandra from two stand-points. *Vyavahāra-kāla* (time from ordinary point of view) is that which helps to produce changes in a substance and which is known from modifications produced in it, while *Pāramārthika*, i.e., real *kāla* is understood from continuity.¹ Let us explain it. According to Jainism, *kāla* is viewed from two view-points. Really speaking, *kāla* is nothing but the auxiliary cause of change. This change is understood from continuity. Without continuity we cannot understand change at all. If there is no continuity, what is that which changes? Hence, continuity is the ground of change. From ordinary point of view, *kālā* is understood in hours, minutes, seconds, etc., by which we call a thing to be new or old according to changes produced in the same. These two types of time are technically called '*kāla*' and '*samaya*' respectively. *Kāla* is eternal and devoid of form. *Samaya* has a beginning and an end, and consists of varieties, viz., hour, minute, etc. *Kāla* may be said to be the substantial cause of *Samaya*.

Kāla consists of minute particles which never mix up with one another. The universe is full of these particles of time. No space-unit of the universe is devoid of it. Every space-unit contains time-unit in it. Hence, it is said that the particles of time are indivisible, innumerable, and without form. As it is remarked: 'Those innumerable substances which exist one by one in each *pradeśa* of *lokākāśa*, like heaps of jewels, are points of time.'² Hence, time (*kāla*) is not one substance but innumerable substances. All are eternal and indivisible.

ETHICAL CLASSIFICATION OF TATTVA

Now, we proceed to the ethical classification of '*tattva*' which is not less important than the previous one. We find this latter classification in the canons as well as in later philosophical works. In the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, *tattva* (*padārtha*) is divided into nine categories. In the old philosophical works like the *Samayasāra*, etc., we find the same classification. These nine categories are as follows:

1. *Jīva* (soul), 2. *ajīva* (non-soul), 3. *puṇya* (good karma),
4. *pāpa* (bad karma), 5. *āsrava* (influx of karma), 6. *bandha*

¹ *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 21.

² *ibid.*, 22.

(bondage of karma), 7. *saṁvara* (prevention of the influx of karma), 8. *nirjarā* (partial annihilation of karma), and 9. *mokṣa* (total annihilation of karma).

We have already discussed the nature of *jīva* and *ajīva* and established the fact that the whole universe is nothing but *jīva* and *ajīva*. It is but natural to ask that while the whole Reality is divided into two categories what else remains which makes the latter seven categories necessary. The Jaina thinkers answer this question from an ethical point of view. They say that the whole Reality is divided into *jīva* and *ajīva*, and we do not deny this. The latter seven categories are necessitated by the consideration of the problem of the conception of *mokṣa* (emancipation). The worldly *jīvas* are bound by karma from beginningless time and they tend to liberate themselves from this strong karmic chain. They do not like bondage but try to attain liberation according to the best of their present capacity. Hence, liberation (*mokṣa*) is our goal. When we accept this category as our life-aim, we naturally desire to know the obstacles which stand in our way. How those obstacles originate and how they might be removed? What is the nature of those obstacles? All these questions are answered by the postulation of the latter seven categories. In other words, the latter seven categories are the different conditions and forms of *jīva* and *ajīva*. We have described the nature of *jīva* and *ajīva*. We propose to give, now, a brief account of the nature of the remaining seven categories.

PUNYA

The essential characteristic of a *jīva* is consciousness, purity, and bliss but through the beginningless chain of karmas, bondage is there and the *jīvās* enjoy weal (*puṇya*) or woe (*pāpa*). *Puṇya* is produced by our auspicious *bhāvas* (activities). The auspicious *bhāvas* are said to consist of freedom from delusion, acquirement of right faith and knowledge, practice of reverence, observance of the five vows, etc. The manifestation of *puṇya* consists in *sātāvedanīya* (feeling of pleasure), *śubha-āyus* (auspicious life), *śubha-nāman* (auspicious physique), and *śubha-gotra* (auspicious surroundings).¹

¹ *Sadvedyaśubhāyurnāmagoṭrāṇi puṇyam*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, VIII, 25.

PĀPA

Pāpa is produced by inauspicious *bhāvas*. These *bhāvas* consist of delusion, wrong faith and knowledge, violence, falsity, stealing, indulgence, attachment, anger, pride, deceitfulness, greed, etc. The manifestation of *pāpa* consists in *asātā-vedanīya* (feeling of pain), *aśubha-āyus* (inauspicious life), *aśubha-nāman* (inauspicious body), and *aśubha-gotra* (inauspicious family surroundings).¹

Some writers like Umāsvāti and others have recognised only seven categories.² They did not regard *puṇya* and *pāpa* as separate and distinct categories. These two categories were included in *āsrava* and *bandha*. It has been observed by Umāsvāti that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are nothing but the auspicious and inauspicious influx of karmas.³

ĀSRAVA

Āsrava is divided into 'bhāvāsrava' and 'dravyāsrava'. That modification of soul by which karma gets into it, is to be known as *bhāvāsrava*. *Dravyāsrava* is the karmic matter itself which enters a soul.⁴ In other words, *bhāvāsrava* is nothing but activities, while *dravyāsrava* is a peculiar type of matter. Umāsvāti did not make such an explicit difference between *bhāvāsrava* and *dravyāsrava*. According to his definition, *āsrava* is nothing but the actions of body, speech, and mind.⁵

BANDHA

That conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called *bhāva-bandha*, while the interpenetration of the *pradeśas* of karma and the soul is called *dravya-bandha*. Now, how this *bandha* (bondage) comes into existence? That modification of consciousness consisting of *kaṣayas*, i.e., anger, pride, deceit, and greed by which karmas are tied to the soul is the cause of *bandha*.⁶ In other words, it is attachment and aversion that constitute the fundamental cause of *bandha*.

¹ *Atonyat pāpam. Tattvārtha-sūtra, VIII, 26.*

² *Jivājivāsravabandhasamvaranirjarāmokṣāstattvam. ibid., I, 4.*

³ *śubhah puṇyasya; aśubhah pāpasya. ibid., VI, 3-4.*

⁴ *Dravya-saṅgraha, 29.*

⁵ *Kāyavānmanahkarma yogah; sa āsravah.* Tattvārtha-sūtra, VI, 1-2.

⁶ *ibid. VIII 2-3.*

First of all, therefore, there is an influx of karmic particles through *āsrava*. Then there are some activities of consciousness which are responsible for a peculiar kind of bondage which is called *bhāva-bandha*. After this *bhāva-bandha*, there is a union of the *jīva* with the actual karmas. This union which consists of the interpenetration of the soul and the karmas is known as *dravya-bandha*.

Bandha is of four kinds: according to the *prakṛti* (nature), *sthiti* (duration), *anubhāga* (intensity), and *pradeśa* (mass).¹

The *prakṛti* and *pradeśa* of bondage result from the activities of thought, speech, and body, while the *sthiti* and *anubhāga* result from the conditions of attachment and aversion.²

SAMVĀRA

It is the antagonistic principle of *āsrava*.³ It is also classified into two kinds according to the internal and external nature of it. That modification of consciousness which is the cause of checking *bhāva-āsrava* is known as *bhāva-samvāra* and the other by which *dravya-āsrava* is checked is known as *dravya-samvāra*.

Sometimes it is divided into seven varieties: *vrata* (vow), *samiti* (carefulness), *guṇti* (restraint), *dharma* (observance), *anuprekṣā* (meditation), *pariśahajaya* (victory over troubles), and *cāritra* (conduct). Each of these, again, is divided into various sub-classes.

The above-mentioned classification is from the *Dravya-saṅgraha*. The *Tattvārtha-sūtra* does not mention '*vrata*' as a variety. It mentions '*tapas*' (penance) in place of '*vrata*'.⁴

NIRJARĀ

That modification of soul by which the matter of karma disappears partially is called *bhāva-nirjarā*. The destruction itself is known as *dravya-nirjarā*. Thus, *nirjarā* is the partial destruction of the karmas which are bound with the soul. This type of partial destruction takes place in two ways: In one way the matter of karma disappears in proper time after the fruits of such karma

¹ *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 33.

² *ibid.*

³ *Āsravanivrodhah samvārah*. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, IX, 1.

⁴ *Tapasā nirjarā ca*. *ibid.*, IX, 3.

are enjoyed. In the other way the matter of karma is destroyed through penances before the actual period of enjoyment comes.¹

MOKṢA

That modification of soul which is the cause of the total destruction of karmas is known as *bhāva-mokṣa* and the actual separation of the karmic matter is called *dravya-mokṣa*. After attaining this stage the soul is never bound again. As Umāsvāti says: A person attains *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience) when first his 'mohanīya' karmas and then his *jñānāvaranīya*, *darśanāvaranīya*, and *antarāya* karmas are destroyed. After attaining *kevala-jñāna* the cause producing bondage being absent and *nirjarā* being present, a person becomes free from the remaining karmas, viz., *vedanīya*, *āyus*, *nāman*, and *gotra* karmas in due course and thus, being void of all kinds of karma attains final liberation.²

¹ Tattvārtha-sāra, VII, 2.

² *ibid.*, X, 1-3.

CHAPTER II

NATURE OF SOUL

THE great problem of the existence of soul had troubled almost all the great minds of the world. There have been such philosophers who did not believe in an independent existence of soul like Cārvākas of India and earlier Greek philosophers as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and the like. Pluralistic Greek thinkers like Democritus and others did not regard mind as a separate entity from material atoms. At the time of Lord Mahāvīra such thoughts were not altogether absent. He attempted in a successful manner to prove the independent existence of soul.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL

Lord Mahāvīra in the opening presents the views of those opponents who do not believe in an independent existence of soul. "O Indrabhūti! You have a doubt about the existence of soul (*jīva*), since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar (*ghaṭa*). And so you argue that whatever is imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky."¹

Some one may here argue that though *anus* (atoms) are not within the range of perception, yet, they do exist. So what about them? The answer is that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as *anus*, but when they are so transformed as to perform the function of a jar, etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived.

"The soul is not an object of inference, because inference, too, is preceded by perception and is the outcome of the recollection of the universal concomitance. There has not been previously seen any connection between soul (major term) and its *līnga* (middle term), the recollection of which, along with the sight of its *līnga*, can lead us to a conviction about the existence of soul."²

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1549.

² *ibid.*, 1550-1.

“The soul is not even within the range of scriptural authority, because scripture is not quite distinct from inference. Moreover, the soul is not directly perceptible to any one whose words make up scripture.”¹

There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as scriptural authority and on the basis of that scripture, the existence of soul would have been admitted.

“Furthermore, the scriptural authorities are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, the doubt is justifiable. You, therefore, believe that the existence of soul cannot be established by any of the means of valid cognition.”²

The existence of soul cannot be established even by the means of analogy, because in the entire universe there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul.

Even implication does not help us in proving the existence of soul. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose postulation can prove the independent existence of soul.

Thus, when the existence of soul cannot be proved by any one of the five means of valid cognition, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of negation (*abhāva*), the sixth means of valid cognition whose function is to establish non-existence.

Thus, it is proved that the soul does not exist. This is, in brief, the view of the opponent—the thesis (*pūrva pakṣa*).

Now, Lord Mahāvīra refutes the arguments of the opponent in the following manner :

“O Gautama! the soul is indeed directly cognizable to you also. Your knowledge about it which consists of doubts, etc., is itself the soul. What is proved by your own experience should not be proved by other means of cognition. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery, etc.

Or, the soul is directly experienced owing to the ‘*ahampratyaya*’ (realisation as ‘I’) in ‘I did, I do, and I shall do’ the realisation which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses.

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1552.

² *ibid.*, 1553.

If there is no soul, how do you realise 'aham'? How can there be a doubt whether the soul is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this 'ahampratyaya' justifiable?"¹

This argument for the existence of soul is advanced from the psychological point of view. The various aspects of cognition, viz., memory, recognition, doubt, judgment, etc., are never possible, if there is no soul. All these psychological functions are centred in a conscious and sentient entity which is not material but spiritual. Cognition, feeling, and conation are not possible unless we regard the existence of a spiritual entity or substance as the source of all these phenomena. All the three aspects of our mental life, viz., knowing, feeling, and willing are not scattered phenomena. The process of memory certainly proves the existence of soul. The four stages of memory, viz., retention, recall, recognition, and localisation are systematically connected with one another and the source of this systematic connection is the soul. A purely material brain cannot work in such a systematic and well adjusted manner.

The problem of doubt and doubter is rather ontological. Just like the Sāṅkhya system that proves the separate existence of *puruṣa* on the ground of 'adviṣṭhāna', Lord Mahāvira proved the existence of soul on the ground of doubt. He argued that without a doubter who is beyond all kinds of doubt but still remains in all doubts, no doubt is possible. Doubt presupposes the existence of a doubter as its ground. That ground is a soul, a self, a sentient being, or a conscious principle. "If the object about which one has doubt is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to whether I do exist or I do not exist? Or, Gautama! when you yourself are doubtful about yourself, what can be free from doubt?"²

He further says: "The soul which is the substratum (*guṇin*) of attributes is self-evident owing to its attributes (*guṇas*) being self-evident, as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realising the attributes (*guṇas*) the substratum (*guṇin*), too, is realised."³

Substance cannot exist without qualities and qualities have no place absolutely independent of substance. If the qualities are

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1554-6.

² *ibid.*, 1557.

³ *ibid.*, 1558.

experienced, the experience of the substance is apparent. The qualities of soul such as perception, intuition, etc., are quite evident. These qualities cannot have an absolutely independent existence. Hence, the existence of the soul to which all these qualities belong, is quite obvious.

It may be that the opponent admits that there is a '*gunin*' (substance) which is the substratum of the qualities like knowledge, etc., but he may refuse to believe that this substance is something else than a body. That is to say, he looks upon the body itself as the substance in question, because the qualities are found in the body only. The argument is like this: Knowledge, etc., are the qualities of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, fatness, thinness, etc.

The answer is: The qualities like knowledge, etc., cannot belong to the material body, for the body is '*rūpin*' (having form) as is the case with a pitcher. The qualities of a substance having form must be with form (*rūpin*). Knowledge, etc., are formless. Therefore, the substance possessing these qualities, too, must be formless, and hence, it cannot be the body which is with form. Thus, that substance which is formless is nothing but the soul.

Secondly, sometimes, it is seen that the qualities such as perception, memory, etc., are absent even when the body is present as in sound sleep, death, etc.¹ It indicates that knowledge, etc., are not the qualities of body but they belong to a separate substance, i.e., soul.

Thirdly, the body cannot be the cause of knowledge, because it is composed of material elements (*bhūtas*) which do not possess consciousness. The effect must exist in the cause implicitly. If the material elements do not possess consciousness as one of their qualities, how is it possible that the body becomes conscious? If consciousness is absent in each of the material elements, it will necessarily be absent in the combination also. As oil is absent in each particle of sand, it cannot be produced from the combination also.² Hence, it is illogical to maintain that consciousness is merely a by-product of the peculiar amalgamation of the four *mahābhūtas* (primary elements), although none of them

¹ Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, p. 114.

² Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, 44.

possesses it separately. The intoxicating nature of wine is not absent in those objects by which it is produced. Intoxication is not a mere by-product. It is systematically produced by those objects in which it exists implicitly. The patent nature of intoxication is merely a manifestation of its latent nature. It is not a product which is quite strange. It is not a miracle but an order. Hence, consciousness cannot be ascribed to the body. All the spiritual qualities reside in a separate conscious substance. A thing which is absolutely non-existent cannot come into existence like sky-flower or a horn on the head of a hare. A thing which is existent cannot be absolutely non-existent like the material elements.¹ If consciousness is absolutely non-existent, it can never come into existence. It exists in the soul because the soul is the principle of consciousness.

Fourthly, a person who does not accept the existence of soul, cannot make a negative judgment in the case of an absolutely non-existent object. Even the existence of sky-flower is not absolutely negative, for both sky and flower exist. The conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of sky and flower is non-existent, not the objects themselves. Hence, the negation of soul itself proves the existence of soul. If there is no soul, whose negation is this?

Fifthly, the word *jīva* is synonymous with the word soul. This word '*jīva*' is significant, for it has a derivation ('*vyutpatti*') and it is a singular whole ('*śuddha pada*'). Whatever is a singular whole and has a derivation is here seen to be one having a meaning. Pitcher, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word '*jīva*'. Therefore, it, too, has a meaning. What is not significant and has no meaning, is wanting in derivation, and besides, it is not a singular whole. '*Ḍittha*,' 'sky-flower', etc., are words of this type; for the former has no derivation, whereas the latter is not a singular whole. Such is not the case with the word '*jīva*'. Therefore, it is significant and has a meaning.² This meaning is nothing but the concept of soul. This argument is etymological in nature.

DEFINITION OF SOUL

The defining characteristic of a soul is *jīvatva* which means '*cetanā*'. When we use the word consciousness as the criterion of

¹ Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, 76.

² Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1575.

soul, we only mean 'cetanā' by it. It is the 'cetanā' alone which cannot exist in any substance other than the soul. Hence, the main line of demarcation between *jīva* and *ajīva* is *cetanā*. Existence, origination, decay, permanence, etc., are the general characteristics of all the substances, therefore, when the Jainas define 'jīva' as a substance possessing *cetanā* or consciousness, they do not exclude all these general qualities (*sādhārana dharmas*). These qualities are included in consciousness itself. The definition of a particular substance consists of only those special qualities which are not found in other substances.¹ When a substance is taken as a whole, or in other words, if we want to refer to all its characteristics we analyse its complete nature. That analysis is not a definition. It is proper to call it a description.

Consciousness consists of knowledge and intuition (*jñāna* and *darśana*) as its constituents. In the Tattvārtha-sūtra the definition of soul in the shape of 'upayoga' is very liberal. It includes bliss and power in it. Strictly speaking, a soul is that substance which possesses 'four infinities' (*ananta catuṣṭaya*). These four infinities are infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss, and infinite power. A liberated soul possesses all these infinities. The worldly *jīvas* do not possess them in their perfection, because they are obscured by the veil of four destructive (*ghātin*) karmas, viz., *jñānāvaraṇīya* (covering the faculty of knowledge), *darśanāvaraṇīya* (covering the faculty of intuition), *mohanīya* (covering the faculty of bliss), and *antarāya* (covering the faculty of power). The liberated souls as well as the omniscients are absolutely free from these four kinds of karmas,² hence, they possess the 'four infinities' in all perfection. Thus, the definition of soul consists in the possession of the four infinities.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DARŚANA AND JNĀNA

The difference between intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) consists in this that in the former, the details are not perceived, while in the latter, the details are also known. In the technical language of Jainism, 'darśana' is named as 'nirākāra-

¹ Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, p. 318.

² *Mohakṣayājñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāyākṣayacca kevalam*. Tattvārtha-sūtra, X, 1.

upayoga’, while ‘*jñāna*’ is called ‘*sākāra-upayoga*’. ‘Before we know a thing in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way, without going into its ins and outs. We simply know it as belonging to a class. This is the first stage of knowledge. It may be called detail-less knowledge or indefinite cognition. If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing.’¹ This statement of Herbert Warren is correct to some extent, because ‘to know a thing as belonging to a class’ is the first stage of *jñāna* which arises after *darśana* according to some Jaina thinkers. They say that the cognition of a thing as belonging to a class is ‘*avagraha jñāna*’ (sensation).² According to them, *darśana* is the primitive stage or the first stage of cognition where we are only aware of an object. This simple ‘awareness’ without any reference to a particularity or generality may be named as *darśana*. In this awareness, the knowledge contains only ‘existence’, i.e., ‘*sattāmātra*’. This kind of knowledge originates just after the contact between the subject and the object. This state of cognition is the preceding stage of sensation proper. In other words, according to these thinkers, sensation is divided into two categories or two stages. The first stage where we have only awareness of an object is called *darśana* (sensation of existence). The second stage where we have a sensation of an object as belonging to a class is called *jñāna* (sensation proper).

There are some thinkers who define *darśana* as the cognition of generality. Such thinkers regard *avagraha* (sensation) as a stage of *darśana*.³ The difference between *darśana* and *jñāna*, however, consists in this that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are also known. In other words, *darśana* is indeterminate, while *jñāna* is determinate; *darśana* is *nirākāra* while *jñāna* is *sākāra*.

JNĀNA-UPAYOGA

Jñāna-Upayoga is of two kinds: *svabhāva-jñāna* (natural knowledge) and *vibhāva-jñāna* (non-natural knowledge).⁴ Natural knowledge is perfect and independent of the senses. It is direct

¹ Jainism, p. 29.

² Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 7.

³ Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, II, 21.

⁴ *Nāṇuvaogo dūviho sahāvanāṇaṃ vibhāvanāṇaṃ tti*. Niyama-sāra, 10.

as well as immediate. It is the innate attribute of soul. It is pure and perfect. The Jainas call it *kevala-jñāna*.

Non-natural knowledge is of two kinds: Right knowledge and wrong knowledge. Right knowledge is further divided into four kinds:

1. Sensory knowledge (*mati-jñāna*).
2. Scriptural knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*).
3. Limited direct knowledge (*avadhi-jñāna*).
4. Direct knowledge of mind (*manah-paryāya-jñāna*).

Wrong knowledge is of three kinds:¹

1. Sensory wrong knowledge (*mati-ajñāna*)
2. Scriptural wrong knowledge (*śruta-ajñāna*).
3. Limited direct wrong knowledge (*vibhāṅga-jñāna*).

Knowledge is the innate attribute of soul. It is pure and perfect. But, on account of the operation on the worldly soul of knowledge-obscuring karma in varying degrees, it is manifested to a greater or less extent. When knowledge-obscuring karma is altogether destroyed, the pure and perfect knowledge shines forth. This type of knowledge is called *svabhāva-jñāna*.

As long as the soul is in its worldly condition and is not altogether free from knowledge-obscuring karma, its knowledge is impure and imperfect, and so it is called *vibhāva-jñāna*.

Vibhāva-jñāna is of two kinds: right knowledge and wrong knowledge. The conditions of rightness and wrongness are dependent on our belief. External matter is not responsible for them. The knowledge combined with right belief is called right knowledge. The knowledge combined with wrong belief is wrong knowledge.

Again, right knowledge has been sub-divided into four kinds:

- (1) Sensory knowledge: Knowledge of the self and non-self by means of the senses and mind.
- (2) Scriptural knowledge: Knowledge derived from the reading or hearing of scriptures.
- (3) Limited direct knowledge: Direct knowledge of matter in varying degrees.

¹ *Matiśrutāvadhayo viparyayaśca. Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 32.*

- (4) Direct knowledge of mind: Direct knowledge of another's mental activities.

The first three kinds are wrong as well as right. The fourth one is never wrong. Knowledge, thus, is divided into eight kinds:—

1. Perfect or natural knowledge.
2. Right sensory knowledge.
3. Wrong sensory knowledge.
4. Right scriptural knowledge.
5. Wrong scriptural knowledge.
6. Right limited and direct knowledge.
7. Wrong limited and direct knowledge.
8. Direct knowledge of mind.

DARŚANA-UPAYOGA

Darśana-upayoga is also of two kinds: Natural (*svabhāva-darśana*) and the opposite of it, non-natural (*vibhāva-darśana*). That which is perfect and independent of the senses is called natural.

Non-natural one is said to be of three kinds:

1. Visual intuition (*caḥsurdarśana*)
2. Non-visual intuition (*acāḥsurdarśana*)
3. Limited direct intuition (*avadhi-darśana*)

In visual intuition, the object is visible undefinedly.

In non-visual intuition, the object is undefinedly tangible to the other four senses and to the subtle sense, i.e., mind.

In limited direct intuition, there is direct tangibility of material objects just preceding their knowledge, without the assistance of the senses and mind.

Darśana, thus, is divided into four kinds:

1. Perfect or natural intuition (*kevala-darśana*)
2. Visual intuition (*caḥsurdarśana*)
3. Non-visual intuition (*acāḥsurdarśana*)
4. Limited direct intuition (*avadhi-darśana*)

TEMPORAL RELATION BETWEEN INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE

As regards the temporal relation between intuition and knowledge, there is no unanimity among the Jaina philosophers. The Canonical conception of the above-mentioned problem is that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. Even two

perfect conscious activities, viz., perfect intuition and perfect knowledge are not an exception. This fact is recorded in the Āvaśyaka-niryukti as 'the omniscient cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously'.¹ Therefore, as regards the Canonical conception, it is free from doubt that intuition and knowledge—whether it is sensory or extra-sensory—cannot occur simultaneously. Regarding the occurrence of intuition and knowledge in imperfect personalities, all the thinkers are unanimous, inasmuch as all of them admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of intuition and knowledge. But with respect to the case of perfect personalities, there is a great controversy among them. The opinions of these thinkers can be classified into three varieties. Some of them hold that the intuition and knowledge (both extrasensory) of an omniscient person occur simultaneously, some stick to the Canonical conception and regard them as successive and not operating at the same time, while others assert that they are mutually identical. Let us deal with all the three.

SIMULTANEITY OF INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE

It has been observed by Umāsvāti that the conscious activities (*upayoga*) manifesting themselves as sensory cognition, scriptural cognition, limited direct cognition, and direct cognition of mind (*mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, and *manahparyāya*) occur successively, and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient, possessing perfect knowledge and intuition which comprehend all objects and are independent and pure, occur simultaneously at every moment.² Umāsvāti, thus, upholds the view of simultaneous occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the case of an omniscient being. Kundakunda also holds the same opinion. It is stated by him that the knowledge and intuition of an omniscient person operate at the same time even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.³ Pūjyapāda is also of the same opinion. According to him, knowledge and intuition occur in succession in the imperfect who is under the influence of obstructive karma, while in the perfect who is completely free from the veil

¹ *sarvaśsa kevalissa jugavaṃ do natthi uvaogā.* —Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 973.

² *Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, 31.

³ *Niyama-sāra*, 159.

of obscuring karma, they occur simultaneously.¹ Akalaṅka also supports the same view. He says: 'If the knowledge and intuition of the omniscient were to occur in succession, his perfection would be conditional and accidental. To the omniscient who has destroyed all the relevant karmic veils, the universal and the particular reveal themselves simultaneously.'² The same position is possessed by Vidyānandī who holds that the awareness of the generic form is intuition, and the comprehension of the specific characters is knowledge. The knowledge-obscuring karma and the intuition-obscuring karma obstruct these faculties. Because of the presence of these two, people like us are not in a position to possess intuition and knowledge in all perfection. There is no reason why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession and not simultaneously when the two types of karma are destroyed simultaneously due to a particular kind of purification of the self.³

SUCCESSIVE OCCURRENCE OF INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE

Now, we proceed to the problem of the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient. Jinabhadra is a great advocate of this view. He has very elaborately dealt with the problem in his *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* and *Viśeṣaṇa-vaṭī*. He has mentioned all the three positions and advanced arguments for and against all of them. His own opinion is in favour of the successive occurrence, since he sincerely recognises the validity of the scriptural texts. He argues that if perfect intuition and perfect knowledge are identical and not separate, what is the sense in recognising two separate veils of karma, viz., intuition-obscuring karma and knowledge-obscuring karma? Moreover, the scriptural conception of five types of knowledge and four types of intuition is condemned by those who are not prepared to accept the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge.⁴ The view of the simultaneous occurrence of intuition and knowledge is also invalid, since two conscious activities

¹ Sarvārtha-siddhi, II, 9.

² Aṣṭaśatī on Āptamīmāṃsā, 101.

³ Aṣṭasahasrī on Āpta-mimāṃsā, 101.

⁴ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 3093.

cannot occur at the same instant.¹ Now, the opponent may argue that the simultaneous occurrence of the two in the imperfect is not possible, since he is under the influence of the veil of obstructive karma and thus, not completely free from it; but in the case of the perfect who is completely free from obstructive karma, it is not an impossibility. This argument, according to Jinabhadra, is also futile. The faculty of the self is qualitatively the same whether it is partially free or completely free.² The cognition of the self is of the same type whether it is imperfect or perfect. The only difference between the two is that perfect cognition comprehends all the objects with all their modes, whereas imperfect knowledge does not claim to comprehend all of them. Thus, Jinabhadra supports the alternative occurrence of intuition and knowledge of the omniscient on the basis of scripture.

INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE AS IDENTICAL

Now, we come to Siddhasena who did not recognise the intuition and knowledge of an omniscient being as two separate faculties. According to his logical mind, both these faculties are identical as regards the case of the omniscient. He observes: 'We can distinguish between knowledge and intuition up to direct cognition of mind (*Manahparyāya*). In omniscience, however, knowledge and intuition are identical'.³ He elaborates the remark in a systematic and logical way. When perfect knowledge dawns just after the complete destruction of the relevant karma, perfect intuition also must dawn immediately after the complete destruction of the veil of the relevant karma. And as it is unanimously admitted that both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that both perfect intuition and perfect knowledge also occur at the same time.⁴ As it is maintained that there is no sensory cognition, i.e., the senses do not serve any purpose as regards the cognition of the omniscient who has completely destroyed the karmic veil that obscures

1 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 3096.

2 *ibid.*, 314-5.

3 *Maṇapajjavanāṇanto nāṇassa ya darisaṇassa ya viśeso.*
Kevalaṇāṇaṁ puṇa daṁsaṇaṁ ti nāṇaṁ ti ya samāṇaṁ.
— *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, II, 3.

4 *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, II, 5.

cognition, so also it should be admitted that there is no separate faculty of intuition in one who has completely destroyed the relevant karmic veil.¹ The contention that knowledge is determinate and distinct, whereas intuition is indeterminate and indistinct is true only in the case of an imperfect person. As regards a person who has destroyed all the relevant karmic obstructions, such distinction has no meaning. In his case, there is no distinction between determinate knowledge and indeterminate knowledge.² The difference of distinct and indistinct, determinate and indeterminate, is true only in the case of the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not with regard to the knowledge of perfect ones. He further argues: If it is admitted that the omniscient intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited, the conception of all perfection would be ridiculous.³ According to the view of the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient, a perfect person knows a fact that was not comprehended before, and intuits a feature of an object which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience? Furthermore, in the scriptures, omniscience has been described to have beginning but no end.⁴ Those who have any regard for the commandments of scripture must realise the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect intuition, knowledge is not possible, and at the moment of perfect knowledge, intuition is an impossibility, it would mean to admit the break of continuity of both of them, but this is absurd, since it goes against the scriptures that prescribe non-break.⁵ If the destruction of intuition-obscuring karma and knowledge-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect intuition and perfect knowledge, should spring forth first? Naturally, the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both,

¹ Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, II, 6.

² *ibid.*, II, 11.

³ *ibid.*, II, 13.

⁴ Prajñāpanā-sūtra, XVIII, 10.

⁵ Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, II, 7-8.

for two conscious activities never synchronise.¹ If the removal of the obstruction of both intuition and knowledge takes place at one and the same moment, does the question at all arise as to which of the two arises first?

NATURE OF WORLDLY SOUL

Vālideva describes the nature of the (worldly) soul in the following manner :

The soul which is proved by direct experience (*pratyakṣa*) etc., is the knower (*pramātā*). It is essentially conscious, changing, agent, direct enjoyer, equal in extent to its own body, different in each body, and the possessor of material karmas.²

All these characteristics serve specific purposes. He intends to refute all those schools that do not agree with his conception of soul.

The first characteristic of the soul that it is proved by direct experience is meant to refute the view of the Cārvāka that does not regard soul as a separate substance. The arguments for the separate existence of soul have already been given.

CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE ESSENCE OF SOUL

The second characteristic that it is essentially conscious, is meant for refuting the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which regards consciousness as an accidental quality of soul. *Caitanya* (consciousness) which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of *ātman* (soul) is treated by the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas as an adventitious (*auṣpādhika*) quality³ which comes temporarily into the soul as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition. *Caitanya* or *jñāna* is, thus, something different from *ātman* (soul). This view is refuted in the following way :

If *jñāna* is supposed to be absolutely distinct from *ātman*, the *jñāna* of Mr. Caitra is in the same position with respect to his *ātman* as the *jñāna* of Mr. Maitra, that is to say, both the *jñānas*

¹ Saṅgati-tarka-prakarāṇa, II, 9.

² *Pramātā pratyakṣādiprasiddha ātmā.*

Caitanyasvarūpaḥ parināmī karttā sākṣādbhoktā svadehāparimāṇaḥ pratikṣetraṁ bhinnah paudgalikādṛṣṭavamaṅcāyam. — Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, VII, 55-6.

³ 'Caitanyamaupādhikamātmanonyat'

—Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā, 8

would be equally strangers to the *ātman* of Mr. Caitra, and there is no reason why his *jñāna* should serve him better than the *jñāna* of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own *jñāna*, all *jñānas* being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the other side: *Jñāna* is absolutely distinct from *ātman*, but it is connected with *ātman* by *samavāya-sambandha* (inherent relationship) and hence, the *jñāna* of Mr. Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the *jñāna* of Mr. Maitra; for the former is connected with him by *samavāya* relation, while the latter is not so. But this explanation can be easily refuted. According to the Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* is one, eternal, and all-pervasive,¹ and therefore, it is impossible that the *jñāna* should reside in Caitra and not in Maitra; and since the souls are also all-pervasive according to this school, the *jñāna* which takes place in one *ātman* takes place in all the *ātman*s as well and any knowledge which Caitra has acquired will belong to Maitra also.

Granted that it is possible for *jñāna* to be connected with *ātman* by *samavāya* relation. But a question still remains to be answered: By what relation is the *samavāya* connected with *jñāna* and *ātman*? If the answer is that it is connected by another *samavāya*, that would mean an unending series of *samavāyas* and it will lead to an infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself,' why should not *jñāna* and *ātman* be connected of themselves without requiring a *samavāya* relation to accomplish the connection?

The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas advance another argument that the distinction between *ātman* and *jñāna* is essential owing to their being related as *kartr* (agent) and *karana* (instrument), *ātman* being the *kartr* and *jñāna* the *karana*. The Jaina thinkers hold that the position of *jñāna* is different from that of an ordinary *karana* such as a scythe (*dātra*). *Jñāna* is an internal *karana*, while the scythe is an external *karana*.² Now, if an internal *karana* as *jñāna* could be shown to be absolutely distinct like scythe from *kartr* (*ātman*), the argument of absolute distinction between *jñāna* and *ātman* would stand valid, but not

¹ *Samavāyasyaikatvānnityatvādvayāpakatvācca.*

² *Syādvāda-mañjarī*, p. 42.

otherwise. We say: "Devadatta sees with the eyes and lamp."¹ Here 'eye' and 'lamp' are both *karāṇas*, but on that account the two are not in the same position of absolute distinction with respect to Devadatta. Hence, *jñāna* is not absolutely distinct from *ātman* as an ordinary *karāṇa*. It is identical with the soul, having different types of modifications (*paryāyas*).

Now, the opponent asks that if *jñāna* and *ātman* are one, how is their relation of *kartṛ* and *karāṇa* to be accounted for? The answer is given by the analogy of a serpent who makes a coil of his body by his own body.² It may be said that the conception of *kartṛ* and *karāṇa* in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary. How can it be said to be imaginary, when we actually see the effect, viz., the coil, which is a new state of rest different from the former state of motion? No amount of imagination could make us believe that a pillar was going to wind itself into a coil.

Next, consider the word *caitanya*. It is the abstract noun from *cetana* which means *ātman*. Thus, *caitanya* means the *bhāva*, *svarūpa*, or nature of *ātman*. Now, how can the *bhāva* (nature) of a thing be absolutely distinct from the thing?

The opponent again argues that *ātman* is no doubt *cetanā* but that is not without a cause, but is owing to *cetanā* coming to reside by *samavāya* relation in *ātman* as is shown by actual experience (*pratīti*). The counter argument is in the following manner: If you are prepared to accept the evidence of *pratīti*, you must admit that *ātman* is by nature *upayogātmaka*, i.e., of the nature of consciousness. Nobody is aware of being first *acetana*, and afterwards becoming *cetana* in consequence of the connection with *cetanā*, or of *cetanā* coming to reside by *samavāya* relation in him who was at first *acetana*. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower (*jñātā*).

It may be further held that the consciousness '*jñānavānaham*' (I have knowledge) would prove a distinction between *jñāna* (knowledge) and *aham* (self), for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that which possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses the consciousness '*jñānavānaham*' in the theory of the opponent? Not the soul, because it is

¹ *Dīpena cakṣusā Devadattah paśyati.*

² *Sarpa ātmānamātmanā veṣṭayati.* — Syādvāda-mañjarī, p. 43.

supposed to be *jaḍa*, i.e., essentially devoid of *jñāna* in itself like a pitcher (*ghaṭa*). By this theory, it cannot be asserted that *ātman* is *jaḍa*, and yet is able to become conscious. Hence, that substance which has the consciousness as '*jñānavānaham*' cannot in itself be *jaḍa* by nature. Therefore, *ātman* is not in itself *jaḍa* by nature which afterwards comes to possess *jñāna* by *samavāya* relation, but it is essentially conscious.

SOUL AS A CHANGING ENTITY

The soul is said to be changing. This characteristic is meant for refuting the theory of the Sāṅkhya and other systems that regard soul as an absolutely permanent entity. They do not admit it as changing. According to the Sāṅkhya system, *puruṣa* (soul) is devoid of form, conscious, enjoyer, permanent, omnipresent, static, inactive, devoid of three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*), and subtle. Now, if *puruṣa* is permanent, i.e., *a-pariṇāmī*, he is above modifications of any sort; he is not liable to undergo bondage; for the same reason, he is devoid of action (*kriyā*) and cannot transmigrate from one life to another. Hence, there is no occasion for *mokṣa* (liberation) in his case. 'Therefore, *puruṣa* is neither bound nor liberated. He does not transmigrate. It is the *prakṛti* (primordial matter) that is bound, liberated, and reborn.'¹ The Jaina asks: If *prakṛti* is bound and liberated, what is that which binds it? If *prakṛti* itself is bound and liberated, there will be no difference between bondage and liberation, because *prakṛti* is always present. Hence, no question of bondage and liberation will arise in this case. If the response of *puruṣa* is necessary to influence *prakṛti*, the response is not possible without *pariṇāma*, i.e., modification or change of *puruṣa*. The mere presence of *prakṛti* could bring about no change in *puruṣa* unless *puruṣa* was capable of action. According to the Sāṅkhya system, it is *prakṛti* which is said to be subject to pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*). *Puruṣa* is reflected in *buddhi* (intellect) which is a factor in the evolution of *prakṛti*. It is the effect of this reflection which is responsible for regarding *puruṣa* to be subject to pleasure and pain. This theory of the Sāṅkhya school also proves *pariṇāma* in *puruṣa*. Without *puruṣa* separating from his original character, he could not be said to be subject to pleasure

¹ Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 62.

and pain. And the moment it is admitted that the original character is lost and a new one acquired, the operation of losing one and acquiring the other is a *kriyā* which makes *ṣuruṣa* a *karṭṛ* (agent) which is contrary to the Sāṅkhya tenets. When it is proved that *ṣuruṣa* is active, i.e., he loses one character and acquires another one, it goes without saying that *ṣuruṣa* is *ṣarīṇāmin*, i.e., active and changing, and not inactive and absolutely permanent.

Moreover, if pleasure and pain of which we are all undeniably conscious as belonging to ourselves, i.e., to our *ātman*, do not belong to *ātman*, they will have to hang in the air, since *buddhi* is incompetent to possess them, it being held to be *jaḍa* (unconscious). Hence, *ātman* is active and changing having consciousness as its essence.

SOUL AS AGENT

The Sāṅkhya school does not regard *ātman* or *ṣuruṣa* as agent, active entity. *Puruṣa*, according to this school, is merely a silent and passive spectator. This view has been already refuted. Pleasure and pain cannot belong to an unconscious entity. *Puruṣa* is subject to pleasure and pain because consciousness belongs to *ṣuruṣa* only. When it is proved that pleasure and pain belong to *ṣuruṣa*, it is obvious that *ṣuruṣa* is active, because an inactive entity cannot be subject to pleasure and pain. Moreover, consciousness itself is active because the term consciousness implies knowledge or intelligence which is active in character.

SOUL AS ENJOYER

The fifth characteristic of soul is its direct enjoyment. The Sāṅkhyas maintain that *ṣuruṣa* is enjoyer in an indirect manner, i.e., through *buddhi*. The Jainas say that material *buddhi* cannot enjoy anything. *Puruṣa* is the *karṭṛ* and *bhokṭṛ* (agent and enjoyer) directly and not through *buddhi*. Enjoyment is the function of a conscious substance. *Puruṣa* is conscious, hence, enjoyment belongs to *ṣuruṣa* and not to *buddhi* which is unconscious. Moreover, *ṣuruṣa* cannot be reflected in *buddhi* because *ṣuruṣa* is immaterial, while *buddhi* is material, and it is evident that an immaterial substance can never be reflected in a material substance. Hence, the soul is the direct enjoyer of all actions performed by it.

SOUL AS EQUAL IN EXTENT TO ITS BODY

The soul is said to be equal in extent to its own body. This characteristic has been given to refute the view of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and the like who hold that a soul is omnipresent like ether. They believe in the existence of many souls but do not admit that they are equal in extent to their own bodies. They say that all the souls are all-pervasive, i.e., present everywhere. To admit a soul to be equal in extent to its own body is a unique conception of the Jaina. The doctrine which advocates the *vibhūṭva* of *ātman* (a soul is everywhere) is a doctrine which on the face of it, says the Jaina, is contrary to our experience. A thing must be where its quality is found, e.g., a pitcher exists where its form exists and not elsewhere.¹ It may be argued: Do we not smell from a distance? The answer is: 'No.' The particles which possess the smell fly to our nose and then we smell. But it may be asked: Does magic not work at a distance? The reply comes: 'No.' The presiding deity of the magical formula or practice who resides elsewhere is working there. This view of soul as equal in extent to its own body may be justified by means of the following syllogism: A soul is not all-pervasive, because its qualities are not found everywhere; that thing whose qualities are not found everywhere is not all pervasive like a pitcher; the soul also is such; therefore, it is not all-pervasive. The heterogeneous example is ether which is all-pervasive because its qualities are found everywhere. The point is this that the measure of a soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies, for its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it. As an alternative argument it may be said: That is non-existent there where it cannot be realised by any one of the means of knowledge. For example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it. The soul is not realised outside the body. Consequently, it should be taken to be non-existent there.²

¹ *Yatraiva yo dṛṣṭagūṇaḥ sa tatra kumbhādivanniṣprati...* Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā. 9.

² Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1586.

To refute this conclusion of the Jaina, the Naiyāyika urges in the course of his answer that the *adr̥ṣṭa* (karma) of our *ātman* is supposed to act even at a distance and it cannot be there hanging in the air without an underlying substratum ; consequently, our *ātman* must be supposed to be existing even there. Since *adr̥ṣṭa* works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., *ātman* must also exist everywhere.

The Jaina gives a counter argument. He denies that *adr̥ṣṭa* is acting there and everywhere. Things, according to him, have their own nature—a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation—and that nature is not caused by *adr̥ṣṭa*. Fire burns because it has got the nature of burning. We cannot say that fire burns, because *adr̥ṣṭa* is there. It burns of itself.

Secondly, to say that the natures of the things are determined by *adr̥ṣṭa* is to leave no room for God.

Thirdly, since they hold that *ātman*s are many, if each of them is *vibhu* (all-pervasive) also, as they believe, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of *ātman*s would ensue? Moreover, each of them would enter the *ātman* of God Himself, and each would thereby become a creator ; for they believe that God is the creator of this universe.

It may be further urged : Unless an *ātman* was *vibhu*, how could it draw to itself the particles of the body in which it has to dwell in the next life? The Jainas reply that it is not necessary for the *ātman* to be *vibhu* for drawing the particles of the body, because if it is so, our body will be equal in extent to the whole universe, for our *ātman* is all-pervasive. If we accept this argument that to draw the particles of the body, the soul must be all-pervasive, our body would be of a horribly vast size, because our soul will draw to itself all the particles of the universe.

The Naiyāyika gives a further argument : If we believe that the soul is body-sized, as a consequence, it will be *sāvayava*, i.e., having parts and therefore a *kārya* (product), just like the body itself. The Jaina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence. More accurately he says that *ātman* has *pradeśas*, though not *avayavas* in an ordinary sense. He believes that *ātman* is *sāvayava*, is *parināmin*, and does change from time to time, for it is a substance having the qualities of origination, decay, and permanence. He does not believe in the absolute changelessness

of *ātman*, or for the matter of that, in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever. He further points out that for some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the *ātman* in them. After that, they rejoin the *ātman* of the body from which they are cut. The particles which are cut retain their connection with the soul as the threads of a lotus-stick remain united even when the stick is cut into two.

It should be noted that Jainism is the only school of Indian philosophy that holds that *ātman* is body-sized. The only other school which holds an analogous, though not the same doctrine, is the school of Rāmānuja, according to which, the *jñāna* of *ātman*, though not the *ātman* itself, undergoes contraction and expansion.

VARIETIES OF SOULS

Jainism believes that each body possesses a different soul, and hence, there are many souls. It is also held that one body can be occupied by more than one soul but one soul cannot occupy more than one body.

Here a Vedāntin may say that many varieties of the soul are unwarranted, for the soul is everywhere the same. Like the sky, it is all-pervasive. On account of illusion, we think that there are different souls in different bodies. Really speaking, it is one.

This view is refuted as follows: As regards the sky, it is all right to hold that it is only one, for the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal bodies, is seen to be uniform—free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform, for it differs from body to body (*pinḍa* to *pinḍa*). Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes the difference in those having the characteristics. Hence, the soul is not one in number.¹

Here is the illustration: The living beings in this world differ from one another, for there is a difference in their characteristics. As a parallel example, we may mention water pots, etc. Whatever is not different from another object does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same. Moreover, if there were only one soul, then there would be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage, and emancipation.

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 158r.

But they do exist. Therefore, all the souls are different and their number is not one but many.¹

How do the characteristics differ in each body? The soul has *upayoga* as its characteristic. This *upayoga* has indefinite varieties, for it differs from body to body, some having the *utkarṣa*, i.e., the maximum *upayoga*, some having the *apakarṣa*, i.e., the minimum *upayoga*, and some having *upayoga* between these two extremes. Therefore, souls are of indefinite kinds owing to the unlimited varieties of *upayoga*.²

Furthermore, if the number of soul is only one and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker, and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer, etc. This fact is corroborated by the example of the sky.

Thus, owing to oneness there is no possibility for happiness, misery, bondage, liberation, enjoyment, thinking, etc. So it follows that there are many souls and not only one and these souls are equal in extent to their own bodies which they happen to occupy at a particular time.

SOUL AS THE POSSESSOR OF MATERIAL KARMA

The soul has been said to be the possessor of material karmas. This characteristic is meant to refute a two-fold belief. First it attacks those philosophers who do not regard karma or *adrṣṭa* as a valid existence. The Cārvākas of Indian thought fall into this category. Secondly, the adjective 'material' is directed against those thinkers who do not regard karma or *adrṣṭa* as material. They are the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, etc.

Lord Mahāvīra says: "O long-lived Agnibhūti!. You entertain a doubt about the existence of karma, which is a multitude of *paramāṇus* (atoms), for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge). You argue that karma is not directly perceived, because it is super-sensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of a hare. Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother Indrabhūti in the case of soul.

But these lines of argument are faulty. This karma is certainly *pratyakṣa* to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1582.

² ibid., 1583.

be realised by you by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no *pramāṇa* can establish its existence. The karma is either good or bad. The good karma makes us experience happiness, whereas the bad karma misery."¹

There is a *kāraṇa* (cause) for experiencing happiness and misery, since it is a *kārya* (effect) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the karma is not *pratyakṣa* to everybody, it should not exist. There is no such rule that what is *pratyakṣa* to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion is not *pratyakṣa* to all beings. But on that account, it is not true to say that a lion does not exist. Therefore, the karma does exist, since it is directly perceived by an omniscient being.

Moreover, the karma is *pratyakṣa* to the doubter, too, since he realises its *kārya*, as is the case with material atoms, which though not directly realisable, are *pratyakṣa*, since their *kāryas* (effects) like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived.

This point of cause and effect is further explained. Just as a sprout which is a *kārya*, has a seed for it, so happiness and misery, which are well known to every individual, have a cause, because they are *kāryas*. And this cause is nothing but karma and so it exists. A question may be raised: A garland, sandal paste, a woman, and the like are the causes of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these causes of happiness and misery are seen—are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe karma to be their cause—the karma which is not seen? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justifiable.

This question is out of place owing to *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. It is the same case with those who have the same or similar means to suffer misery. This difference in each case, cannot be without a cause which is not seen. This very unseen cause is karma.

Furthermore, just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in childhood, so is the body in childhood preceded by another body. The body which is prior to that in childhood is karma.²

¹ *Vṛtti* on Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1611.

² Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1614.

The opponent asks: If on the ground that we can see the body, etc., which are the effects, the karma is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karma also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form. The Jaina thinkers reply: Karma has indeed a physical form.

The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karma has a physical form :

1. Karma has a physical form because of the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. That has a physical form in association with which pleasure, etc., are experienced, just as the food one eats. There is no experience of pleasure, etc., in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether.

2. That in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with fire, there is the rise of a burning sensation. So, pain occurs when one is in association with karma. Therefore it has a form.

3. There is an addition of our strength by means of external objects. Only a physical strength can have an addition by means of the physical substance, just as a pot gets strength by means of oil, etc. Such is the case with our strength which is karmic (product of karma) and on account of its being karmic, it can have an addition by means of external objects.

4. Karma has a physical form because it undergoes change in a way different from soul. The *pariṇāmitva* (change) of karma is inferred from the *pariṇāmitva* of its *kāryas* (effects) like body, etc. If the effect is mutable, the mutability of its cause is automatically recognised, just as the mutability of milk is recognised from the *pariṇāma* of its *kārya* (curd) in the form of butter-milk (*takra*).

Now, if we agree that karma is *mūrta*, how could the *mūrta* karma be connected with the *amūrta jīva* (formless soul); either by means of the *samavāya* (inherent relationship) or by the *saṃyoga* (combination)? As a *mūrta ghaṭa* (pot) is connected with the *amūrta ākāśa* (ether) by means of the *saṃyoga* and an object like finger is connected with *kriyā* (action) like contraction

by means of the *samavāya*, so here also karma is connected with *jīva*.

How could the *amūrta* soul be favourably or adversely affected by the *mūrta* karma? The answer is: It can be affected in the way as *viññāna*, etc., are affected by a drink of wine, medicine, etc.

Or, the mudane soul is not absolutely *amūrta*, because it has assumed an alteration in the continuous chain of karma, which has no beginning. Now, since karma is *mūrta* and *ātman* is similar to karma to a certain extent, *ātman* is also *mūrta* to a certain extent even though it is *amūrta* by its *svabhāva*. Consequently, the soul can be affected by the *mūrta* karma.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTION OF MATTER

'DOES matter exist?' It is a very complicated problem in the sphere of philosophy. The idealists maintain that the universe is a spiritual reality. Matter does not enjoy any separate existence independent of spirit or thought. The realists do not agree with this view. They explicitly say that the material reality is absolutely independent of the spiritual reality. It does not depend upon thought for its existence. It is as real as thought itself.

REALITY OF MATTER

Jainism, being a school of realism, certainly believes in an independent and separate existence of matter. When the idealist perceives various effects of material elements, he entertains a doubt whether material elements (*bhūtas*) exist or not. The Jaina thinkers maintain that the doubt about a non-existent object is totally unjustifiable as in the case of sky-flower and hare-horn where non-existence is certain. The point is that our doubt is justifiable in the case of existent objects only. We entertain no doubt in regard to an absolutely non-existent object. The doubt is only possible in the case of existent objects like tree and man (*sthānu* and *puruṣa*). If we raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, we will have to raise a doubt in the case of sky-flower and hare-horn also.

To establish the existence of self, we say that 'I think therefore I am' or 'I doubt therefore I exist.' Similarly, what is the harm if we say that 'I doubt about the existence of external objects therefore they do exist' or 'all things which are distinctly perceived are true.' As Descartes, the father of modern (Western) philosophy says: 'I think therefore I am'—'*cogito ergo sum*.' In the same way, 'I perceive all things clearly and distinctly therefore they are true.'

To support the belief that doubt springs up even in absolute non-existence, the opponent may advance an argument like this: Just as in a dream, a poor fellow raises a doubt and questions

whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house, though in fact, nothing like them exists there; so also, at other places, doubt can be raised in spite of the absolute non-existence of objects.

This argument of the opponent is totally baseless. In dreams, doubt arises on account of various reasons. As for example, when an object is seen or experienced formerly, the remembrance of that experience gives rise to doubt. Similarly, it is some past experience which brings a dream into existence and on the basis of that previous experience, we reject the dream. Thus, doubt arises from an existent object and not from absolute negation. If such were not the case, the doubt should also have to arise from objects like the sixth element (*ṣaṣṭha bhūta*), etc., which has never been existent so far.

The causes that bring dreams into existence are as follows¹ :-

1. *Previous experience*—Certain acts like bathing, taking food, etc., that have once been experienced are perceived again in dreams due to some reason.
2. *Observation*—When objects like elephants, horses, etc., are perceived in a dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the observed objects.
3. *Attentive consideration*—A dream representing acquisition of a beloved, etc., is called the dream of the object which is attentively considered.
4. *Hearing*—When places like heaven and hell which are only heard of, and not seen, are perceived in a dream.
5. *Disturbance of health*—Ill health caused by physical disorders is also one of the causes of dreams.
6. *Deity*—When one beholds a deity adverse or favourable in a dream, the dream can be called deity-caused.
7. *Watery place*—This is also one of the causes when one dreams in the midst of a watery region.
8. *Meritorious act*—A dream is said to be good according to the auspicious actions that may be its cause.
9. *Sinful act*—A dream is called bad according to the inauspicious actions that may be its cause.

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1703.

According to the neurological theory, a dream is a partial awakening. It is the activity of disconnected cells or neurograms that have remained in a state of relative irritability or readiness to respond. Delage, a French writer on dreams, has summed up his psychological theory of dreams in the statement that the dream is a perseveration of the unadjusted. This means that the dream is the working out of a problem which was unsolved during the working period. According to the psycho-neurological theory of Morton, a dream is an apperceptive trial and error process. This means that a dream is a series of attempts to perceive and interpret a stimulus. These attempts are unsuccessful or only partly successful. The theory advanced by Sigmund Freud may be summed up briefly in the statement that a dream is a symbolical fulfilment of repressed infantile sex-wishes. Freud distinguished between the manifest and latent content of dream, and pointed out that the manifest content is symbolical to the latent sexual wishes. These sexual wishes are really of a childish or undeveloped nature. Thus, according to the Freudian theory, a dream is an expression of unsatisfied needs. The theory that a dream represents a mental conflict has been suggested by Rivers and others. According to Adler, present problems are responsible for dreams. Jung is of the opinion that we experience our past events in dream. According to him, dreams are a sort of memory.

All these psychological theories as well as the views expressed by the Jaina thinkers establish firmly that dream is not non-existent. Its contents are past experiences and the like. Thus, when dream itself is existent, how can the opponent hold the physical world to be non-existent like dream? Hence, the existence of material objects cannot be unreal. Therefore, matter does exist.

MEANING OF 'PUDGALA'

The Jaina writers have used the term '*pudgala*' exactly in the sense of matter. '*Pudgala*' is one of the six substances recognised by Jainism. The term '*pudgala*' has been used in the sense of soul by the Buddhist writers. How does the Jaina explain the word '*pudgala*'? The word '*pudgala*' has two parts: '*pud*' and '*gala*.' The first part '*pud*' means 'to combine' and the second part '*gala*' means 'to dissociate.' Hence, the etymological

meaning of the word '*puḍgala*' is: that substance which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociations. This definition of '*puḍgala*' is very significant. It is '*puḍgala*' alone that undergoes modification by combination and dissociation. This process of combination and dissociation does not occur in substances other than '*puḍgala*.' One form of matter is changed into another by combinations and dissociations of material constituents. The selection of the word '*puḍgala*' is full of deep meaning. It is worthy of note that the use of this word in the sense of matter is quite peculiar to Jainism.

DEFINITION OF MATTER

Matter has four chief characteristics associated with it, viz., touch, taste, smell, and colour.¹ Each and every element of matter possesses these four characteristics.

Touch—Eight kinds of touch have been described in the Jaina works. They are named as soft (*mṛdu*), hard (*kaṭhina*), heavy (*guru*), light (*laghu*), cold (*śīta*), hot (*uṣṇa*), smooth (*snigdha*), and rough (*rūkṣa*).² Modern psychology recognises only four principal kinds of touch, viz., cold, hot, painful, and general.

Taste—It is of five kinds: bitter (*tikta*), sour (*kaṭuka*), acidic (*āmla*), sweet (*mādhur*), and astringent (*kaṣāya*).

Smell—Smell is of two kinds: good smell and bad smell (*surbhigandha* and *asurbhigandha*).

Colour—Five kinds of colour are described: blue (*nīla*), yellow (*pīta*), white (*śūkla*), black (*kṛṣṇa*), and red (*lohita*).³

Thus, the four characteristics are divided into twenty categories. (8 kinds of touch plus 5 kinds of taste plus 2 kinds of smell plus 5 kinds of colour=20 kinds). That is why it is mentioned in the Vyākhyā-prajñapti-śataka that '*puḍgala*' is characterised by five kinds of colour, five kinds of taste, two kinds of smell, and eight kinds of touch.⁴

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 23.

² Tattvārtha-rājavārtika, V, 23, 7.

³ *ibid.*, V, 23, 8-10.

⁴ Vyākhyā-prajñapti-śataka, XII, 5, 450.

It is further maintained that the foregoing twenty are the principal divisions. In fact each of these can be further subdivided into numerable, innumerable, and indefinite ways.¹

PARTS OF MATTER

Matter consists of numerable, innumerable, and indefinite parts according to its different combinations.² The scientific division of matter is like this :—

1. Concrete matter. 2. Invisible matter. The concrete form is called Matter and the invisible form is known as Energy. Matter is further divided into solids, liquids, and gases. All the three forms of matter consist of molecules and atoms (*skandhas* and *skandha deśas*.) Atoms are again an assemblage of indivisible elementary particles as protons, electrons, and their combinations.

The Jaina thinkers also regard matter to be of two kinds : concrete or perceptible *skandhas* (molecules) and imperceptible or subtle *anūs* (atoms.) When we say that atoms (*anus*) are imperceptible, we only mean that they are imperceptible explicitly. The contact or relation between our sense-organs and atoms is present but on account of the lack of capability of the sense-organs or nerves to send the message to the brain in an explicit form, we are unable to perceive them distinctly. In other words, there is a sensation of atoms but we are not aware of it, i.e., we have no perception of atoms.

Matter is said to consist of numerable (*sañkheya*), innumerable (*asañkheya*), and indefinite (*ananta*) parts (*pradeśas*.) This statement seems to be contradictory, since the number of the universal spatial units (*lokākāśa-pradeśas*) is only innumerable, whereas the material units may be indefinite. How can an indefinite number of material particles be accommodated in innumerable particles of the universal space ? This question would have been quite valid if all the indefinite particles of matter were in a free state. But they are not so. Even an ordinary person has the experience that a tiny piece of fuel on combustion gives

¹ Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 23.

² Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 10.

rise to an enormous volume of smoke-particles. A scientist knows that a quantity of water when converted into steam occupies a volume about 1700 times greater than the original volume. Therefore, there is no possibility of contradiction between the conception of the universal spatial particles that are innumerable (*asaṅkheya*) and that of indefinite (*ananta*) particles of matter.

Now, how can we justify the conception of numerability, innumerability, and indefiniteness of material particles? It is said that in one *pradeśa*, i.e., in one unitary cell of space only one atom of matter will find place if it is in a free state, but in an aggregate form any number of atoms can occupy one or more units of space.¹ The same idea can be expressed in a different language: One atom occupies one unit of space, but two atoms in a state of combination may also be accommodated in the same unit. Two free atoms will occupy two units, but two atoms forming a diatomic molecule can cover one as well as two units. Three atoms can be located in a single unit if they are all in a state of condensation; they can occupy two spatial units if two atoms are in a state of condensation and one is free; they occupy three spatial particles if they are all free. And this process is to be continued to infinity.²

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CONCEPTION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA AND THAT OF THE JAINA

The Vaiśeṣikas regard nine substances as the constituent elements of the universe other than qualities, actions, etc. They are: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind.

Of these nine substances, earth, water, fire, and air are included in the Jaina category of *puṅgala* (matter), since *puṅgala* is defined as a substance possessing touch, taste, smell, and colour as its qualities. The Vaiśeṣikas regard air as without colour, taste, and smell. It has the characteristic of touch only. This conception of the Vaiśeṣikas is not tenable, because even an elementary student of physics knows that air can be converted into a 'bluish liquid' by continuous cooling, just as steam can be

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 14.

² Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 14.

converted into water. This is a concrete proof that air has colour. And since it has colour it must possess both taste and smell.

They regard fire as devoid of taste and smell and possessing touch and colour only. This belief is also blind, for the scientists have clearly demonstrated that fire is a material substance. When the energy of molecular agitation in a substance becomes very acute, its temperature rises and we get the sensation of fire. It is a form of energy and we know that energy and matter are identical. Hence, all the characteristics of matter are associated with fire, because fire is composed of material particles raised to a high temperature.

The exponents of the Vaiśeṣika system regard smell to be existent only in earth. We agree that our nose in general cannot perceive water, fire, or air but on this ground, we are not entitled to hold that odour is not associated with all these forms of matter. The human nose is not sensitive enough to detect the smell of these forms. Several cases are known where our olfactory organ fails, for instance, an ant at once smells sugar or a cat smells milk, whereas we cannot perceive these smells so quickly and from such a distance.

In the light of this discussion, we can say that with regard to the conception of matter, the position of the Jainas is sound and scientific. The Jaina thinkers did not regard earth, water, fire, and air as separate and independent entities but included all these forms in matter. They held that earth, water, etc., are the various combinations and forms of matter. These various combinations should not be regarded as separate substances.

FORMS OF MATTER

Having dealt with the general characteristics of matter, we, now, proceed to its specific forms. Matter has two chief forms: Indivisible elementary particles and their combinations. In the technical terms of Jainism, the indivisible elementary particles are called *anus* and the combinations of these particles are known as *skandhas*. We translate *anu* as atom and *skandha* as molecule for our present purpose. We will not mind some minute differences between the word atom of modern chemistry and our technical term *anu*. *Skandha* (molecule) is defined as an

aggregate of atoms. It possesses a gross form and undergoes processes of association and dissociation.

ANU

The last particle of matter, which cannot be further divided by any means whatsoever, is an *anu* or a *paramāṇu*.¹ In the *Tattvārtha-rājavārtika*, *anu* is defined as the smallest material particle. There is nothing smaller than *paramāṇu*.² In the *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, the following properties are associated with atoms:³ The substance that has a single taste, a single colour, a single smell, and two kinds of touch; which is the cause of sound while itself unsounding; which is different from molecules though constituting them, is called atom.

Jaina philosophy maintains that the perception of the atoms of matter is not possible to ordinary persons. It can be the subject of direct experience to a person endowed with the faculty of intuitional perception. Since atoms are quite real entities, five physical attributes (1 taste plus 1 colour plus 1 smell plus 2 touches) are always associated with them. The properties of hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness are not associated with atoms. As Kundakunda remarks: 'Of the eight kinds of touch, hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness are the qualities of molecules, not of the individual atoms.' In fact, the properties of hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness can be associated only with molecules. These properties are generated by the loose or compact aggregation of atoms, and because all atoms have the same mass, there arises no question of light and heavy or hard and smooth amongst the elementary particles of matter. This difference of light and heavy or hard and smooth in mass is found only amongst molecules.

We have already mentioned that all atoms are not found in a free state. Some of them are in the various forms of molecule and some are found as separate entities, i.e., in a free state. Now, how do the atoms living in the forms of molecule become liable to

¹ Sarvārtha-siddhi, V. 25.

² *Tattvārtha-rājavārtika*, V, 11, 2.

³ *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 88.

pass to a free state? 'The atoms are produced only by division of matter; not by the process of union or combination.'¹

SKANDHA

Skandha (molecule) has been already defined as an aggregate of atoms. It possesses a gross form and undergoes processes of association and dissociation as we have seen. The same idea is expressed more lucidly in the following manner:

Molecules are formed in three different ways:²

1. By division or dissociation (*bheda*)
 2. By union or association (*saṅghāta*)
 3. By the united process of dissociation and association taking place simultaneously.
1. Dissociation occurs on account of two causes, viz., internal and external.³ The former cause is in the molecules themselves as the phenomenon of radio-activity and the like. The examples of the latter cause are the dissociation of molecules in solution, the breaking under high temperatures, the breaking under high pressures, the breaking under artificial bombardment, and the like.
 2. Association has been defined thus: The union of separate entities is association (*saṅghāta*).⁴ The assemblage of atoms to form molecules is an instance of association (*saṅghāta*.)
 3. The united process of dissociation and association is defined as follows: By simultaneous dissociation and association, molecules occupying two spatial particles, etc., are produced. Just when one molecule breaks, the remaining part is associated by another molecule.⁵

The advanced researches in physical chemistry have also revealed three processes of molecule-formation. The following lines will clarify the point:

The question to be answered is, in what ways are atoms united in the molecule? The electronic theory of valency is able to supply a very satisfactory answer. According to this theory,

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 27.

² *ibid.*, V, 26.

³ Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 26.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *ibid.*

there are three methods of linking atoms. The linkage may be electrovalent, co-valent, or co-ordinate.

Molecules with an electrovalent linkage are ionised even in the solid state, X-ray analysis of the crystal indicating that the elementary particles making up the crystal lattice are ions and not atoms or molecules. Nearly all inorganic salts are electrovalent compounds.

The second arrangement, i.e., co-valent linkage is found in organic compounds. The atoms attain stability by a process of sharing electrons. For instance, in the case of the methane gas CH_4 the carbon atom attains a stable arrangement by sharing four electrons with the four electrons of the four hydrogen atoms.

The third type of linkage, the co-ordinate linkage, involves the sharing of two electrons but both are supplied by the same atom. The process of the formation of a co-ordinate linkage resembles both transference and sharing. Therefore, the three modern processes are transference, sharing, and combined transference and sharing.¹

PERCEPTIBILITY OF MOLECULES

The Jaina thinkers maintain that not only atoms are imperceptible but that certain types of molecules are also imperceptible. As Pūjyapāda says: 'Out of molecules composed even of an infinite number of elementary particles (*anus*) some are visible and some invisible.'² The question, therefore, is: How the invisible molecules become visible, i.e., what is the process by which the imperceptible molecules are perceived? The answer is as under:

'If a molecule breaks and the broken part then attaches itself to another molecule, the resulting combination may be coarse enough to be perceived.'³ The point is that the imperceptible molecule becomes perceptible by the combined process of division and union, i.e., dissociation and association. For instance, the molecules of hydrogen and chlorine gas are invisible to the eyes but when each of them breaks and then combines to form two molecules of hydrochloric acid, the product becomes visible. Regarding other sense-perceptions, the same rule can be applied.

¹ Cosmology: old and new, p. 183.

² Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 28.

³ *ibid.*

UNION OF MATTER

Molecules are formed in three different ways, as we have already indicated. Of these three ways, one way is purely divisional. The remaining two ways are not so. Association or union plays an important rôle in determining their nature. Now, what is this union or association? How does matter unite? It is said that 'the *puḍgalas* unite by virtue of the properties of ' *snigdha* ' and ' *rūkṣa* ' associated with them.'¹ ' *Snigdha* ' and ' *rūkṣa* ' are two kinds of touch. The former is known as smooth and the latter as rough.

The *puḍgalas* cannot unite in an arbitrary way. There are certain conditions which restrict the freedom of association. They are as follows :

1. The ultimate elementary particles at the lowest energy-level of smoothness or roughness do not unite at all.
2. The ultimate elementary particles of matter (atoms) with equal degrees of smoothness or roughness and of the same kind cannot unite with an atom of their own kind. In other words, an electron would not combine with another electron or a positron with a positron if both the particles are at the same energy-level, but an electron can unite with a positron or *vice versa* under the same conditions.² This is one opinion.³ According to the other opinion, the *paramāṇus* of opposite kinds cannot unite even if the degrees of smoothness or roughness are equal.⁴ Thus, while the latter view denies the possibility of union for all combinations of particles at the same energy-level, the former view recognises such a possibility if the union is between the particles of opposite kinds.

Consequently, according to the latter view, a smooth or a rough elementary particle of a higher level combines with another of a similar or a dissimilar type if they differ in their degrees of smoothness or roughness by two units. The former view does not recognise this as a necessary stipulation for the union of the particles of dissimilar types, nor does it accept the conception of

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra V, 32.

² Cosmology: old and new, p. 216

³ Śvetāmbara view.

⁴ Digambara view,

a higher level. According to this view, a smooth or a rough atom combines with another of a similar type if they differ in their degrees of smoothness or roughness by two or more units. With regard to dissimilar types, this difference is not necessary. They can unite in an equal condition except in the case of the lowest type. The following table will show the difference underlying these two views :

			FORMER VIEW		
	<i>Energy-Level</i>		<i>Similar</i>		<i>Dissimilar</i>
1.	Lowest	Lowest	... No union	...	No union
2.	Lowest	1" More	... "	...	Union
3.	Lowest	2" more	... Union	...	"
4.	Lowest	3", etc., more	... "	...	"
5.	Higher	equally higher	... No union	...	"
6.	Higher	1" more	... "	...	"
7.	Higher	2" more	... Union	...	"
8.	Higher	3", etc., more	... "	...	"

			LATTER VIEW		
	<i>Energy-Level</i>		<i>Similar</i>		<i>Dissimilar</i>
1.	Lowest	Lowest	... No union	...	No union
2.	Lowest	1" more	... "	...	"
3.	Lowest	2" more	... "	...	"
4.	Lowest	3", etc., more	... "	...	"
5.	Higher	equally higher	... "	...	"
6.	Higher	1" more	... "	...	"
7.	Higher	2" more	... Union	...	Union
8.	Higher	3", etc., more	... No union	...	No union.

The latter view can be explained in a different method also. A smooth elementary particle combines with another similar particle differing in energy-level by two units. A rough elementary particle combines with another rough elementary particle differing again in energy-level by two units. A smooth particle can also unite with a rough particle and *vice versa*. Particles at the lowest energy-level do not unite. The union of the various particles of different energy-levels may form an odd or an even series (as 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, etc. or 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, etc.).¹

The result of union is that an elementary particle or a molecule in the process of association with a higher degree of

¹ Gommaṭa-sāra : Jīva-kāṇḍa, 615.

smoothness or roughness absorbs the one with a lower degree into itself. In other words, 'in the molecules of numerable, innumerable and indefinite atoms, the atoms with greater degrees of smoothness or roughness when uniting, alter the atoms of lesser degree to their own kind.'¹ The union between dissimilar particles of equal degrees of smoothness and roughness produces a neutral particle.

SIX SUB-CLASSES OF MATTER

Broadly, matter is divided into two classes: atoms and molecules. Matter is divided into six classes also.² These classes are not different from atoms and molecules. They are, in other words, their sub-divisions:

1. *Solids*—Earth, stone, and the like are the solid forms of matter. This class is called *sthūla-sthūla*.
2. *Liquids*—Butter, water, oil, milk, and the like are the liquid forms of matter. They are known as *sthūla*.
3. *Energy*—It manifests itself in the forms of heat, light, electricity, and the like. It is called *sthūla-sūkṣma*.
4. *Gases*—Air, etc., are the forms of gases. This class is known as *sūkṣma-sthūla*.
5. *Fine Matter*—It is responsible for thought-activities and is beyond sense-perception. This type of matter is called *sūkṣma*.
6. *Extra-Fine Matter*—The forms of single elementary particles are composed of extra-fine matter. It is called *sūkṣma-sūkṣma*.

MATTER AND SOUL

Does matter influence soul (*jīva*)? The Jaina system admits that matter does influence a worldly soul. How does it influence? It forms the physical basis of the bodies, speech, mind, and respiration of the souls. The same idea is expressed in a definite form in the following lines:

Matter is the cause of the making of bodies. One kind of molecules called *āhāra-vargaṇā*, forms the first three types of bodies, viz., the organic body of men and animal beings, the

¹ Gommatā-sāra : Jīva-kāṇḍa, 619.

² Niyama-sāra, 21.

body which is possessed by the beings of heaven or those of hell and sometimes by human beings and animals also in an extraordinary condition, and a subtle body which is developed by advanced mystics and the respiration. *Tejo-vargaṇā* forms the fourth type, viz., the electric body. Speech and mind are formed by two special types of molecules called *bhāṣā-vargaṇā* and *mano-vargaṇā*, respectively. The inner subtle body, i.e., *kārmaṇa-śarīra* which is the root cause of all mental and physical activities is constituted by *kārmaṇa-vargaṇā*.¹

Pleasure, pain, life, and death are also experienced through the agency of matter. Moreover, one piece of matter is capable of producing physical and chemical changes in another piece of matter. For instance, bronze is purified by ashes, water is clarified by an organic substance '*kataka*,' and so on. It is needless to say that the whole super-structure of modern science is built upon physical and chemical changes in matter.

FIVE KINDS OF BODIES

We have stated that bodies are constituted by matter and such bodies are of five kinds :

1. *Audārika*—A body which is gross and physical is called *audārika* body. The organic body of human beings, animal beings, and vegetable kingdom is of this type. It is full of blood, bones, etc.
2. *Vaikriya*—That which is possessed by the beings of heaven and those of hell and by human beings as well as animals possessing an extraordinary power (*labdhi*) is called *vaikriya* body. It is invisible and is capable of transformation in different shapes and sizes.
3. *Āhāraka*—A subtle body which is developed by an advanced *yogin* is called *āhāraka* body. It can be projected, i.e., sent to great distances on special occasions.
4. *Taijasa*—It is composed of electric matter and is a necessary link between the *audārika* body and the *kārmaṇa* body. It possesses the power of digesting the food we take.
5. *Kārmaṇa*—The inner subtle body which is the seed of all mental and physical activities is called *kārmaṇa* body. It is composed of eight kinds of karmas.

¹ Jīva-kāṇḍa, 606-8.

We can perceive only the first of these five kinds with our sense-organs. The remaining bodies are subtle. 'The succeeding body is subtler than the preceding one in order. The *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* bodies are not obstructed by any material form. They are beyond any kind of check and can travel the whole universe. Both these bodies are associated with a worldly soul from beginningless time. Each and every *jīva* possesses at least these two kinds of bodies. At the time of transmigration, only these two bodies are possessed by the souls. The mundane soul can possess four kinds of bodies at the most at a time.'¹ The following scheme will clearly indicate the point :

At least two bodies : *Taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*.

Three bodies : *Taijasa*, *kārmaṇa*, and *audārika*

or

Taijasa, *kārmaṇa*, and *vaikriya*.

Four bodies : *Taijasa*, *kārmaṇa*, *audārika*, and *vaikriya*

or

Taijasa, *kārmaṇa*, *audārika*, and *āhāraka*.

From the above scheme, it is evident that no soul possesses five bodies at any one time. Of course, alternatively, it can possess all the bodies at different times. It is also obvious that one soul cannot have both the *āhāraka* and *vaikriya* bodies at the same time, while *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* are always present so long as the soul is in bondage.

MANIFESTATION OF MATTER

Some effects of matter in the forms of body, mind, etc., have been mentioned. There remain still some important effects as the manifestations of matter. We propose to describe them here. They are in the forms of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade, heat, and light.

SOUND

Some Indian systems of thought like the Vaiśeṣika, etc., associate sound with ether. Jainism does not accept this view and explains the creation of sound as due to the violent contact of one material object with another. A single molecule in an isolated form cannot produce sound. It is on account of this

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 38 ; II, 41-4.


theory of sound that the system regards an individual atom as unsounding by itself. The atom is defined as having a fine form, the cause of elements like earth, fire, water, and air and unsounding. The cause of sound has been pointed out to be the striking of molecules against one another.¹

The scientists also regard sound as a product of matter. Experiments in the sphere of science have shown that 'sound does not travel in vacuum.' If sound were generated by the ether as is supposed by other schools, it should be heard in the vacuous space also, for the ether is present everywhere. In the opinion of a scientist, 'it is a common experience that a source of sound is in a state of vibration. For example, the prongs of a tuningfork, a bell, the strings of a piano, and the air in an organ pipe are all in a state of vibration when they are producing sound.'²

Sound is classified into two chief divisions : sound incorporated in languages and sound which does not find place in any language. The former is further divided into two categories : articulate utterance or speech and sounds made by creatures, etc. The latter, i.e., the sound which does not find place in any language, is further classified into two sub-divisions : sounds produced by human beings with the help of musical instruments and natural sounds such as the roar of the thunder or the rippling of water, and the like. Musical sound is further classified into four categories : musical sound of a stretched instrument such as a drum, musical sound of a stringed instrument such as a violin, musical sound of a reed instrument such as a bell, and sound produced from a wind instrument such as an organ pipe. The next table will show the scheme of the classification in a lucid manner.

¹ Pañcāstikāya-sāra, 85-6.

² Text-book of Physics, p. 249.




Expressed in the form of the above table, we have seven classes of sound :

1. Speech or articulate utterance.
2. Inarticulate utterance.
3. Natural noise.
4. Noise of a stretched musical instrument.
5. Noise of a stringed musical instrument.
6. Noise produced from a reed instrument of music.
7. Noise produced from a wind instrument of music.

UNION

It is classified as under :



1. *Forced*—Union produced by the efforts of the body, speech, or mind of a person.

2. *Natural*—Union produced without any effort of a person.
3. *Matter with matter*—Union of one kind of matter with another kind of matter.
4. *Matter with soul*—Union of matter with spirit.
5. *Karmic*—Union of karmic matter with subtle bodies.
6. *Physical*—Physical combinations.
7. *Fastening*—As the fastening of a chain to a chariot.
8. *Painting*—As the painting over a canvas or mural painting.
9. *Dovetail joint*—As joints in pieces of timber.
10. *Ligamentary joint*—Such joints as of a living body.
11. *Union of bodies*—Union of bodies more than one in number.
12. *Natural union having beginning*—That natural union which has a beginning as has resulted from a definite cause, such as the union of different colours in a rainbow, is called natural union having a beginning. Formation of the clouds, production of lightning, etc., are included in this class.
13. *Beginningless union*—Eternal union such as the union of the different parts of substances like the medium of motion, the medium of rest, space, and the like.

FINENESS AND GROSSNESS

Each of these manifestations is of two categories: extreme and relative.¹ The atoms furnish the example of extreme fineness in matter and the universe itself constitutes the example of extreme grossness in matter, since it is the biggest molecule or compound of matter. There is nothing smaller than atom and nothing bigger than the universe in the world of matter. Material objects vary relatively to each other in quantity. For instance, a cocoanut is bigger than an orange and so on.

FIGURE

Figure is nothing but the shape of a body. It may be regular, circular, triangular, rectangular, and the like; or it may be an irregular body like the shape of clouds.

¹ Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika, V, 24, 14-5.

DIVISIBILITY

It is of six kinds :¹

1. Separation—as sawing a piece of wood.
2. Grinding—as making wheat into flour.
3. Parting—as the separate parts of a broken pitcher.
4. Chaffing—as the separation of chaff from rice or pulses.
5. Layers—as the separation of layers in a sheet of mica.
6. Smithereen—as a blacksmith smites with his hammer.

DARKNESS

It is opposite to light and is generally the cause of invisibility of objects. It is a positive reality existing independent of light. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the existence of darkness should not be regarded as separate from light. They think that darkness is nothing more than the negation of light. In other words, they do not regard darkness as a positive reality. They believe that darkness is nothing but the negation of light. The Jaina thinkers do not agree with this view of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. They say that darkness has an independent existence. Modern scientists also believe in the conception of 'dark rays.' Without the presence of these 'dark rays' photography in pitch darkness would have been impossible.

SHADE

It is of two kinds : virtual image produced by a plane mirror which shows the object laterally inverted and uninverted image like shadow or image of a modern cinema screen. The obstruction of light is the cause of the production of shadows.²

Regarding the formation of shadows, the physicists hold that an opaque obstacle in the path of the rays of light casts a shadow because the rays are obstructed and are unable to enter the region of the shadow. The images formed by lenses and mirrors are of two kinds called virtual and real. The example of a virtual image is the image seen in a looking glass, whereas the example of the latter is the images on a cinema screen. In the case of a virtual image the rays appear to come from the image, whereas in the case of a real image the rays do actually come from it. Thus, it is

¹ Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika, V, 24, 18.

² Sarvārtha-siddhi, V, 24.

clear that energy manifests itself in the form of shadows and images, virtual and real.¹

HEAT AND LIGHT

Heat is the sunlight, the light of fire, that of electric lamp, and the like. Light is the moonlight, the light of jewels, or the light of the glow-worm. The former predominates in heat-rays and the latter in light-rays. Science also regards heat and light as two separate manifestations of energy.

¹ Cosmology : Old and New, p. 88.

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

THE relation of knowledge with soul, in Jainism, is not like that in the system of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, as we have already seen. The Jaina writers have defined knowledge as the essence of soul. Soul has other characteristics also as we have mentioned, but the Jaina thinkers always emphasised knowledge to be the chief characteristic possessed by soul. Kundakunda has stated that although from the empirical point of view there is difference between soul and knowledge, yet, from the transcendental point of view it is sufficient to say that soul is knower and nothing else.¹ In this way, he apparently amalgamated all the characteristics of soul in the conception of knowledge. He went further and clearly stated that absolute bliss is absolute knowledge. Bliss and knowledge are identical.² He further said that there is no difference between the knower and his knowledge.³ In the Jaina Canons also we find such expressions to the effect that from one point of view soul is knowledge and knowledge is soul. Kundakunda further said that from the empirical point of view the omniscient perceives and knows the whole of reality; and from the transcendental point of view he perceives and knows the self only.⁴ (Here the self includes all the knowledge of reality.) In this way, we conclude that knowledge plays an important part in the conception of soul, emancipation, etc. We intend to give a brief account of the Jaina theory of knowledge.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE JAINA CANONS

Knowledge is divided into five broad categories in the Jaina Canons. The conception of five-fold knowledge is very old. We come across some descriptions in the Canons which show that the conception of five-fold knowledge is pre-Canonical. Even before Lord Mahāvīra this division existed. Keśikumāra, a monk

¹ Samaya-sāra, 6-7.

² Pravacana-sāra, I, 59-60.


³ Samaya-sāra, 10; 11; 433.

⁴ Niyama-sāra, 158.

following the tradition of Lord Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third *Tirthaṅkara* of Jainism, mentioned five kinds of knowledge as *ābhini-bodhika-jñāna*, *śruta-jñāna*, *avadhi-jñāna*, *manah-ṣaryaya-jñāna*, and *kevala-jñāna*.¹ It clearly shows that Lord Mahāvira had accepted the tradition of the conception of knowledge as it was in existence before him.

Now, how does this conception evolve in the Canonical period? What additions are made? We find three stages of evolution in the Canons :²

1. At the first stage, knowledge is divided into five categories according to the above tradition as under :³




2. The second stage of evolution presents two broad divisions of knowledge, viz., *pratyakṣa* and *ṣarokṣa*. These two categories are further divided into various sub-divisions.

The scheme according to the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra* is as follows :—

¹ Rāja-praśnīya, 165.

² Introduction : Nyāyāvātāra-vārtika-vṛtti, p. 58.


³ Bhagavati-sūtra, 88, 2, 317.



This table shows that knowledge is divided into two main categories, not five. This two-fold division is generally accepted

by the Jaina logicians who discussed the theory of knowledge on the ground of logic. In the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, first of all knowledge is divided into five categories and then these categories have been included in two categories, viz., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*¹ as the means of valid knowledge. This latter division clearly indicates that *Umāsvāti* was also influenced by the second stage of evolution.

3. The third stage is as follows :



¹ *Matiśrutiāvadhimanahparyayakevalāni jñānam*, I, 9.

Ādye parokṣam, I, 11.

Pratyakṣamanyat, I, 12.

On this stage of evolution, sensory knowledge has been placed in both the categories, viz., direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. On the second stage, sensory knowledge as well as scriptural knowledge was placed in the category of indirect knowledge which as a matter of fact is in the true spirit of Jainism. The third stage that has its root in the Nandi-sūtra, seems to be influenced by the general tendency of Indian philosophy that regards sensory knowledge as direct. The later Jaina logicians and philosophers also took this view in the name of *laukika pratyakṣa*. The gist of the third stage is :

1. *Avadhī*, *manahparyaya*, and *kevala-jñāna* are really direct.
2. *Śruta-jñāna* is always indirect.
3. *Mati-jñāna* produced by the sense-organs is really indirect but is regarded as direct for practical purposes.
4. *Mati-jñāna* produced by the mind is always indirect.

Thus, these three stages of evolution of the conception of knowledge in the Canons show that all the classifications of the logical period as well as the schemes of division of knowledge of the earlier philosophers were rooted in the Canons. We shall explain the various categories of knowledge, viz., *avagraha*, *īhā*, etc., while dealing with the logical conception of knowledge.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MEANS OF COGNITION IN THE JAINA CANONS

It is wrong to say that the Jaina Canons discuss the categories of knowledge only and not the means of valid knowledge. We come across many references where the means of valid knowledge are independently discussed. In the Bhagavatī-sūtra, Lord Mahāvīra says: 'There are four means of valid knowledge, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), and authority (*āgama*)...'¹

It apparently indicates that the ancient Jaina thinkers certainly believed in the separate and independent discussion of the means of valid knowledge. Their deliberations were not confined to the categories of knowledge only. They discussed the means of valid cognition as well like other systems of philosophy. Generally, such means are regarded as four in number, but in some places we find three also. As it is mentioned in the

¹ Bhagavatī-sūtra, V, 43, 192.

Sthānāṅga-sūtra : Determination is of three kinds, viz., perception, authority, and inference.¹

In spite of this type of separate discussion and description of the means of valid knowledge, we are not entitled to maintain that the Canons made an absolute difference between the categories of knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. Both are related as well as synthesised in some places.

LOGICAL CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE

When we look at the Tattvārtha-sūtra, we come to know that Umāsvāti made no difference between the categories of knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In other words, he did not differentiate *jñāna* and *pramāṇa*. He observes: *Jñāna* is of five varieties, viz., *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyaya*, and *kevala*. All these varieties are *pramāṇa*.² He did not mention any particular characteristic except 'rightness' regarding the conception of *pramāṇa*. He took *jñāna* (right knowledge) and *pramāṇa* as identical.

The later philosophers defined *pramāṇa* independently and strictly. They did not conceive knowledge as the means of valid knowledge in a general form but added some specific characteristics to it. Maṇikyānandī says: That *jñāna* is *pramāṇa* which has the determination of itself as well as of the object not known before. It enables us to get the desirable and give up the undesirable. Hence, it can be nothing but knowledge.³

Hemacandra writes in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*: The valid judgment about an object is *pramāṇa*. In another language, a means of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object.⁴ Vādideva says: That *jñāna* is *pramāṇa* which has the determination of itself as well as of the object. It is able to tell us what is desirable and what is undesirable. Hence, it can be knowledge only.⁵

On the basis of these various definitions of *pramāṇa*, we can understand what type of knowledge is *pramāṇa* and what type of knowledge is not *pramāṇa*. The gist of all these definitions is that it is a right knowledge or a valid judgment which is *pramāṇa*

¹ Sthānāṅga-sūtra, 185.

² Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 9-10.

³ Parikṣā-mukha, I, 1-2.

⁴ *Samyagarthanirṇayah pramāṇam*, I, 1, 2.

⁵ *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, I, 2-3.

and not a wrong one. In other words, all *pramāṇa* is *jñāna* but all *jñāna* is not *pramāṇa*. The word 'determination' is meant for refuting the conception of the Buddhists who regard indeterminate knowledge as the means of valid cognition. According to the Jainas, indeterminate knowledge is no knowledge at all. It is only an indeterminate perception or intuition (*darśana*). The determination of knowledge is essential, because if the knowledge itself is not self-conscious, it cannot determine the object. The Jainas believe in the self-illuminating nature of knowledge, therefore, no question of infinite regress arises. The conception of self-determination of knowledge through the medium of soul can be compared with the doctrine of Transcendental Unity of Apperception of Kant.

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

We have seen that knowledge must be valid, if it is to be justified in being called *pramāṇa*. Now, the question is: How can the nature of validity be determined? The Jaina thinkers say that 'the validity is either determined intrinsically or extrinsically.'¹ They believe in both the types, viz., intrinsic validity and extrinsic validity. The determination of validity is in some cases achieved by a cognition by itself. As for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm induced by a repeated course of experience or the direct achievements of results such as by the acts of bathing, drinking, etc., there occurs cessation of heat, thirst, etc.; and this alone gives final satisfaction to the subject and a person does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition. This shows that validity is self-determined, i.e., intrinsic.

On some occasions, the experience of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point for instance to the primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its validity is determined (1) by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or (2) by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or (3) by the cognition of an object invariably or universally concomitant with it. This establishes the fact that validity is determined by other means. It is called extrinsic validity.

¹ *Prāmāṇyaniścayah svatah parato vā. Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā, I, 1, 8.*

The Mīmāṃsakas do not hold to extrinsic validity but intrinsic validity only. Hence, the view of the Mīmāṃsakas is not complete according to the Jaina conception of validity.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

The means of valid knowledge are of two kinds. Is this two-fold classification to be understood in the terms of what has been propounded by the Buddhists, viz., perception and inference¹ or in a different way? The Jaina classification is certainly different. Their two kinds are named 'direct and indirect.'² From the practical point of view they are called perceptual and non-perceptual. According to the Cārvāka, there is no other means of knowledge than perception (*pratyakṣa* or direct knowledge). In order to refute his view, it is said that there is means of valid knowledge other than perception and it is proved by the determination of the validity and invalidity of knowledge, by the knowledge of other men's thoughts, and by negation.³ The realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man's thought, and the negation of what transcends sense-intuition are not possible without the help of other means of valid knowledge such as inference.

Furthermore, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the evidence of its unflinching correspondence with the fact. Why should the Cārvāka not acknowledge the validity of non-perceptual cognitions, arising either from verbal testimony (authority) or from a logical ground (inference) known to be necessarily concomitant with a fact, on the identical ground of unflinching correspondence with the fact? Hence, non-perceptual cognition is as valid as perceptual cognition.

The Vaiśeṣikas as well as the Sāṅkhya thinkers contend that there are three means of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, and authority. The Naiyāyikas accept analogy in addition to the three. The Prābhākaras accept the four and add implication as the fifth. The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) accept negation as an additional means and thus assert six such means in all. All

¹ *Pratyakṣamanumānaṁ ca*. Nyāya-bindu, I, 3.

² *Pramāṇaṁ dvidhā. Pratyakṣam parokṣam ca*. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 9-10.

³ *ibid.*, I, 1, 11.

these means of valid knowledge except negation are included in perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions accepted by the Jainas as we shall see later on. As regards negation, it is not different from perception. Since reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own. As a matter of fact, reality is made up of both being and non-being as its constitutive elements, since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the nature of another. It is evident that a perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation, its object in the following way. When we say that 'the jar is not on the ground,'¹ we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar. The surface of the ground itself is the negation of the jar. The experience of negation is not additional which compels us to admit an independent means of cognition in the form of negation or non-existence. The position is as follows :

"A positive real that is, determined as 'this is exclusively of such and such a character' is not capable of being understood without the concomitant cognisance of the negation of what is different from it."²

The Mīmāṃsakas might contend : Well, let reality be accepted as partaking of the nature of both being and non-being, but that does not affect our position in the least, as we, too, have proved this very truth. Our contention is that only the positive element of being with which a sense-organ comes in contact is the field of perceptual cognition and as regards the element of non-being, it cannot be so. The latter is consequently held to be cognised by a separate means, viz., negation. How can then it be maintained that negation would have no separate object? The Jaina refutes this contention as under :

If the element of non-being be not different from the element of being, why should it not be liable to apprehension by perceptual knowledge? If, again, it be different, still it has to be admitted that jar and the like are perceived when a surface of land is perceived as in the form of the non-being of jar and the like. It is a universal rule that the non-apprehension of the non-being of

¹ 'Bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti.'

² Śloka-vārtika : Abhāva, 15.

anything is necessarily concomitant with the apprehension of its being.

Moreover, this so-called means of valid cognition is of no use being of the nature of mere negation of the five positive means of knowledge. And thus, it is the reverse of cognition and as such how can it function as a means of valid cognition? It follows, therefore, that negation as a means has no object, since there is nothing like pure non-being separate from the double nature of the real. The conclusion, therefore, is that it cannot be an additional means of valid cognition.

Now, we propose to give the specific definition of each of the kinds :

'That which is direct or immediate is perceptual cognition.'¹

The directness or immediacy is defined as : consisting in either its independence of the services of another means or in apprehension of its content as 'this.'²

CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTION

The most significant thing to be noted in this connection is that the Jaina philosophers divide perceptual knowledge into two categories.³ In the first division they put that perceptual cognition which is directly related to soul. This perception is called direct perception, immediate perception, transcendental perception, extra-sensory perception, or real perception. The second division is known as empirical perception, pragmatic perception, or sensory perception.

DIRECT PERCEPTION

Now, we propose to give the definition of direct perception :

'The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of a soul, emerging on the total annihilation of all obstructive veils, is called direct perception.'⁴

¹ *Viśadah pratyakṣam. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 13.*
Spaṣṭam pratyakṣam. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 2.
Viśad.cin pratyakṣamiti. Parikṣā-mukha, II, 3.

² *Pramāṇāntarānapekṣedantayā pratibhāso vā vaiśadyam.*
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 14.
Pratītyantarāvyaadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā pratibhāsanam
vaiśadyam. Parikṣā-mukha, II, 4.

³ *Tad dvīprakāram sāmvyāvahārikam pāramāthikam ca.*
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 4.

⁴ *Tatsarvathāvarānavilaye cetanasya svarūpāvirbhāvo mukhyam*
kevalam. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 15.

The self has consciousness as its essence which is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of self, which is nothing but the self as manifested, is styled *pārmārthika pratyakṣa*, i.e., transcendental intuition or direct perception. It is the highest kind of all cognitions. It is characterised as pure and perfect in the scriptures, since it is independent of the services of external instruments such as sense-organs and mind. It emerges on the disappearance of obscuring veils which results from the total purging of all the destructive karmas. The soul is manifested in its pure nature and perceives the whole of reality in a direct and immediate manner. Hence, it is called omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*).

Omniscience is not the only instance of transcendental knowledge, but there are other varieties also.

‘Owing to the variation of the degrees of the destruction of obstructing veils, the transcendental knowledge admits of two varieties, viz., limited direct perception and direct perception of the modes of other minds.’¹ They are nothing but clairvoyance and telepathy.

Pure perception occurs on the complete destruction of all possible veils. But when there is variation in the degrees of the annihilation of veil, there occur two varieties of extra-sensory intuition, viz., *avadhi*—limited intuition and *manahparyaya*—direct perception of the modes of minds. *Avadhi* means ‘limit’ or ‘that which is confined’ and so it is said: ‘*Avadhi* is limited to the objects having form,’² i.e., colour, taste, smell, and touch. It is of two kinds according as it is congenital or acquired by merit. Of these, the first belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell just as movement in the sky belongs to birds. The second variety is possible for man and animals.

The mind is a particular substance and its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. And the knowledge of these states is called *manahparyaya-jñāna*.

CLAIRVOYANCE

The self, according to Jaina philosophy, has inherent capacity to know all things irrespective of time and space. Temporal and

¹ *Tattāratamyevadhimanahparyāyau ca. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 18.*

² *Rūpiṣvavadheh. Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 28.*

spatial distance is immaterial if the self were in its perfection. To put it in a different language, the self is inherently capable of cognising all things together with all their characteristics irrespective of temporal distinctions, i.e., past, present, and future, and spatial differences, i.e., here, there, near, far, and the like. It is only because of karmic obstructions that this capacity is obscured. Pure perception occurs on the total destruction of all karmic obstructions. But when there is variation in degrees of this destruction, there occur different varieties of perception. As regards the occurrence of normal perceptions, they are derived from the senses and mind. Regarding the occurrence of super-normal perceptions, the Jaina holds that they are derived directly from the self. They are not dependent on the senses and mind. Nevertheless, there is variation in degrees of their occurrence. Perfect perception occurs on the complete annihilation of all possible veils. But when there are differences in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils, there occur two varieties of super-normal perception, viz., clairvoyance and telepathy.

Clairvoyance is confined to the objects having form. Only those things which have shape, colour, etc., can be perceived through the faculty of clairvoyance. This faculty differs in scope and durability with different persons due to the difference of destruction and subsidence of karmic veils. The highest type of clairvoyance can perceive all the objects having form. With regard to space, it extends over a space that could be occupied by innumerable space-points (*pradeśas*) of the size of the universe. As regards time, it pierces into innumerable cycles of time, both past and future. It cannot perceive all the modes of all the things. It knows only a part of them. The lowest type of clairvoyance can cognise the object occupying a very small fraction of space. In the technical language of the Jaina, it can extend to a very small fraction of an '*aṅgula*' (a measure) and know the things having form that lie therein. As regards time, it can penetrate only a small part of time which is less than a second. Regarding the modes, it can know only a part of all the modes of its object.¹

¹ Nandi-sūtra, 16.

Clairvoyance is of six types: First, a clairvoyance which continues to exist even if a person leaves a particular place and goes elsewhere. This type is called *anugāmin*. Second, a clairvoyance that does not continue to exist in the aforesaid situation. It is diametrically opposed to the former. This variety is known as *ananugāmin*. Third, a clairvoyance that increases in its scope and durability as time passes. It is called *vardhamāna*. Fourth, a clairvoyance which embraces deterioration as regards its scope and durability. It is called *hīyamāna*. This type is opposed to the third one. Fifth, a clairvoyance that neither faces growth nor embraces deterioration. This variety is known as *avasthita*. Sixth, a clairvoyance that sometimes increases and sometimes decreases with respect to its scope, durability, etc. It is known as *anavasthita*.¹

TELEPATHY

Let us turn to the nature of telepathy. Mind, according to the Jainas, is a particular material substance, as we have already stated. Its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. Every state of our thought is a particular mode of mind. As our state of thought changes, so also the mind changes. Thus, every state of our thought is reflected in the different modes of our mind. In another language, a state of thought is nothing but a particular mode of mind itself. The direct apprehension of the modes of mind is called telepathy in Jaina philosophy. A person possessing the faculty of telepathy can directly cognise the states of our thought. This cognition of the states of thought is nothing but a direct perception of the modes of the stuff of which the mind is made up.

Telepathy is confined to the abode of human beings. Its emergence is conditioned by a particular capacity possessed by one having a particular mode of right conduct.² The faculty of telepathy is not acquired by an ordinary person. It is conditioned by a strict mental and physical discipline. The person possessing the faculty of telepathy is necessarily a homeless ascetic. His character must be of a higher type. Such conditions

¹ *Anugāmyananugāmivardhamānahīyamānāvasthītānavasthitaḥedāt śaḍvidhah. Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika, I, 22, 4.*

² *Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 76.*

are not set down in the case of clairvoyance. The faculty of telepathy is far more superior to that of clairvoyance. The Jaina thinkers recognise two varieties of telepathy: *ṛjumatī* and *vipulamati*. The latter is purer and everlasting, i.e., lasts up to the dawn of omniscience, whereas the former is less pure and sometimes trembles too.¹ The latter perceives less number of objects than the former but apprehends them more vividly. It is only he who is at the upward stage of spiritual advancement is possessed of the latter, whereas the former is possessed by one who is sure to descend the spiritual ladder. The latter is more lucid than the former.

CLAIRVOYANCE AND TELEPATHY

As regards the subject matter, both clairvoyance and telepathy have reference to material objects. Such being the case, what is the line of demarcation between the two? The difference of clairvoyance and telepathy consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject, and object.² The perception of telepathy is more lucid than the perception of clairvoyance. The person possessing the power of clairvoyance also perceives mind, but the person possessing the faculty of telepathy perceives the same more lucidly. The scope of clairvoyance varies from an extremely minute part of an *anṅula* up to the whole inhabited universe. But the scope of telepathy is limited to the sphere inhabited by human beings only. With regard to the difference of subject, the acquisition of clairvoyance is possible for living beings in all the possible states. But the faculty of telepathy is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of noble conduct occupying a certain stage of spiritual development. In other words, only those who are possessed of super-normal powers acquire this type of perception and not any one else, and again it is possible only for a few and not for all of them. As regards the difference in reference to objects, the jurisdiction of clairvoyance is limited to material objects and that again not covering all their modes, but that of telepathy extends to by far the minuter parts.³

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 25.

² *ibid*, I, 26.

³ Commentary on Pramāṇa mimāṃsā, I, 1, 19.

OMNISCIENCE

Let us turn our attention towards the nature of omniscience. It is the highest type of perception which falls in the category of extra-sensory perception. It is the perfection of the cognising faculty of the self. It is the pure manifestation of the real nature of the conscious principle. The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of all obstructive veils, is called omniscience.

The self, as has already been mentioned, possesses consciousness as its essence. It is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the conscious principle is nothing but the self as manifested in the act of knowledge. It occurs on the annihilation of the perception-obscuring veils. The person possessing the super-normal faculty of omniscience perceives all the substances with all their modes.¹ Nothing is unknown to him. His knowledge is pure and perfect due to the total destruction of all possible obstructions.

Now, there arises a question: If the self is luminous by its very nature, why should it be subject to obscuration. And if obscuration is possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. Though luminous in nature, the moon, the sun, and the like are liable to be obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud, and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these cases, when it is found to be obscured by different veils of karma. The destruction of the obscurations of the self is possible by the practice of a particular course of meditation and the like in the same way as the obscurations of the sun, the moon, etc., is removed by a blast of wind.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OMNISCIENCE

The Jaina thinkers advance the following argument to prove the existence of omniscience. 'The proof of omniscience follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition.'² The progressive development of knowledge must reach its completion somewhere,

¹ *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I, 30.

² *Prajñātiśayaviśrāntyādisiddhestatsiddhih*. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 16.

because this is the way of all progression, as seen in the progression of magnitude. Just as heat is subject to varying degrees and consequently reaches the highest limit, so also cognition which is subject to progressive development owing to the various degrees of destruction of the obscuring veil, reaches the highest limit, i.e., omniscience when the hindrance of the obscuring karma is totally annihilated.

The Mīmāṃsakas are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience. To refute the theory of omniscience, the Mīmāṃsaka asks : What does omniscience mean ? Does it mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe ? Or does it mean merely the comprehension of certain principal objects ? As regards the first alternative, does it mean the knowledge of all the objects of the universe in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, there can be no omniscience, inasmuch as the objects of the world in the shape of past, present, and future can never be exhausted. This being the fact, the cognition conditioned by them also can never be complete. Because of the impossibility of the knowledge of all the objects of the world there cannot be omniscience. In the latter case also there can be no omniscience. It is an established fact that all the objects of the world are impossible to be known at one and the same time. How is it possible to comprehend contradictory things like heat and cold at the same time by a single cognition ? Besides, if all the objects are known at one and the same instant by an omniscient soul, in the next moment it would become unconscious having nothing to cognise. And further, the omniscient person would be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others in cognising them. Consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, since attachment and the like are obstructions to right cognition. Thus, it is established that omniscience does not mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe either successively or simultaneously. On the other hand, it cannot be admitted that omniscience means the cognition of certain principal objects, since only when all the objects of the universe are known, the distinction of principal objects from subordinate objects can be established. Furthermore, it is an impossibility to have the cognition of the past and future which are, really speaking, non-existent. If the omniscient cognises the past and future which

are non-existent, his knowledge would be illusory and wrong. If the past and future are known as existent, they are converted into the present. If the past and future are known by the omniscient as present, his knowledge again would be illusory. Hence, logically no existence of omniscience can be established.¹

All these objections advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka are refuted by the Jaina as follows:² Our ordinary perceptions are produced by the sense-organs, and hence, they are incapable of cognising the past, the future, and the like. But such is not the case with the omniscient. The perception of an omniscient self is not produced by the sense-organs; hence, it can know supra-sensory objects. It is not produced in succession but simultaneously, and hence, it cognises all the objects of the universe at the same time. It is beyond the limitations of space and time that are the necessary conditions of the perception produced by the senses. As regards the objection that contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be cognised at the same time by a single cognition, the Jaina asks the Mīmāṃsaka: Why contradictory things cannot be cognised by a single cognition? Is it because they cannot be present at the same time, or because they by their very nature cannot be comprehended by a single cognition, though they are present at the same time? The former view is not tenable, because contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time. The latter position is also not capable of being defended, because when there is a flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of two contradictory things, viz., darkness and light. Regarding the objection that if the omniscient knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, in the next moment he would become unconscious having nothing to cognise, the Jaina thinker replies that this type of objection would be valid if both the perception of the omniscient and the whole world were annihilated in the following instant. But, really speaking, both of these are ever-lasting. Hence, it is not an absurdity to hold that the omniscient self perceives all the objects of the universe by a single cognition. With respect to the objection that the omniscient would be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others

¹ Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa, pp. 254.

² *ibid.*, pp. 260-1.

in cognising them, and consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, the reply is: Mere knowledge of desires, aversions, etc., is not sufficient enough to make a person tainted unless the self is transformed in that very mode. The omniscient self cannot be affected by desires, etc., in the least. Hence, it cannot be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others by merely knowing them. Besides, desires and aversions are produced by our impure mental states and senses and not by the self which is pure and perfect. The omniscient self is pure and perfect. Hence, it cannot be tainted by the imperfections of sensory cognition. It is further urged that the omniscient is not capable of perceiving the past and future, inasmuch as they are non-existent. On the other hand, if they are perceived as existent, the perception of the omniscient person is illusory. The Jaina says: The past and future are perceived by the omniscient not as present, but as past and future. Hence, no question of illusion arises. The past things are as much existent and real in relation to their own time as the present things are existent and real in relation to the present. The same argument can be applied to the future. The omniscient knows the past as existing in the past and the future as existing in the future. Because of the absolute destruction of the obscuring veils of karma, the cognition of an omniscient person is not produced by the senses, but it is produced directly by the self. Hence, the omniscient directly perceives all the objects of the past, present, and future. In other words, the limitations of space and time are only for sensory perception. They cannot obstruct the perception of an omniscient person. To summarise, an omniscient self directly and immediately perceives all the objects of the universe, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single ever-lasting cognition without the assistance of the medium of external senses and mind. Omniscience is the culmination of the faculty of cognition of the conscious principle.

EMPIRICAL PERCEPTION

Now, we come to empirical perception. 'Empirical perception is conditioned by the senses and mind and is limited.'¹ The

¹ *Indriyānindriyanimittam deśatah sāmvyavahārikamiti. Parikṣā-mukha, II, 5.*

perception which has for its condition the senses and mind is called empirical perception, i.e., *sāṃvya vahārika pratyakṣa*. The meaning of the phrase 'conditioned by the senses and mind' is to be understood in both distributive and collective senses. It is said to be conditioned by the senses when the senses play a major part and the mind exerts influence in its generation; and it is said to be conditioned by the mind when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity.

SENSES

The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight, and ear having respectively for their characteristic the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odour, coloured shape, and sound. Each of these again is of two kinds: physical and psychical. The physical sense is of material atoms possessed of definite shape like ear, eye, etc. The psychical sense is of two kinds; attainment (*labdhi*) and conscious activity (*upayoga*). Attainment means acquisition of the capacity of manifestation of the sense-activity. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to attainment.¹

MIND

Mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects of all the senses.² All the objects of the senses are apprehended by the mind and so it is called the organ of apprehension of all the objects. It is also designated as non-sense (*anīndriya*), quasi-sense (*no-inīndriya*), subtle sense (*sūkṣma-indriya*), or inner sense (*antaḥ-karāṇa*).

Mind is also of two kinds, just like the five senses. These kinds are: physical and psychical. The physical mind is nothing but matter transformed into it. The psychical mind is the conscious activity.

An objection is raised here that the statement about the empirical perception 'it is conditioned by the senses and mind' is inadequate. Thus, for example, visual cognition has for its additional conditions the presence of object and light. In

¹ *Spārśarasagandharūpaśabdagrahaṇalakṣaṇāni spārśanarasanaghrāṇa-
caḥśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi dravyabhāvabhedāni. Dravyendriyaṃ niya-
tākārāṇaḥ pudgalāḥ. Bhāvendriyaṃ labdhyupayogau. Pramāṇa-
mimāṃsā, I, 2, 21-22-23.*

² *Sarvārthagrahaṇaṃ manah. ibid., I, 2, 24.*

answer to this, it is said: 'The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*) between the two.'¹ The meaning is that the external object and light are not the direct conditions of visual cognition, though we do not deny that they are remote (*vyavahita*) conditions, just as time, space, and the like are. Of course, it is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of removal of the knowledge-obscuring karma and also of direct service by benefiting the sense of vision. The question is: Then why should not they be held to be the direct conditions of visual cognition? The answer is: Because there is no concomitance in difference between them which is the most essential form of universal relationship. For instance, it is observed that the perception of water takes place in mirage (*marīcikā*) in the desert in spite of the absence of sensation of water in it and the cats and owls have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in a thick pall of darkness.²

CATEGORIES OF EMPIRICAL PERCEPTION

Sensory as well as mental perception is of four kinds, viz., sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*ihā*), determinate perception (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāraṇā*).³

SENSATION

Sensation is the cognition of an object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate awareness upon the contact of the sense-organ with it.⁴ Sensation is the first stage of knowledge which catches the general feature of an object after the contact of the object with the sense-organ.

SPECULATION

Speculation is inquisitive pursuit for the knowledge of specific details of the perceived datum.⁵ On the sensation

¹ *Nārthālokaḥ jñānasya nimittamavyatirekāt.* Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 2, 25.

² Compare - *Tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānābhāvācca, keṣoṇḍukajñānavannakṭaṅcarajñānavacca.* Parikṣā-mukha, II, 7.

³ *Etaddvitayamavagrahehāvāyadhāraṇābhedaḍekaśaścaturvikalpakaḥ.* Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 6.

⁴ *Akṣārthayoge darśanānantaramarthagrahaṇamavagrahaḥ.* Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 26.

⁵ *Avagyhīlavīṣeṣakāṅkṣaṇamīhā.* *ibid.*, I, 1, 27.

of an objective datum, for instance, a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound emanates from a conch (*śaṅkha*) or a horn (*śṛṅga*) and the mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference in the form of the judgment 'it is perceived as sweet and agreeable which qualities belong to the sound of a conch and not as harsh and shrill which are the qualities of the sound of a horn.' The difference between doubt (*saṁśaya*) and speculation (*ihā*) lies in the fact that doubt is the antecedent form of speculation while speculation stands above doubt. In doubt (*saṁśaya*) there is uncertainty of a specific object, whereas in speculation (*ihā*) there is some sort of certainty that does not fall in the category of doubt.

DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

Determinate perception is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation.¹ Determinate perception is the final determination of the specific characteristic regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition 'the sound must be of a conch and not of a horn.'

RETENTION

Retention is the condition of memory.² The condition is the causal stuff capable of change into the effect as memory which consists in the recollection of a past event. It is nothing but the latent mental trace left over as a legacy by our previous experience.

NON-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION

Now, let us turn to non-perceptual cognition. Non-perceptual cognition is what lacks immediacy and lucidity.³ The subdivisions of non-perceptual knowledge are as under :

'The varieties of the same are recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference, and authority.'⁴

1 *Ihītavīṣeṣanirṇayovāyah*. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 28.

2 *Smytīhetuddhāraṇā*. *ibid.*, I, 1, 29.

3 *Aviśadah parokṣam*. *ibid.*, I, 2, 1.

Aspaṣṭam parokṣam. *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, III, 1.

4 *Smarāṇapratyabhiññānatarkānumānāgamabhedataṭ pañcaprahāram*. *ibid.*, III, 2.

RECOLLECTION

Recollection is a cognition which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression (retention) and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that.'¹

When requisite conditions such as the elimination and subsidence of obstructive veils, observation of similar objects, and the like (similarity, contiguity, and contrast of modern psychology) are at work to bring it to maturation, recollection occurs. And so the clause 'which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression' has been stated. The phrase 'which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun that' is inserted for setting forth its mode of communication.

It is Jainism alone that regards recollection (*smṛti*) as a valid and independent means of cognition among all the philosophical systems in India. As a consequence, it has to face many objections from the side of opponents. How can recollection be a means of cognition when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis? This is an objection. The answer is: It is certainly possessed of an object that has been experienced in the past. The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence is the condition of validity of a cognition. If it be contended, on the analogy of perception, that the object must be felt as present in order that the cognition may be valid, one might with equal force contend that perceptual cognition is invalid, since it is found to lack the criterion of referring to a fact that has been experienced in the past. If the opponent thinks that the revelation of the relevant object is the criterion of validity, it is found to be equally present in the case of recollection (memory) also. Another objection is that how can a dead object be the generating condition of recollection? The Jaina answers: It is your delusion that makes you think so. For validity of cognition, it is not necessary that the object must be the generating condition. For instance, light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions reveals the objects jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also does a cognition reveal its object, though it is not produced by the object.

¹ *Vāsanodbodhahetukā tadityākāṛā smṛtiḥ*. Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā, I, 2, 3.

RECOGNITION

Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it,' 'it is like that,' 'that is dissimilar to that,' 'this is different from that,' and the like.¹

Observation is perceptual cognition. Recollection is an act of memory. These two are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgment. 'This is necessarily that jar,' and the like are the cases of judgment of identity. 'This is like that,' e.g., 'the gayal (*gavaya*) is like the cow' is the judgment of similarity (analogy). 'This is dissimilar to that,' e.g., 'the buffalo is different from the cow' is the judgment of dissimilarity. 'This is less than, more than, farther than, nearer than,' etc., are examples of the judgment of difference. Recognition is neither perception alone nor analogy exclusively.

INDUCTIVE REASONING

Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation (*upalambha*) and non-observation (*anupalambha*)²

'Observation' means the knowledge of existence of the major term (*sādhya*) on the existence of the middle term (*liṅga*). 'Non-observation' stands for the knowledge of non-existence of the middle term where there is no major term.

Now, it should not be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual cognition. It is beyond the capacity of perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, since our empirical perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. In other words, perception is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present in a limited sense.

Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of

¹ *Darśanasmarāṇasambhavaṃ tadevedaṃ tatsaḍrśaṃ tadvilakṣaṇaṃ
tatpratīyogītyādisaṅkalanam pratyabhijñānam.* Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā,
I, 2, 4.

² *Upalambhānupalambhanimittam vyāptijñānamūhah.* *ibid.*, I, 2, 5.

universal concomitance. In other words, the knowledge of universal concomitance has been apprehended as an antecedent condition of inference. Such being the case, how is it possible that the knowledge of universal concomitance, i.e., inductive reasoning can be obtained by inference? It follows, therefore, that reasoning is a separate means of knowledge which serves to give knowledge of universal concomitance which is not apprehended by any other recognised means. It is known as *tarka* or *ūha*.

Now, what is universal concomitance? Hemacandra defines it in the following terms: 'Universal concomitance consists in the 'occurrence necessarily' of the determinant concomitant (major term-*vyāpaka*) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (middle term-*vyāpya*), or the occurrence of the determinate concomitant 'exclusively in the locus' where the major term occurs.'¹

The uniform characteristic of both the middle and major terms has been regarded as follows: The major necessarily exists in the locus in which the middle occurs, and as for the middle, it occurs exclusively in a locus where the major exists. If this necessary restriction were reversed, the concomitance between the middle and major terms will not be necessary (universal).²

INFERENCE

Now, we define inference which comes next in order. Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya*) on the strength of the probans (*sādhana*).³

The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact, and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated, is called inference (*anumāna*).

It is of two kinds: for one's own self (subjective) and for others (syllogistic).

SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE

Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self, as having the sole

¹ *Vyāptirvyāpakasya vyāpye sati bhāva eva, vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvah.* *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 2, 6.

² *Līṅge līṅgī bhavatyeva līṅginyevetarat punah, niyamasya viparyāse sambandho līṅgalīṅginoh.*

³ *Sāadhanāt sādhyaiviññānamanumānam.* *ibid.*, I, 2, 7.

and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum.¹

Necessary concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. The knowledge of the probandum from such a probans definitely cognised by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic of inseparable relation with the probandum is called subjective inference.

Inseparable relationship is further defined as consisting in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events.² Synchronous events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions such as colour and taste of a fruit and the like. Successive events are those which occur in succession, as for instance, the appearance of *kṛttikā* and *śakaṭa*; or which are related as effect and cause, e.g., smoke and fire. The necessity of the simultaneity of synchronous events and the necessity of the succession of successive events, is what is meant by inseparable relationship or universal concomitance. The triple characteristic of the Buddhists and the quantuple characteristic of the Naiyāyikas are nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance.

PROBANS

The probans (*sādhana*) is of five types: essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite.³ Of these, the essential identity is illustrated by the attribute of 'being a product' or 'audible' with regard to the inference of impermanence in a word. Word is impermanent, because it is a product or because it is audible.

The cause is illustrated by the attention of a particular type of cloud with regard to the inference of shower of rain.

1 *Svārthaṁ svaniścitasādhyaivinābhāvaiikalakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhyajñānam.* Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 2, 9.

2 *Sahakramabhāvinoḥ sahakramabhāvānīyamōvinābhāvuh.* ibid., I, 2, 10.

3 *Svabhāvah kāraṇaṁ kāryamekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti pañcadhā sādhanam.* ibid., I, 2, 12.

The effect is illustrated by such instances as the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the probans of rainfall, smoke serving as the probans of fire, life serving as the probans of consciousness.

The co-inherent in the same substratum is illustrated by colour and taste belonging to one and the same fruit, by the emergence of *śakaṭa* and *kyṭṭikā*, by the moon-rise and the sea-tide.

As regards the opposite, it is what is opposed to the negatum or to the effect, etc. As for example, there is no touch of cold herein, as fire is present; the causal conditions of cold with their powers unfrustrated cannot be present here, as fire is present in this place.

SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE

Subjective inference has been defined. Now, we propose to give the definition of syllogistic inference. 'Syllogistic inference is definite cognition resulting from a statement of a probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum.'¹ The definite authentic cognition of a fact that arises from a statement of a person having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with probandum, is designated as 'syllogistic inference'. In other words, it is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person.

The syllogistic statement has two different types. The first type is due to the consideration of the logical possibility on the necessary occurrence of the probandum. In other words, when the possibility of probans is understood to be necessarily dependent on the occurrence of the probandum, the first type is there. The second type arises from the consideration of the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum. Take some concrete example: The hill is on fire, because the logical possibility of its being possessed of smoke is intelligible only on that condition; or, because the fact of its possession of smoke would become logically impossible in the absence of fire. The difference of syllogistic inference is conditioned merely by this difference of form and not a real difference. In other words,

¹ *Yathoktasādhanābhīdhānaṅgaḥ parārtham. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā,*
II, 1, 1.

the difference between these two is not in respect of ultimate intention but is merely formal. For this very reason, the statement of both the propositions is not necessary.

PARTS OF THE SYLLOGISM

Philosophers of different schools hold different views with regard to the constitution of the syllogism. For instance, the Sāṅkhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three parts, viz., thesis, reason, and example. The Mīmāṃsakas assert four parts with the addition of application. The Naiyāyikas assert five parts with the addition of conclusion. Such being the case, the question naturally arises: What is the proper form of a syllogism? The Jaina thinkers answer: 'The thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person.'¹ In obligation to the pledge of edification of a pupil or any layman, the syllogism may have five propositions also, viz., thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. As has been remarked by Bhadrabāhu: 'The syllogism is said to consist of five parts or of ten parts in the alternative. We denounce neither but accept both as legitimate.'²

THESIS

Now, we set forth the definition of thesis that comes first in order: 'Thesis is the statement of the theme to be proved.'³ It is called *pratijñā* or *pakṣa*. 'This hill is possessed of fire' is a typical illustration.

REASON

The definition of reason is as follows: 'Statement of a probans ending in an inflexion (*vibhakti*) unfolding the character of probans is called reason.'⁴ A particular type of statement unfolding the character of probans is known as reason. The inflexion is either the fifth or the third case-ending in Sanskrit and such words as 'because' or 'since' prefixed to it in English. As for instance, (this hill is possessed of fire) 'because it has smoke or smoke is impossible in its absence.' The existence of

¹ *Etāvān prekṣaprayogah. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, II, I, 9.*

² *Katthai pañcāvayavaṃ dasahā vā savahā ṇa paḍikuttham ti. Daśavaikālikā-niryukti, 50.*

³ *Sādhyavirdeśah pratijñā. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, II, I, 11.*

⁴ *Sādhanaivābhivyañjakavibhaktiyantam sādhanavacanam hetuh. ibid., II, 1, 12.*

smoke is logically justifiable only on the condition of its positive concomitance with fire or the existence of smoke is logically impossible unless the said concomitance be a fact.

EXAMPLE

Example is the statement of an illustration.¹ It is a statement which sets forth an illustration. It is also of two kinds on account of the difference of illustrations. The statement of an illustration based upon similarity of attribute is called 'homogeneous example' (*sādharmya dṛṣṭānta*). 'Whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example, an oven' is a typical instance. 'Heterogeneous example (*vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta*) is the statement of an illustration in dissimilarity. 'Whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, as for example, a lake' may be cited as a typical case.

APPLICATION

Application is the act of bringing the probans into connection with the minor term (*dharmīn*).² The proposition 'it is possessed of smoke' is a typical example of the same.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion is the predication of the probandum.³ The proposition 'Therefore it is possessed of fire' is an illustration.

The complete form of the proposition of the syllogism is like this: This hill is possessed of fire, because it has smoke; whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire as for example, an oven; it is possessed of smoke, therefore it is possessed of fire.

Or

This hill is possessed of fire because smoke is impossible in its absence; whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, as for example, a lake; it is possessed of smoke, therefore it is possessed of fire.

¹ *Dṛṣṭāntavacanamudāharaṇam*. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, II, 1, 13.

² 'Hetoh sādhyadharmīnyuḥpasamharaṇamupanayoḥ yathā dhūmaścātra pradeśe.' Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, III, 49-50.

³ *Sādhyadharmasya punarnigamanam, yathā tasmādniratra*. ibid., III, 51-2.

AUTHORITY

We have dealt with recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, and inference. The fifth division of non-perceptual cognition, viz., authority still remains to be defined. We now propose to deal with it.

The knowledge produced by the word of a reliable source is called authority.¹ It is also known as 'verbal testimony' or 'word.' The reliable source is that person who knows the object as it is and describes it as he knows it. He who possesses right knowledge and makes a right judgment is said to be reliable or *āpta*. Such a reliable person cannot tell a lie. His proposition is always true. Hence, he is authority. His 'word' is also known as testimony. The authority is of two kinds: ordinary and extraordinary, i.e., *laukika* and *alaukika*, respectively. The ordinary authority is father, etc. The omniscient is an example of extraordinary authority.

The *Āgrika* conception of knowledge can be covered by the logical division of cognition in the following style: *Avadhi-jñāna* (clairvoyance), *manahpariyaya-jñāna* (telepathy) and *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience) are styled as transcendental perception. *Mati-jñāna* (sensory and intellectual knowledge) is occupied by empirical perception, recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, and inference. *Śruta-jñāna* (scriptural knowledge) is called authority, verbal testimony, scriptural testimony, or 'Word.'

¹ *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, IV, 1.

CHAPTER V

RELATIVITY OF JUDGMENT

ACCORDING to Jainism any object that is real has three fundamental characteristics, viz., origination, decay, and permanence. Every object that seems to be permanent is liable to both origination and decay. In the same way, every thing that seems to originate and perish has an aspect of permanence. All things including the flame of a lamp which is generally believed to be momentary and space that is believed to be permanent are subject to the law of origination, decay, and permanence. The Jaina thinkers reject the definition of permanence (*nityatva*) given by other schools. They do not believe in absolute changelessness. According to the Jainas, the permanent is that which continues to exist in spite of origination and decay. They argue what would origination and decay belong to, if nothing continues? A continuous reality must be posited for the very possibility of origination and decay. Modes, i.e., origination and decay and essence, i.e., permanence exist together in a substance. Neither is origination possible without decay and permanence, nor is decay possible in the absence of origination and permanence, nor is permanence tenable without origination and decay. All the three retain their respective existence on the basis of mutual co-operation. They are not heterogeneous elements, as generally supposed, but they possess the nature of homogeneous elements. Jainism differs equally from those who hold that all is absolutely permanent, and those who hold that all is absolutely momentary, and also from those who hold that some things are absolutely permanent and some absolutely momentary. According to Jaina philosophy, all are both permanent and momentary. This criterion belongs to all objects. Moreover, all objects are inter-related to each other. The individual form of an object cannot be established unless the knowledge of its inter-relations is assumed. When we speak of a human being, the relative knowledge of objects other than the human being springs up of itself. Similarly, when we speak of Europeans, the idea of non-Europeans springs up naturally. Similarly, when we speak of Indians, the

idea of non-Indians spontaneously springs up. The idea of virtue suggests the idea of vice and so on. Thus, the knowledge of one substance or object suggests the relative knowledge of other substances or objects. Lord Mahāvīra, keeping this in view, said that a man who knows only one object with all its properties, knows all things. He, who knows all things with all their properties, knows one thing.¹ Thus, the Jaina philosopher advocates the doctrine of non-absolutism. Every judgment of a Jaina thinker bears the conception of non-absolutism in its heart. He makes no judgment that goes against the spirit of non-absolutism.

TRACES IN THE CANONS

The theory of non-absolutism is not an innovation of the later philosophers who propounded the sacred teachings of the Great Teacher Lord Mahāvīra. The Lord himself preached this philosophical doctrine and the later followers put it into a systematic and logical form. While describing the nature of soul (*jīva*), Mahāvīra addressed Gautama: "O Gautama! from one point of view the soul is permanent, from another point of view the soul is not permanent. From the view-point of substance the soul is permanent, from the view-point of modes the soul is not permanent."²

Lord Mahāvīra emphasised the identity of soul and knowledge from one stand-point. In the Ācārāṅga-sūtra it is said: Soul is knowledge and knowledge is soul...³ From another point of view he emphasised the difference of various modes and according to those modes, the soul was classified. We find in the Bhagavatī-sūtra: "O Lord! how many kinds of soul are there?" "O Gautama! the soul is said to be of eight kinds, viz., *dravya-ātmā* (from the point of view of substance), *kaṣāya-ātmā* (from the point of view of passion)....."⁴

Similarly, the medium of motion is said to be one as well as many. From the stand-point of substance (*dravya*), the medium

¹ *Je egaṃ jānai se savvaṃ jānai.*

Je savvaṃ jānai se egaṃ jānai. Ācārāṅga-sūtra, I, 3, 4, 122.

² *Goyamā! jīvā siya sāsaya siya asāsaya. Goyamā! dāvvaṭṭhayāe sāsaya bhāvvaṭṭhayāe asāsaya.* Bhagavatī-sūtra, VII, 2, 273.

³ *Je āyā se vinnāyā.....*

⁴ Bhagavatī-sūtra, XII, 10, 467.

of motion is one and from the view-point of units (*pradeśas*) it is innumerable.¹ The same method can be applied to the medium of rest, etc.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Whether the effect exists in the cause or is it a new outcome? Those philosophers who admit that the effect is not a new product but that it does exist in the cause, are known as '*Satkāryavādins*.' Those thinkers who do not believe in this doctrine but hold that the effect is entirely a new outcome and that it does not exist in the cause, are called '*Asatkāryavādins*.' The schools of Indian philosophy believing in the theory of '*satkāryavāda*' are Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta. The *Asatkāryavādins* are Cārvāka, Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā (one sect). Jainism does not regard these views as valid in their absolute forms. According to its doctrine of non-absolutism, the effect is neither absolutely identical with the cause nor absolutely different from it. The cause remains in the effect as an essence and not as a mode. The effect is new in the shape of a mode and not as the essence. In other words, the essential quality remains unchanged, while the mode is changed. When we say that the effect is new, we mean only that the mode is new. When we admit that the effect is not new, we mean by this that the essence is the same. That which exists can never be absolutely non-existent and that which does not exist at all can never come into existence. An existent object cannot be destroyed and a non-existent object cannot be originated. Hence, from one point of view, the effect does not exist in the cause. It is a new outcome. From another point of view, it can be maintained that the effect does exist in the cause. Both these stand-points are right so far as they are not absolute. We cannot define the theory of causation in an exclusive manner. Unless the doctrine of causation in the form of '*sad-asatkāryavāda*' is accepted, it is not possible to have a true picture of reality.

Thus, the so-called opposites such as existence and non-existence, permanence and non-permanence, identity and difference, oneness and maniness, etc., can be attributed to an object from various points of view. These opposites should not be taken to be absolutely heterogeneous. They can remain in the same

¹ Prajñāpanā-pada, III, 56.

object without contradicting each other. Besides, the object requires these opposites to depict its complete and real picture. In the absence of these opposites, the existence of an object is impossible. When we say that an object exists, we only mean by this statement that in a certain respect it exists. When we make a statement that an object does not exist, we only mean that from a particular point of view, it does not exist. We cannot say that it absolutely exists or it does not exist absolutely. As it is remarked: 'Everything exists in its own individuality, and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent, and thus, there would possibly be no individuality at all.'¹

ANEKĀNTA, ANEKĀNTAVĀDA, AND SYĀDVĀDA

According to Jainism, a particular object can be viewed from different points of view. It can be existent, non-existent, one, many, identical, different, and the like. It possesses indefinite attributes. These attributes or characteristics (*dharma*s) are not conceptual but they really exist in the object. We select some of the aspects when we make any judgment. *Anekānta* is the name of the ontological nature of Reality, according to which every object possesses indefinite aspects. When we speak of a particular aspect, we have to use the word 'syāt,' i.e., from a particular point of view or as related to this aspect, this object is such and not otherwise. As for instance, when we speak of the aspect of existence of a pot, we choose the 'existence' aspect of that pot which possesses many other aspects as well. We make a statement about the aspect of existence, i.e., in relation to the aspect of existence, the pot exists. Take another example: Mohan is a father, brother, uncle, etc., according to various relations. He is the father of his son, the brother of his brother, and so on. When his son calls him, he uses the word 'father.' Now, Mohan possesses many aspects like those of father, brother, etc. In relation to his son, he is father. Thus, Mohan is a father as related to his son, i.e., relatively Mohan is a father. Thus, 'Syādvāda,' i.e., the theory of the relativity of propositions is the theory of the relativity of judgment. When an object, which is *anekāntātma* (possessing many characteristics), is expressed in a particular

¹ *Sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāsti ca.
Anyathā sarvasatvaṃ syāt svarūpasyāpyasambhavaḥ.*

form of judgment, the expression is known as *Syādvāda*. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and these points of view are expressed by the word 'syāt.' As it is said: 'The judgment about an object possessing many characteristics is called '*Syādvāda*.''¹

The theory of '*Syādvāda*' is also called '*Anekāntavāda*' because the relativity of judgment is nothing but a relative judgment about an object that possesses indefinite aspects or qualities. In other words, the relative judgment is not possible unless the object for which that judgment stands, is *anekāntātma*. Hence, the judgment that stands for an object possessing many characteristics (*anekāntātma*) is also known as *Anekāntavāda*. As it is maintained: 'In the term '*Syādvāda*', the word 'syāt' expresses many aspects of an object, hence, '*Syādvāda*' is called '*Anekāntavāda*.''²

Thus, the object itself is *anekānta*, i.e., the substratum of many characteristics. The judgment about the object is '*Syādvāda*' because every characteristic is expressed with the word 'syāt'. This judgment is also called '*Anekāntavāda*', since it expresses the object that possesses many characteristics.

SEVEN-FOLD JUDGMENT

The object has been described as a possessor of indefinite characteristics. When we select one of the characteristics with its contrary aspect and judge it, this kind of judgment has seven forms, hence, it is called seven-fold judgment.³ The following are the seven propositions with reference to the concrete illustration of pot:—

1. Relatively the pot does exist.
2. Relatively the pot does not exist.
3. Relatively the pot does exist and does not exist.
4. Relatively the pot is indescribable.
5. Relatively the pot does exist and is indescribable.
6. Relatively the pot does not exist and is indescribable.
7. Relatively the pot does exist, does not exist, and is indescribable.

¹ *Anekāntātma-kārthakathanam syādvādaḥ*. Laghīyastraya-tikā, 62.

² *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā*, 5.

³ *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, IV, 14.

In these propositions, the word 'relatively' is most significant. Every judgment bears the stamp of relativity, by which the notion of absolutism is refuted. All our judgments are relative, i.e., non-absolutistic. The proposition 'relatively the pot does exist' shows that from a particular point of view, the pot does exist. This particular point of view is determined by four factors. These factors are the substance, place, time, and mode as related to the pot. The explanation of these determining factors is as follows :

- (a) The substance of the pot is the clay of which it is made. Viewed from the point of view of this particular substance, the pot does exist.
- (b) The place of the pot points to the locality where it is lying. As viewed from the point of view of a particular room, the pot does exist.
- (c) The time of the existence of the pot is the present time in which it exists. As viewed from the point of view of eight o'clock, the pot does exist.
- (d) The mode of the pot points to the form or shape. Viewed from the point of view of a particular form such as its contracted neck, the pot does exist. To be more clear, the proposition 'relatively the pot does exist' means that the pot does exist as far as its own individual form is concerned by reason of its substance, place, time, and mode. Its substance points to the clay of which it is made, its place is the locality in which it stands, its time is the present time in which it exists, and its mode points to its particular form such as its contracted neck.

The proposition 'relatively the pot does not exist' means that the pot does not exist if looked at from the point of view of the absence of the characteristics of its substance, place, time, and mode. To elucidate, the pot does not exist with reference to another substance such as gold, etc.; with reference to another place such as some other room, etc.; with reference to the time preceding its manufacture or succeeding its destruction, i.e., the past and the future times; and with reference to other modes such as a broad neck, etc. In this proposition the pot is looked at from the point of view of the absence of the four determining

factors that are ascribed to the aspect of existence. But it is not a proposition contradictory to the first proposition. It does not deny the existence of the pot in so far as its specific properties are concerned but denies its existence when other properties that are not positively present in it, are taken into consideration. This proposition stands from the point of view of the predominance of the aspect of non-existence.

The third proposition 'relatively the pot does exist and does not exist' is maintained on the ground that the pot does exist in reference to its own substance and does not exist with reference to the substance of other things. It does exist in its own place and does not exist in other places. It does exist in the present time and does not exist in the time preceding its manufacture or succeeding its destruction, i.e., the past and the future. The pot does exist in reference to its own form or mode and does not exist in reference to the modes or forms of other things. According to this proposition, the first part of the judgment is true from the point of view of the existence of the individual properties of the pot and the second part is true from the point of view of the non-existence of other properties in it. It means that the pot does exist from the standpoint of its individual properties and that it does not exist from the view-point of the absence of other qualities in it.

The fourth proposition 'relatively the pot is indescribable' is true if both the points of view of the previous propositions are assumed simultaneously. When both the views of existence and non-existence are taken at the same time, it becomes indescribable.

The fifth proposition 'relatively the pot does exist and is indescribable' means that the pot exists in regard to its existent form but it becomes indescribable if both its existent and non-existent forms are considered simultaneously. It is indescribable, yet, it exists.

The sixth proposition 'relatively the pot does not exist and is indescribable' means that the pot does not exist in regard to its non-existent aspects but looked at from the point of view of its existent and non-existent forms simultaneously it becomes indescribable. Here the point of view refers to the combination of indescribability and non-existence.

The seventh proposition 'relatively the pot does exist, does not exist, and is indescribable' means that the pot does exist owing to its own properties, does not exist in regard to its non-existent characteristics, and is indescribable if both the points of view are assumed simultaneously. Here the point of view is dominated by the combination of indescribability, the existence, and the non-existence of the pot.

The point is that when the truth of a particular aspect of a thing is to be ascertained, it should not be examined only from one point of view. The Jainas hold that every aspect of an object can be viewed from seven stand-points, every one of which is true but the whole truth about that aspect lies in the combination of all these seven views. This seven-fold declaration of judgment in regard to everything, is a peculiar and unique method of the Jaina dialectic. Just as existence is applied to everything, so also the terms permanent and non-permanent, one and many, describable and indescribable, and the like can be applied to it. The propositions will be the same with the change of these words. For instance, relatively the pot is eternal (in view of its substance), relatively the pot is not eternal (in view of its changing forms), and so on.

The gist of the seven-fold judgment of the Jaina dialectic is as under :

1. Thesis (positive).
2. Anti-thesis (negative).
3. Aggregation (both positive and negative respectively).
4. Synthesis (both positive and negative simultaneously).
5. Thesis and synthesis (positive, and both positive and negative simultaneously).
6. Anti-thesis and synthesis (negative, and both positive and negative simultaneously).
7. Aggregation and synthesis (both positive and negative respectively, and both positive and negative simultaneously).

Or

1. Existence.
2. Non-existence.
3. Existence and non-existence.

4. Indescribability.
5. Existence and indescribability.
6. Non-existence and indescribability.
7. Existence, non-existence, and indescribability.

First of all we take the aspect 'existence.' Then we come to the anti-aspect 'non-existence.' After it we put both 'existence' and 'non-existence' together respectively. Then we put both these 'existence' and 'non-existence' together simultaneously. We cannot describe both 'existence' and 'non-existence' simultaneously, since our proposition will necessarily have either of the two first. Hence, we call it indescribable. These four propositions are fundamental. When we add the first proposition to the fourth, the fifth proposition is there. Adding the second to the fourth, we derive the sixth one. Similarly, when we add the third proposition to the fourth, we naturally have the seventh category. The scheme is as under :

1. Existence.
2. Non-existence.
3. Existence and non-existence.
4. Indescribability.
- 1+4=5. Existence and indescribability.
- 2+4=6. Non-existence and indescribability.
- 3+4=7. Existence, non-existence, and indescribability.

This is the general view of the method of the Jaina dialectic. This dialectical method follows the theory of relativity of judgment, i.e., *Syādvāda*. In other words, *Syādvāda* can be represented only by this type of dialectical method. *Syādvāda* is said to be the foundation of Jaina philosophy. It is so important that the Jaina thinkers did not hesitate to put it on an equal status with omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*). As it is said: 'Both *Syādvāda* and *kevala-jñāna* illuminate the whole reality. The difference between them is only this much that while the former illuminates the objects indirectly, the latter illuminates them directly.'¹

Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgment is of two kinds: complete (*sakalādeśa*) and incomplete (*vikalādeśa*).²

¹ Āpta-mīmāṃsā, 105.

² Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, IV, 43.

COMPLETE JUDGMENT

We know that an object possesses indefinite characteristics but it is not possible for us to describe all of them. To overcome this difficulty, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object, and hold the remaining characteristics to be identical with it. By this method we can describe all the characteristics of an object by the description of a particular aspect only. This type of proposition is called complete judgment. The identity of other aspects with a single aspect of an object is proved by the identity of time, etc.

The word 'existence' in the proposition 'relatively the pot does exist' includes all other aspects of the pot through the identity of time, quality, substratum, relation, contributory part, residence of substance, association, and word.¹

- (1) *Time (kāla)*—Time indicates that at the time when the quality of existence is predicated of the pot, the qualities of redness, hardness, etc., can as well be predicated of it. In other words, the pot has many qualities or characteristics at the same time. Therefore, from the view-point of time, all the qualities of the pot are inseparable from one another. Thus, time bridges the difference existing in the various qualities and takes 'existence' as identical with all the qualities.
- (2) *Quality (ātma-rūpa)*—Just as existence is the quality of the pot, so also redness, hardness, etc., are its qualities. Hence, with regard to qualities, existence is not different from redness, hardness, etc., in the case of the pot.
- (3) *Substratum (artha)*—In the same substratum where the characteristic of existence resides, the other qualities also reside. Hence, with reference to substratum, all other qualities are identical with existence.
- (4) *Relation (sambandha)*—Just as the quality of existence is related to the pot, so also the other qualities are related to it. Hence, from the view-point of relation all other qualities are not different from existence.
- (5) *Contributory part (upakāra)*—The part which the quality of existence plays in regard to the pot, is also played by the

¹ Syādvāda-ratnākara, IV, 44.

other qualities of the pot. Thus, so far as the contributory part is concerned, there is no difference between existence and all other qualities.

- (6) *Residence of substance (guṇi-deśa)*—In that place where the pot exists, the quality of existence resides. In the same place the other qualities also reside. Hence, with reference to the residence of substance, the quality of existence is identical with all other qualities.
- (7) *Association (saṃsarga)*—Just as the quality of existence is associated with the pot inseparably, so are all other qualities. Hence, from the point of view of association, there is identity in all different qualities. This is the identity of association.
- (8) *Word (śabda)*—Just as the quality of existence is signified by the word 'is,' so are the other qualities signified by it. Just as we propose a judgment 'relatively the pot is existent' so also we propose another judgment 'relatively the pot is red, hard, etc.' Here, just as the quality of 'existence' is signified by the word 'is,' so are the other qualities signified by it. This is the identity from the stand-point of word.

All these eight stand-points can be applied to the other qualities also in the same manner as they are applied to the quality of existence of the pot. This kind of judgment is called complete judgment. It is also called '*pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī*,' i.e., the seven-fold judgment of *pramāṇa*.¹

INCOMPLETE JUDGMENT

While describing the nature of complete judgment, we saw that all qualities are identical with one quality attributed to it. In the case of incomplete judgment, the order is reversed.² Every judgment presupposes some difference in every aspect or quality. In regard to a complete judgment, time, quality, etc., establish identity among various qualities, whereas with regard to an incomplete judgment, time, quality, etc., prepare the ground

¹ Ratnākarāvatārikā, IV, 44.

² *Tadviparītaṣṭu vikalādeśah*. *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, IV, 45.

for difference among various qualities. This kind of judgment is called ' *naya-saptabhaṅgī*.'

DEFINITION OF NAYA

Pramāṇa or complete judgment describes the object with all its qualities. *Naya* or incomplete judgment holds any one of the qualities of that object and leaves the rest untouched. This does not mean that it rejects all other qualities except one. The point is that a particular *naya* (view-point) selects one of the indefinite number of qualities for its purpose, not rejecting the other ones but leaving them for other view-points (*nayas*). A judgment which accepts only one quality and rejects the remaining ones is fallacious (*nayābhāsa*).

If we look at an object from indefinite points of view, we can say that there are indefinite kinds of *naya* because the object is composed of indefinite characteristics and one *naya* knows only one characteristic. Looking at it from a specific point of view, it is maintained that *naya* is of two kinds: *dravyāstika* (dealing with generality) and *ṣaryāyāstika* (dealing with particularity).¹ *Dravyāstika* is the view of looking at the identity of things (*abheda*), while *ṣaryāyāstika* is the view which looks at the difference of things. Man speaks of something either from the stand-point of identity or from that of difference. Statements of things from the former point of view are put under the head of *dravyāstika*. Propositions of objects from the stand-point of difference fall under the category of *ṣaryāyāstika*. Many minor classifications of things ranging between general (*dravyāstika*) and particular (*ṣaryāyāstika*) view-points are also possible. But briefly speaking, there can be only two groups of statements. The view-point of identity, upon which are founded the statements of generalisation is called *dravyāstika naya*, while the view-point upon which are founded the statements of particularisation is called *ṣaryāyāstika naya*. *Dravyāstika naya* is further divided into three categories: *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, and *vyavahāra*. The sub-divisions of *ṣaryāyāstika naya* are four: *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.²

¹ Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, I, 3.

² Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, VII, 6; VII, 27.

NAIGAMA NAYA

It views an object as possessing both the general and particular properties, because no object is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some particular property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class.¹ As for example, 'I am conscious' is a statement of *naigama naya*. Here the property 'consciousness' is a general quality that exists in all living beings, whereas 'I' indicates my particular nature, i.e., individuality.

SAṄGRAHA NAYA

It deals with the general properties of an object.² As for instance, 'reality is one because it exists' is a proposition of *saṅgraha naya*. It does not look at the particular properties of reality but regards the general property as its subject-matter. In its pure form, it is only concerned with the simple statement 'it is,' that is to say, when the thing is mentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications. All other statements deal, in one way or the other, with some attribute or the other, and as such is the subject of all *nayas*.

VYAVAHĀRA NAYA

It takes into consideration a general object as possessing specific properties.³ It does not deal with generality in the sense as *saṅgraha naya* deals with it. Its subject-matter is only a part of the object of *saṅgraha*. In other words, it classifies the subject-matter of *saṅgraha* in a particular fashion. 'Existence is either substance or modification' is an instance of *vyavahāra naya*.⁴ Here 'existence' is classified into two, viz., substance and modification.

RJUSŪTRA NAYA

It does not trouble itself with the past and the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present aspect of a thing because that alone is useful for the moment.⁵ The argument underlying the *rjusūtra* view-point is that of immediate utility

¹ Naya-karṇikā, 5.

² *ibid.*, 6.

³ *ibid.*, 8.

⁴ Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, VII, 23-4.

⁵ *ibid.*, VII, 28.

which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. As for instance, 'I am happy at this moment,' is a proposition dealing with the present state of my happiness.

ŚABDA NAYA

It treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance, 'kumbha,' 'kalaśa,' 'ghaṭa' are all expressive of one and the same object, viz., a jar.¹ The meaning is that *śabda naya* does not concern itself with the difference of synonymous words, but simply deals with them as if they were pure equivalents of one another.

SAMABHIRŪDHA NAYA

It holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs; just as a jar and a piece of cloth are different, so also a jar (*kumbha*), a pitcher (*kalaśa*), and a pot (*ghaṭa*) signify different things according to their meanings.² The point is that while the '*śabda*' would treat synonyms as equivalent words, the '*samabhirūdhā*' would distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds.

EVAMBHŪTA NAYA

It recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word.³ The argument is that if a thing is not in the state of performing its function, as expressed by the term at the moment of recognition, and still it be recognised as that thing, then even a jar can be called a cloth, though it is not in the state of discharging the function of a cloth. Etymologically, *evambhūta* means 'true in its entirety to the word and the sense.' As for instance, 'go' (cow) means that which goes.⁴ If a cow is not going but sitting, she would not be called 'go' (cow) at that time. She is cow only when she goes.

PROVINCE OF NAYA

Dravyāstika naya and *ṣaryāyāstika naya* are not absolutely different. *Dravyāstika* includes in itself all those statements in

1 Naya-karṇikā, 14.

2 *ibid.*, 15.

3 *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, VII, 40.

4 '*Gacchatīti gauh.*'

which there is some sort of general statement. In all such statements, there is an overlapping of *ṣaryāyāstika* also. Only that statement where there is no further possibility of particularisation falls under the strict purview of pure *ṣaryāyāstika*.¹ The point is that as a rule, every statement that deals with some sort of universal statement is the legitimate province of *dravyāstika*. Except the ultimate statement where there is a statement of that indivisible particularisation, all other statements gradually culminating in the statement of the highest universality fall under the purview of *dravyāstika*. But, at the same time, all these statements, except the statement of the highest universality, become the subject-matter of *ṣaryāyāstika* as well. In other words, only one statement dealing with the highest entity without a single attribute, is covered by *dravyāstika* only. Only that statement which deals with ultimate particularisation beyond which there is no possibility of further particularisation, falls under the range of *ṣaryāyāstika* only. All the intermediary statements are covered by *ṣaryāyāstika* as well as *dravyāstika*, for in every such intermediary statement there is some kind of generalisation as well as some sort of particularisation. That very object which is viewed by *dravyāstika* from the view-point of generalisation, is viewed by *ṣaryāyāstika* from the stand-point of particularisation. 'This being the case, it is (perhaps) impossible to find a *dravyāstika* in its pure form, that is to say, absolutely unmixed with *ṣaryāyāstika*. Similarly, it is equally impossible to find a *ṣaryāyāstika* in its pure form totally unmixed with *dravyāstika*. Hence, assigning a particular statement to a particular *naya* depends upon the volition of the speaker.'²

The distinction between the proper province of these *nyayas* is that *dravyāstika* takes its stand excluding the positive assertion of *ṣaryāyāstika* as its legitimate subject, while *ṣaryāyāstika* views the same object exclusively from the stand-point of particularisation. Here, each does not consider the assertion of its rival *naya* as its property. Herein lies the true distinction between them and their spheres when applied to one and the same thing. The same fact is expressed in the following words: 'From the stand-point of *ṣaryāyāstika*, all things are necessarily born and perish;

¹ Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, I, 8.

² *ibid.*, I, 9.

dravyāstika, on the other hand, holds that all things exist eternally without birth and decay. There cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding or eternal something, i.e., a permanent substance, for birth, decay, and permanence constitute the characteristic of a substance.¹ How these *nayas* become wrong in their absolutely exclusive assertion, is shown in the following statement: 'These three characteristics of origination, decay, and permanence must dwell together in harmony to make a real definition of a thing in its integral form. Each *naya*, therefore, if taken independently, isolated from the other, can never yield an adequate idea of 'sat.' Both these, therefore, divorced from each other, are wrong (fallacious). As these two *nayas* when taken in their exclusiveness are false *nayas*, all other *nayas* (as *naigama*, *śabda*, etc.) are also wrong when taken in their isolated stand-points, for the subsequent *nayas* occupy themselves in viewing the different aspects of the thing which is the subject of these two principal *nayas*. Just as emerald and other jewels of rare quality and of excellent kind do not acquire the designation of a necklace of jewels, even though all of them be precious jewels, on account of their lying unconnected with or disunited with each other; similarly every *naya* in its own sphere is right, but if all of them arrogate to themselves the whole truth and disregard the views of rival *naya*, then they do not attain the status of a right view.'²

FALLACY OF NAYA

Nayas, taking their own view-points in an absolute form and rejecting or disregarding the stand-points of others are called fallacious *nayas* (*nayābhāsas*). There are the following seven fallacies according to the seven *nayas* :—

1. *Fallacy of naigama naya*.—It consists in making an absolute separation between the general and particular properties of things. As for instance, if a proposition establishes a

1 *Uppajjanti viyanti ya bhāvā niyameṇa pajjavanayassa.*
Davvatthiyassa savaṃ sayā anuppannamaviṇattham.
Davaṃ pajjavaviyaṃ davvaviuttā ya pajjavā natthi.
Uppāya-ññii-bhaṅgā haṃdi daviyalakkhaṇaṃ eyaṃ.
 —Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, I, 11-2.

2 *ibid.*, I, 13; I, 22-3.

separation between the individual self and consciousness as if they could be separated from one another, it is the fallacy of *naigama naya*.

2. *Fallacy of saṅgraha naya*.—The fallacy of *saṅgraha* occurs when we describe the general properties alone as constituting a thing. This kind of fallacious proposition gives rise to confusion of thought, because the general qualities alone can never constitute an actual object. For instance, the general qualities of a tree only give us the idea of treeness, never an actual tree. The latter will have to be some particular kind of tree—an oak, a mango, or the like—and will, therefore, possess its own special qualities along with those of a tree in general.
3. *Fallacy of vyavahāra naya*.—This type of fallacy lies in wrong selection of species, as for instance, is the case with the materialists (Cārvākas) who select only four primary elements as real.
4. *Fallacy of ṛjusūtra naya*.—It occurs when the permanence of things is altogether denied. In this fallacy, every object is taken to be momentary without having any kind of permanent or general feature.
5. *Fallacy of śabda naya*.—This kind of fallacy occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of *śabda naya* and deal with synonymous words as absolutely having the same meaning.
6. *Fallacy of samabhirūḍha naya*.—This type of fallacy consists in treating the synonymous words as having absolutely different meanings.
7. *Fallacy of evambhūta naya*.—It lies in making the existence of a thing absolutely dependent on the performance of the special function with reference to which a particular name has been awarded to it, e.g., to say that a teacher outside the class is absolutely a non-teacher because he does not teach at that time, is fallacious.

REFUTATION OF SOME OBJECTIONS

The opponent who does not regard the nature of reality as a synthesis of identity and difference, and makes an absolute judg-

ment about reality rejecting the relativity of propositions, raises the following objections: The exponents of the doctrine of the relativity of judgment or non-absolutism affirming the multiple nature of things reject the view that substance (essence) and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are identical and different both. But this position cannot be legitimate, inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as under: ¹

1. Affirmation and negation cannot co-exist in one substratum like blue and not-blue owing to their mutual opposition. Therefore, it is contradictory to say that the same object is different as well as identical.

The answer is: There is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum, no question of contradiction arises. As regards blue and not-blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction in the situation, and thus, the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not-blue in the unitary cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further, when one single piece of linen is found to possess in harmony the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and not-covered, what then is the ground for doubt?

2. If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that the difference will have one locus and identity another and thus, there will be a split in the integrity of the locus.

This kind of objection is not tenable because in conformity with the principle mentioned above, they have all been proved to be perceived in the same locus. The same cloth is mobile and immobile and the like.

3. The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its

¹ Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 73.

predicate, and this means confusion (*sañkara*) which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum.

As regards the charge of confusion, it is easily parried by the instance of the cognition of the multiform colour, and the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals.

4. The aspect which embodies difference will embody identity also, and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference, and this, thus, gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of modes and attributes).

This charge is easily met by the same example of the cognition of the multiform colour and the synthesis of universal and particular.

5. A real being both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt.

6. The consequence will be the absence of determination.

7. This will result in the impossibility of determination of objective reality.

Regarding these objections, there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a kind of cognition in which the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives. It is absolutely out of the question when the cognition is found to be unwavering. The establishment of knowledge proves that there is no justification for the charge of lack of knowledge, and consequently for the impossibility of such a multiform real. The conclusion follows that the conception of Reality as a synthesis of mode and attribute is not incompatible with the verdict of experience and the interest of truth. Our judgment with regard to Reality as a synthesis of mode and attribute has no other alternative than to be relative. Hence, the relativity of judgment and Reality as a synthesis of identity and difference are co-related.

CHAPTER VI

DOCTRINE OF KARMA

ALL phenomena of the universe are linked together in the universal chain of cause and effect. No event can occur without having a definite cause behind it. To find out the cause and condition under which an effect is produced has always been the aim of the various branches of science and philosophy. Almost all branches of science and philosophy in the world unanimously declare that the law of cause and effect is the most universal of all laws. It is the only law which governs all phenomena however gross or fine they may be. All the forces of nature whether physical or psychical obey this law. Every action of our body, speech, or mind is the result of some force or power which is its cause. At the same time, that which is an effect of some cause becomes in turn the cause of some other effect and thus, the chain goes on extending its sphere.

Under the sway of the all-pervading law of causation, there is no room left for chance or accident. What we generally regard as an accidental event is really a product of some definite cause which is not known to us on account of our limited knowledge. In other words, accidents are not fortuitous but they have some definite cause behind them, although we are not always aware of it on account of the limitations of our knowledge. In ancient times, when the scope of knowledge of people was extremely limited, they used to explain accidental events by attributing them to some supernatural powers. Such accidental effects of unknown causes were called Providential. Really speaking, all accidents have their definite causes whether we know them or not. That which appears to be supernatural or Providential to an unscientific mind, is natural or causal and not supernatural or accidental to a scientific mind.

MEANING OF KARMA

The Jaina thinkers do not regard this universe as a mere aggregate of the six substances set together by some supernatural

authority. They hold that it is a system in itself, subject to some definite laws inherent in its own constitution. Certain phenomena occur regularly in certain circumstances and not otherwise. There is a universal law of causation operating in the universe. The phenomena of life and consciousness are not similar to the phenomena of matter or energy. In pure material activity, there is growth by addition in dead objects which is a product of chemical law only, whereas a conscious being takes to itself particles foreign to those that are already in the body and changes their nature and assimilates them with its own body. Moreover, living beings reproduce themselves in their species. These characteristics are not possessed by dead matter. Jainism regards souls to be real and indefinite in number. Each soul possesses some individual characteristics different from others. The doctrine which gives us some explanation of our individual characteristics, i.e., some satisfactory answer to the factors of our individuality which we have at present and tells us how these factors were produced as the result of the forces generated in the past is known as the doctrine of karma. In other words, the doctrine of karma is the law that interprets our actions and reactions found in the form of introspection as well as behaviour.

According to Jaina philosophy, every individual soul possesses infinite intuition, infinite knowledge, infinite power, and infinite bliss. All these attributes belong by nature to every soul in its perfection. Mundane souls are not perfect because their knowledge, energy, etc., are found to be restricted. They are not perfectly free to enjoy complete knowledge and unrestricted bliss. Why is it so? What restricts their innate faculty of knowing, etc.? The answer is: They are infected by something foreign which veils their natural faculties. This foreign element is known as karma. Jainism does not mean by karma 'work or deed.' According to Jaina conception, karma is an aggregate of material particles which are very fine and are imperceptible to the senses. It enters into the soul and produces changes in it. It is a form of matter which produces certain conditions in the mundane souls that are suffering from the shackles of birth and death from beginningless time.

The entire cosmos is full of that kind of fine matter which can become karma. Through the actions of body, mind, and speech,

the fine matter gets into the soul and is tied to it according to the modifications of consciousness consisting of *kaṣāyas*, i.e., anger, pride, deceit, and greed. Therefore, first of all there is an influx of karmic particles and then there occur certain activities of mind which are responsible for the actual bondage. In the state of bondage, soul and karma are more intimate than milk and water. Once matter enters the soul, it causes various kinds of effect on it. The bondage is of four kinds: according to its nature, duration, intensity, and quantity. The activities of thought, speech, and body are responsible for the nature and quantity. The duration and intensity result from attachment and aversion. Karma may remain latent in the soul for a definite period without emerging into appearance. When the moment for its enjoyment arrives, it becomes apparent and releases itself.

As has already been mentioned, the soul has been eternally infected by matter, i.e., its association with karma has no beginning. Moreover, it is gathering new matter every moment. The liberation of soul from matter is possible by certain means. The soul must stop the influx of new karmas and eliminate the acquired ones. Through this twofold method, it can attain the ultimate goal, i.e., emancipation. All obstacles which impede the manifestation of its true nature are then automatically overcome, because it is released from the foreign domination of karma. This being the situation, when liberation is attained it can undisturbedly make manifest its own innate nature, i.e., infinite knowledge, etc.

FOUR KINDS OF BONDAGE

The atoms that have become karma can be contemplated from four points of view :

1. According to their nature (*prakṛti*).
2. According to their duration (*sthiti*).
3. According to their intensity (*rasa* or *anubhāga*).
4. According to their quantity (*pradeśas*).¹

NATURE

It has eight fundamental species (*mūla prakṛtis*):²

1. Knowledge-obscuring karma (*jñānāvaraṇa*),

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 2.

² ibid, I, 3.

2. Intuition-obscuring karma (*darśanāvaraṇa*),
3. Feeling-producing karma (*vedanīya*),
4. Belief and conduct-obstructing karma (*mohanīya*),
5. Age-determining karma (*āyus*),
6. Personality-determining karma (*nāman*),
7. Status-determining karma (*gotra*),
8. Power-hindering karma (*antarāya*).

Each of these eight species is divided into a number of sub-species (*uttara-prakṛtis*). The latter can be further classified into yet smaller sub-divisions, so that the entire number of karmas is exceedingly large. For our present purpose, only the eight chief species and the 158 sub-species are of importance.

KNOWLEDGE-OBSCURING KARMA

That karma which obscures the knowing faculty of soul is known as knowledge-obscuring karma, i.e., *jñānāvaraṇa* karma. It is divided into five sub-species (*uttara prakṛtis*) according to the five kinds of knowledge :¹

1. *Mati-jñānāvaraṇa* karma.—It causes the obscuration of the knowledge acquired through the media of senses and mind.
2. *Śruta-jñānāvaraṇa* karma—It produces the obscuration of the knowledge acquired by reading or hearing scriptures or by the words of an authority.
3. *Avadhi-jñānāvaraṇa* karma.—It hinders direct knowledge of material objects.
4. *Manahparyāya-jñānāvaraṇa* karma.—It obscures transcendental knowledge of the thoughts of others.
5. *Kevala-jñānāvaraṇa* karma.—It hinders the faculty of omniscience inherent in a soul by natural disposition.

INTUITION-OBSCURING KARMA

This kind of karma is called *darśanāvaraṇa* karma. In Jaina philosophy, the word '*darśana*' is used to signify two meanings. Firstly, it means belief, opinion, or faith. Secondly, it has also the meaning the awareness of an object or the cognition of a thing in its general form. It is the first stage of knowledge which is known as indistinct knowledge. In '*darśanāvaraṇa* karma' the

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 4; I, 9.

word ' *darśana* ' is meant to signify the second meaning. It can be translated as intuition, indeterminate perception, indistinct knowledge, undifferentiated cognition, or perception in the sense of general cognition. That karma which obscures the faculty of intuition is called intuition-obscuring karma. It is of nine sub-species according to the four species of intuition and five kinds of sleep.¹

1. *Cakṣurdarśanāvaraṇa* karma.—It produces the obscuration of the intuition conditional upon the eye.

2. *Acakṣurdarśnāvaraṇa* karma.—This species causes the obstruction of the intuition conditional upon the four senses (other than the eye) and mind.

3. *Avadhīdarśanāvaraṇa* karma.—It hinders the faculty of transcendental intuition of material things.

4. *Kevaladarśanāvaraṇa* karma.—It produces the obstruction of the faculty of complete intuition.

5. *Nidrā* karma.—This type of karma causes a light and pleasant sleep, out of which the sleeper is aroused by the clicking of fingernails or by a slight call.

6. *Nidrānidrā* karma.—This type of karma produces a deep sleep, out of which the sleeper can be awakened by being shaken violently.

7. *Pracalā* karma.—It causes a sound slumber which overtakes a person while sitting or standing.

8. *Pracalāpracalā* karma.—This species of karma causes intensive sleep that overcomes a person while walking.

9. *Styānagrddhī* karma.—It produced somnambulism. This kind of sleep is also called ' *styānarīdhi* . ' The person possessing this kind of slumber unconsciously acts in the state of sleeping but forgets what he did when he wakes.

FEELING-PRODUCING KARMA

The feeling of pleasure and pain is caused by this species of karma known as *vedanīya* karma. It has, therefore, two sub-species :²

¹ *Krama-grantha*, I, 10-12.

² *ibid.*, I, 12.

1. *Sātā-vedanīya* karma.—It causes a feeling of pleasure as for instance, we have the feeling of pleasure by licking something sweet like honey, etc.

2. *Asātā-vedanīya* karma.—It produces the feeling of pain as for example, pain is produced if one is hurt by a sword.

The *sātā-vedanīya* is predominant with gods and human beings, although pain can be produced with the former at the time of the downfall from the heavenly world and with the latter through cold and heat, death and accident, and the like. Animal beings and beings of hell experience chiefly the *asātā-vedanīya*, although on some occasions, they also experience a feeling of pleasure.¹

BELIEF AND CONDUCT-OBSCURING KARMA

This kind of karma obstructs true faith and right conduct. It is called *mohanīya* karma. It has two chief divisions: obstruction of belief and obstruction of conduct, i.e., *darśana-mohanīya* and *cāritra-mohanīya*.

(a) *Darśana-mohanīya* karma.—It produces an obstruction of the faith of the true nature of objects. The obstruction is further divided into three sub-species:

1. *Mithyātva mohanīya*.—It produces complete wrong belief or heterodoxy. The soul possessing this kind of *mohanīya* karma does not believe in the truths as proclaimed by a true authority but believes false prophets who enjoin false doctrines to be saints.
2. *Samyaktva mohanīya*.—It induces correct belief. It is not the right faith in its completeness but only in a preliminary degree. The true belief in its completeness is obtained only when the *samyaktva mohanīya* karma is entirely destroyed, as for instance, the sun which is covered by white clouds only shines perfectly after the clouds have been removed.
3. *Miśra mohanīya*.—It produces a mixed belief having some degree of truth and some of falsity. In other words, it causes a kind of indifference between true faith and false belief. It is a mixture of both *samyaktva mohanīya* and

¹ Commentary on Karma-grantha, I, 13.

mithyātva mohaniya. That is why it is also called *samyag-mithyātva mohaniya*.

(b) *Cāritra-mohaniya* karma—This kind of *mohaniya* karma obscures right conduct which is the innate property of soul. It obstructs the soul from acting according to the right prescriptions of scriptures or any authoritative sources. The obstruction of conduct is produced through the sixteen passions (*kaṣāyas*) and nine *quasi*-passions (*no-kaṣāyas*):

(i) *Kaṣāya*—There are four chief *kaṣāyas*: anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*), and greed (*lobha*).

Each of these is again classified into four sub-divisions according to the intensity of their nature. The four sub-divisions are:

1. *Anantānubandhin*—It completely hinders right belief and conduct. The soul possessing *anantānubandhin* anger, etc., can never have right belief and conduct. It lasts for the whole of life.
2. *Apratyaḅhyānāvaraṇa*—It hinders partial self-discipline but allows the existence of true belief. It lasts for one year.
3. *Pratyaḅhyānāvaraṇa*—It obstructs the beginning of complete self-discipline or renunciation but does not prevent the existence of right belief and partial self-discipline. It lasts for four months.
4. *Sañjvalana*—It hinders the attainment of complete right conduct (*yathāḅhyāta cāritra*). Its effect lasts for one fortnight.


(ii) *No-kaṣāya*—*Quasi*-passions are divided into nine categories:

1. *Hāsyā*—Laughing and joking fall under this category.
2. *Rati*—Proper or improper liking for a certain object is called *rati*.
3. *Arati*—Proper or improper disliking for a particular thing is named *arati*.
4. *Śoka*—Sorrow for an object is known as *śoka*.
5. *Bhaya*—Fear is caused by *bhaya* karma.
6. *Jugupsā*—It is a kind of disgust.
7. *Puruṣa-veda*—Through this, in the male the desire for union with a female is produced.

8. *Strī-veda*—Through this, in the female the desire for union with a male is excited.
9. *Naṇumsaka-veda*—The third sex is produced by the rise of this karma. The sexual urge with them is exceedingly strong, since it is directed towards male and female both.¹

The *cāritra-mohanīya* karma has accordingly twenty-five sub-species. Adding the three sub-species of the *darśana-mohanīya* to it, we have in all twenty-eight sub-species of the belief and conduct-obscuring (*mohanīya*) karma. The following table will show the sub-species of *mohanīya* karma.

¹ Commentary on Karma-grantha, I, 14-9; I, 21-2.



AGE-DETERMINING KARMA

It confers on a being a certain quantum of life in any one of the four states of existence. The following are the four sub-species of *āyus* karma :

1. *Deva-āyus*—It determines the celestial age.
2. *Manuṣya-āyus*—The human age is determined by it.
3. *Tiryag-āyus*—This determines the age of animal life.
4. *Naraka-āyus*—The age of hellish beings is determined by it.

PERSONALITY-DETERMINING KARMA

It causes the individual diversities of souls. It is known as *nāma* karma. The number of its sub-species is 103. These sub-species are mostly quoted in a fixed succession in four groups : *piṇḍa-prakṛtis*, *pratyeka-prakṛtis*, *trasa-daśaka*, and *sthāvara-daśaka*.¹ The names of the causes of these sub-species are according to the names of the sub-species.

(a) *Piṇḍa-prakṛtis*—There are seventy-five sub-species in this group :

- 4 *States of Existence*—Celestial state of existence, human state of existence, animal state of existence, and hellish state of existence.
- 5 *Classes of Beings*—A being with one sense, two senses, three senses, four senses, and five senses.
- 5 *Bodies*—Physical body of animals (including vegetable kingdom) and human beings, transformable body of fine matter, projectable body of pure matter, electric body, and karmic body.
- 3 *Chief and Secondary parts of Bodies*—The chief and secondary parts of the physical body, of the transformable body, and of the projectable body. The electric body and the karmic body have no parts.

15 *Bindings* :

1. The binding of physical body with previous physical body.
2. The binding of physical body with electric body.
3. The binding of physical body with karmic body.

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 11.


4. The binding of physical body with electric and karmic bodies.
5. The binding of transformable body with previous transformable body.
6. The binding of transformable body with electric body.
7. The binding of transformable body with karmic body.
8. The binding of transformable body with electric and karmic bodies.
9. The binding of projectable body with previous projectable body.
10. The binding of projectable body with electric body.
11. The binding of projectable body with karmic body.
12. The binding of projectable body with electric and karmic bodies.
13. The binding of electric body with previous electric body.
14. The binding of electric body with karmic body.
15. The binding of karmic body with previous karmic body.

Certain types of bodies are not bound with some particular types of bodies as for instance, physical body has no binding with transformable body and so on. Hence, the bindings are only fifteen in number.

- 5 *Saṅghātanas*—*Saṅghātana* is a type of scraping as a rake gathers together the grass that has scattered about. According to the five bodies there are five *saṅghātana-nāma* karma: The scraping of the matter of the physical body, of the transformable body, of the projectable body, of the electric body, and of the karmic body.
- 6 *Firmnesses of the Joints of Physical Body*—*Vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca-saṁhanana* is an excellent joining in which two bones are hooked into one another, *ṛṣabha-nārāca-saṁhanana* is not so firm, *nārāca-saṁhanana* is still weaker, *ardha-nārāca-saṁhanana* is a joining which is on one side like the preceding one, whilst on the other, the bones are simply pressed together and nailed, *kīlika-saṁhanana* is a weak joining by which the bones are merely pressed together and nailed, and *sevārta-saṁhanana* is quite a weak joining in which the ends of the bones only touch one another.

- 6 *Figures*—The *saṁsthāna-nāma*-karma determines the figure of a being. Six types of figures have been discussed in the Jaina doctrine of karma : the entire body to be symmetrical, the upper part of the body to be symmetrical, not the lower one, the body below the navel to be symmetrical and above it unsymmetrical, the body to be hunch-backed, the body to be dwarf-like, and the entire body to be unsymmetrical.
- 5 *Colours*—Black, blue, red, yellow, and white. Other colours are produced by mixing only.
- 2 *Odours*—Pleasant odour and unpleasant odour or good smell and bad smell.
- 5 *Tastes*—Bitter, sour, acidic, sweet, and astringent.
- 8 *Touches*—Soft, hard, light, heavy, cold, hot, smooth, and rough.
- 4 *Ānupūrvīs*—When one existence of a soul is finished and it goes from the place of death to the place of its new birth, this state is called *ānupūrvī*. There are four *ānupūrvīs* according to the four states of existence (*gati*) : celestial, human, animal, and infernal.
- 2 *Gaits*—To move in a pleasant manner as oxen, elephants, etc., do and to move in an ugly manner as camels, asses, etc., do.
- (b) *Pratyeka-prakṛtis*—This group consists of eight sub-species : superiority over others, capability of breathing, hot body of the sun, etc., cold body of the moon, stars, etc., a body that is neither heavy nor light, the body of a founder of the Holy Order (*tīrthaṅkara*), normal formation of the body, and abnormal formation of the body.
- (c) *Trasa-daśaka*—There are ten sub-species in this group : a body possessing two senses, etc., gross body, developed body, individual body, firm body, beautiful and lovely parts of the body, gaining of sympathy without any obligation, sweet voice, suggestive speech, and honour and glory-winning personality.
- (d) *Sthāvara-daśaka*—This group also consists of ten sub-species : the body of plants, etc., subtle body, undeveloped body, a body in common, body without firmness, ugly parts of the body, no sympathy gaining, ill-sounding voice, unsuggestive speech, and dishonour and shame-giving individuality.

The scheme of the sub-species of the personality-determining karma is as under :



STATUS-DETERMINING KARMA

It destines the hereditary rank occupied by a person through his birth. This species is called *gotra* karma. It is divided into two sub-species :¹

1. *Uccairgotra* karma destines high family surroundings.
2. *Nīcāirgotra* karma determines low family surroundings.

POWER-HINDERING KARMA

It hinders the power (*vīrya*) of the soul. It is known as *antarāya* karma. The power is hindered in a five-fold manner :²

1. *Dāna-antarāya* karma—It hinders dispensing alms, etc.
2. *Lābha-antarāya* karma—This kind of *antarāya* karma hinders receiving.
3. *Bhoga-antarāya* karma—It hinders the enjoyment of some object which can only be enjoyed once such as food, etc.
4. *Upabhoga-antarāya* karma—It hinders the enjoyment of something that can be repeatedly enjoyed such as clothes, etc.
5. *Vīrya-antarāya* karma—It hinders the freedom of will-power.

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 52.

² *ibid.*

The total number of the sub-species of the eight karmas is as follows :

1. Knowledge-obscuring karma	5
2. Intuition-obscuring karma	9
3. Feeling-producing karma	2
4. Belief and conduct-obscuring karma	28
5. Age-determining karma	4
6. Personality-determining karma	103
7. Status-determining karma	2
8. Power-hindering karma	5
		Total	158

BANDHA, UDAYA, UDĪRAṆĀ, AND SATTĀ

Taking into consideration the existence in *potentia* (*sattā*), all the sub-species can exist in a soul. So far as the realisation (*udaya*) of the species is concerned, the entire number amounts only to 122. If the bondage (*bandha*) of new species is taken into consideration, the total number is assumed to be 120. If the premature realisation (*udīraṇā*) is considered, the entire number amounts to 122 as in realisation.¹ The following table will indicate the number of the sub-species existing in different states :

..	<i>Bandha</i>	<i>Udaya</i>	<i>Udīraṇā</i>	<i>Sattā</i>
Knowledge-obscuring ...	5	5	5	5
Intuition-obscuring ...	9	9	9	9
Feeling-producing ...	2	2	2	2
Belief and conduct-obscuring ...	26	28	28	28
Age-determining ...	4	4	4	4
Personality-determining ...	67	67	67	103
Status-determining ...	2	2	2	2
Power-hindering ...	5	5	5	5
Total ...	120	122	122	158

In *sattā* all the *prakṛtis* exist. In *udaya* the number is only 122 because the fifteen bindings and the five *saṅghātanās* are not

¹ Sukhlal : Karma-vipāka, p. 111.

included as they are then thought to exist implicit in the five bodies. The colour, odour, taste, and touch are only reckoned as four species instead of twenty. In *udīraṇa* also the same species are counted. In *bandha* the number is 120, since the two *mohanīya* karmas, viz., *samyaktva* and *miśra* cannot be bound separately because they are purified conditions of *mithyātva*. Therefore, they must be subtracted from the 122 species of *udaya* and *udīraṇā*, so that the total number in *bandha* is 120.

DURATION

After having considered the nature of karmas we, now, proceed to their duration. First, let us understand the scheme of the division of time as conceived by the Jainas. 'The lowest unit of time is the *samaya*. Innumerable *samayas* form an *āvalikā*. 16,777,216 *āvalikās* equal one *muhūrta* (48 minutes of European time). Thirty *muhūrtas* make one day. Out of the days are formed weeks. . . . The number of years can be expressed in words up to a number containing 77 cyphers. Beyond that, it is *asaṅkhyeya*. An innumerable quantity of years is called *phalyoṣama*, 10 *koṭākoṭi* (1,000,000,000,000,000) of *phalyoṣamas* are one *sāgaroṣama*. 10 *koṭākoṭi* of *sāgaroṣamas* comprise one *utsarpīni* (ascending period of time); the same number of *sāgaroṣamas* measures one *avasarpīni* (descending period of time).¹

The following table will give the highest as well as the lowest duration of each chief species of karma :²

<i>Karmas</i>	<i>Maximum time</i>	<i>Minimum time</i>
1. Knowledge- obscuring.	30 <i>koṭākoṭi</i> <i>sāgaroṣamas</i>	Less than one <i>muhūrta</i>
2. Intuition- obscuring.	" "	" "
3. Feeling-producing	" "	12 <i>muhūrtas</i>
4. Belief and conduct- obscuring.	70 " "	Less than one <i>muhūrta</i>
5. Age-determining	33 <i>sāgaroṣamas</i>	" "
6. Personality- determining.	20 <i>koṭākoṭi</i> <i>sāgaroṣamas</i>	8 <i>muhūrtas</i>
7. Status-determining	" "	" "
8. Power-hindering	30 " "	Less than one <i>muhūrta</i>

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 20.

² Tattvārtha-sūtra, VIII, 15-21.

INTENSITY

The intensity of the effect of karma depends upon the weakness or strength of the passions (*kaṣāyas*). In accordance with the four degrees of the passions, four degrees of the strength of karma have been recognised by Jainism. The more sinful a person is, the duration of his bad karma is longer. The stronger the effect of his badness, the weaker that of his good species. With an increased purity the duration of the bound karma and the intensity of the bad species decrease, while the intensity of the good species grows. With the bad species, the fourth degree of the intensity is produced by the most violent passions, i.e., *anantānubandhi kaṣāyas*. The third degree is caused by the *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaṣāyas*, the second by the *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaṣāyas*, and the first by the *sañjvalana kaṣāyas*. With regard to the good species, the *sañjvalanas* produce the fourth, the *pratyākhyānāvaraṇas* the third, the *apratyākhyānāvaraṇas* the second degree. The intensity of the first degree does not exist with the good species.¹

QUANTITY

The soul assimilates only that karmic matter which is within its own *pradeśas*, and not that lying outside, just as fire seizes only that inflammable material which is lying within its reach. The matter assimilated by the soul is divided into the eight species of karma. The shares which fall to the eight chief species differ from one another. The age-determining species (*āyus*) receives the smallest part, a greater portion goes to the personality-determining (*nāman*) and status-determining (*gotra*) species which both obtain equal portions. More than that goes to the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*), intuition-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa*), and power-hindering (*antarāya*) species, each of which gets an equal portion. Still a larger part than these falls to the belief and conduct-obscuring species (*mohanīya*) and the greatest of all goes to the feeling-producing species (*vedanīya*). These shares are further divided among the sub-species.²

CAUSES OF BONDAGE

The theory of causation explains each and every event of life in the strict form of cause and effect. No effect can be produced

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 24.

² *ibid.*, p. 26

in the absence of its cause. This universal law is applied to the doctrine of karma also as we have already mentioned. Each of the karma-species can only be bound so far as its cause of bondage is in existence. The following activities constitute the causes of the different species. Although all the species are bound by activities and passions in general, yet, every species has some special causes constituted by some particular activities. They are as follows :¹

CAUSES OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION—OBSCURING KARMAS

1. Hostility against knowledge, knower and, the means of knowledge.
2. Denial, annihilation, and hindrance of these three.
3. Disregard of a true doctrine and its commandments.
4. Rebelliousness and lack of discipline towards teachers.
5. Complete destruction of books and other means of knowledge.
6. Indifferent or opposite attitude towards knower and knowledge.

CAUSES OF FEELING—PRODUCING KARMA

Pleasure :

1. Respects for parents, teachers, etc.
2. To have pity on miserable beings.
3. Keeping of vows of a house-holder or a monk.
4. Honourable conduct.
5. Overcoming of passions.
6. Giving of alms or some other kind of help.
7. Fidelity in belief.
8. Interest in spiritual activities.

The contrary causes produce pain.

CAUSES OF BELIEF—OBSTRUCTING KARMA

1. The teaching of a false faith.
2. The denial of the path of liberation.
3. The pollution of sacred objects.
4. The blasphemy of liberated souls.

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 54-61.

5. The blasphemy of monks and saints.
6. The blasphemy of gods.
7. The disregard of Holy Order.

CAUSES OF CONDUCT-OBSTRUCTING KARMA

1. The actions produced by the outbreak of passions cause the binding of *kaṣāya-mohanīya* karma.
2. *No-kaṣāya-mohanīya* karma is bound by the mind which is confused through joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, disgust, etc.
3. Slight passionate desire, conjugal fidelity, inclination for right conduct, etc., cause the binding of *puruṣa-veda* (male sex) karma.
4. Jealousy, deceit, great sensuality, adultery, etc., cause the binding of *strī-veda* (female sex) karma.
5. Violent love of pleasure and strong passions directed towards sexual intercourse with male and female cause the binding of *napuṃsaka-veda* (third sex) karma.

CAUSES OF AGE-DETERMINING KARMA

1. Hellish age is bound by the actions of one who tortures and kills other beings and strives in an extraordinary manner after passions.
2. The deceitful and fraudulent person binds animal age.
3. The humble and sincere one whose passions are slight binds human life.
4. One who possesses right belief but who only partially or not at all practises self-discipline, whose passions are slight, who is chaste, who endures troubles, etc., binds celestial life.

CAUSES OF PERSONALITY-DETERMINING KARMA

Honesty, gentleness, absence of desire, purity, etc., are the causes of the binding of good personality-determining karma, while the reverse that of bad.

CAUSES OF STATUS-DETERMINING KARMA

The recognition of the excellence of others, modesty, reverence towards teachers, the desire to learn and to teach are some of the causes of the binding of high family surroundings, whereas the contrary causes the binding of low family surroundings.

CAUSES OF POWER-HINDERING KARMA

The withholding of food, drink, lodging, clothing, and the like causes the binding of power-hindering karma.

PREVENTION AND DESTRUCTION OF KARMA

The binding of new karma can be prevented through the means of control of the activity of body, speech, and mind (*gupti*); carefulness in waking, speaking, lifting up and laying down a thing, etc. (*samiti*), moral virtues (*dharma*); reflection (*anuprekṣā*); patient endurance of troubles (*pariṣaha-jaya*), and conduct (*cāritra*).¹

The acquired karmas can be annihilated through suitable measures of fasting, reduction of food, restriction to certain kinds of food, renunciation of delicacies, a lonely resting place, mortification of the body, expiation, modesty, service, study, renunciation of ego-identification, and meditation.²

STAGES OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

According to Jaina philosophy, there are fourteen stages of development through which the soul gradually delivers itself from the state of complete dependence upon karma to the state of complete dissociation from it. These stages are known as the 'states of virtue', i.e., *guṇasthānas*. Here the word 'virtue' does not mean an ordinary moral quality but it stands for the nature of soul, i.e., knowledge, belief, and conduct.³

Through these fourteen stages of development the soul gradually frees itself, firstly from the worst, then from the less bad, and finally from all kinds of karma, and manifests the innate faculties of knowledge, belief, and conduct in a more and more perfect form. The owners of these stages are the following: ⁴

1. Wrong believer (*mithyādṛṣṭi*).
2. One who has a slight taste of right belief (*sāsvādāna samyag-dṛṣṭi*).
3. One who has a mixed belief (*miśradṛṣṭi*).

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 2.

² *ibid.*, IX, 3; IX, 19-20.

³ *Tatra guṇāḥ : jñānadarśunacāvitrarūpāḥ jīvasvabhāvaviśeṣāḥ.*
Karma-grantha, II, 2 (commentary).

⁴ *ibid.*

4. One who has true belief but has not yet self-discipline (*avirata samyagdr̥ṣṭi*).
5. One who has partial self-control (*deśavirata*).
6. One who has complete self-discipline, sometimes, however, brought into wavering through negligence (*pramatta samyata*).
7. One who has self-control without negligence (*apramatta samyata*).
8. One who practises the process called 'apūrvā karaṇa' in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form (*niṣṛtti bādara sam̐parāya*).
9. One who practises the process called 'anīṣṛtti karaṇa' in whom, however, the passions are still occurring (*anīṣṛtti bādara sam̐parāya*).
10. One in whom the passions occur in a subtle form (*sūkṣma sam̐parāya*).
11. One who has suppressed every passion but who does not yet possess omniscience (*upaśānta kaṣāya vītarāga chadmasṭha*).
12. One who has annihilated every passion but does not yet possess omniscience (*kṣīṇa kaṣāya vītarāga chadmasṭha*).
13. One who possesses omniscience and engages himself in activities (*sayogi kevalin*).
14. One who is omniscient and does not perform any activity (*ayogi kevalin*).

The whole scheme of *guṇasthānas* is devised in a logical order according to the principle of decreasing sinfulness and increasing purity. At the first stage all the causes of binding, viz., wrong belief, lack of self-discipline, passions, and activity are operating. From the second to the fifth, only three causes are in operation, i.e., wrong belief is absent. From the sixth to the tenth, only passions and activity exercise their influence. From the eleventh to the thirteenth, only activity is present. On the last stage there is no binding of karma. The number of the karmas which are in realisation (*udaya*) and existence in *potentia* (*sattā*) also decreases with every step.

1. MITHYĀDR̥ṢṬI GUṆASTHĀNA

The chief characteristic of this *guṇasthāna* is wrong belief. The 'abhavyas' (not capable of salvation) as well as 'bhavyas' (capable of salvation) are on this stage. The difference

between their conditions is that all the 'abhavyas' are eternally in this *guṇasthāna*, whereas only those 'bhavyas' who by reason of certain unfavourable conditions do not reach salvation do so for a certain period of time. With the other 'bhavyas' this stage has no beginning but an end which comes sooner or later. With a being who fell from a higher stage and sank into wrong belief, it has a beginning as well as an end.

2. SĀSVĀDĀNA SAMYAGDRṢṬI GUṆASTHĀNA

It is of very short duration lasting in the minimum one 'samaya' and in the maximum six 'āvalikās'. Those beings that possessed right belief produced by suppression of wrong belief during the period less than a 'muhūrta' but who had lost it again on account of the breaking out of passions, are said to enjoy this *guṇasthāna*. After the lapse of the settled period, the being necessarily sinks back into the first *guṇasthāna*.

3. MIŚRA GUṆASTHĀNA

The fundamental characteristic of this stage is indifference which lasts only during the period less than forty-eight minutes (*muhūrta*). It is a mixed belief produced by the mingling of truth and falsity. After the lapse of the time of the stay on this stage, the being attains wrong or right belief, according to the circumstances.

4. AVIRATA SAMYAGDRṢṬI GUṆASTHĀNA

To this stage belong those beings who possess right belief and have the knowledge of truth and falsity but on account of the realisation of the 'apratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaṣāyas' are not capable of practising self-discipline. The duration of this stage is in the minimum less than a *muhūrta* and in the maximum more than thirty-three *sāgaropamas*.

5. DEŚAVIRATA SAMYAGDRṢṬI GUṆASTHĀNA

In this state of virtue, partial self-discipline exists. The duration is in the minimum less than a *muhūrta* and in the maximum somewhat less than a 'pūrvakoṭi'.

6. PRAMATTA SAMYATA GUṆASTHĀNA

The being belonging to this *guṇasthāna* attains complete self-discipline, although he is disturbed through negligence produced by the realisation of the *sañjvalana* passions. This state lasts in

the minimum one *samaya* and in the maximum less than a *muhūrta*. If the person belonging to this stage degrades after one *samaya*, he becomes an 'avirata' (4th stage); if the degradation is after 'antarmuhūrta' (less than 48 minutes) he becomes a *deśavirata* (5th stage). If the 'antarmuhūrta', however, has passed without any incident, he goes into the seventh stage. If he has ascended no series, he comes back to the sixth stage and the operation begins anew. This wavering between the sixth and seventh *guṇasthānas* lasts in the maximum somewhat less than a 'pūrvakoṭi'. If the 'upaśama' or 'kṣapaka' series is ascended, such a wavering does not take place.

7. APRAMATTA SAMYATA GUṆASTHĀNA

In this state of virtue, complete self-discipline without negligence exists. It lasts one *samaya* till *antarmuhūrta*.

8. NIVṚTTI BĀDARA SAMPARĀYA GUṆASTHĀNA

Like the following stages, this stage is accessible only to those beings who are on a *śreṇi* (series). A special process known as 'apūrva karaṇa' is performed in this stage. The being who is on the 'upaśama śreṇi' remains on this stage in the minimum one *samaya* and in the maximum *antarmuhūrta*; the one who is on the 'kṣapaka śreṇi' altogether *antarmuhūrta*.

9. ANIVṚTTI BĀDARA SAMPARĀYA GUṆASTHĀNA

One who is on the *upaśama* or *kṣapaka śreṇi* and performs the process called 'anivṛtti karaṇa' belongs to this stage. The former remains in it in the minimum one *samaya*, in the maximum *antarmuhūrta*; the latter *antarmuhūrta* altogether. The passions still occur in this stage.

10. SŪKṢMA SAMPARĀYA GUṆASTHĀNA

On this stage passions only occur in the most subtle form in order to be then totally suppressed or annihilated. It lasts with the *upaśama śreṇi* one *samaya* in the minimum; *antarmuhūrta* in the maximum; with the *kṣapaka śreṇi* altogether *antarmuhūrta*.

11. UPASĀNTA KAṢĀYA VĪTARĀGA CHADMASTHA GUṆASTHĀNA

It is the highest stage that can be reached on the *upaśama śreṇi*. The passions on this stage are totally suppressed. It lasts

in the minimum one *samaya*, in the maximum *antarmuhūrta*. After ending this stage, the being belonging to it falls from the *uṣāsama śreṇi* and sinks into one of the lower stages.

12. KṢĪNA KAṢĀYA VĪTARĀGA CHADMASTHA GUṆASTHĀNA

In the last *samaya* of the tenth stage (*sūksma samparāya guṇasthāna*), when the last particle of greed has been annihilated, the being who is on the *kṣapaka śreṇi* becomes a *kṣīna kaṣāya* (one with annihilated passions). He remains *antarmuhūrta* on this stage and then becomes omniscient without fail.

13. SAYOGI KEVALI GUṆASTHĀNA

When the karma obscuring the knowledge, intuition, bliss, and power of the soul has completely been annihilated, the person becomes a *sayogi kevalin*. He possesses omniscience and omnipotence. He still possesses certain activities conditional upon matter. Certain karmas are still realising themselves, but as soon as his 'āyus' (age) is exhausted, he annihilates them also in order to be emancipated. This state of virtue lasts in the minimum *antarmuhūrta*, in the maximum somewhat less than a *pūrvakoṭi*.

14. AYOGE KEVALI GUṆASTHĀNA

This last and the highest state of virtue is a transitory state which lasts *antarmuhūrta* and leads to the complete emancipation from karma. With the complete annihilation of every action, the omniscient enters the *śaileśi* state—a state of pure meditation which only lasts as long as is necessary to pronounce five short syllables (*a, i, u, ṛ, l*). When the remaining karmas are completely annihilated, the liberated soul goes to the end of the universe which is called 'śiddha-śilā'. It dwells there without visible shape. It possesses an immaterial dimension of two-third of that which it had during its last existence (*gati*). There, it enjoys infinite, incomparable, indestructible, supernatural happiness of salvation. A soul in its perfect nature is God. Every being has got the innate nature of Godliness. Through its right belief, right knowledge, and right conduct, it can attain that state. It is the individual effort—the personal endeavour that constitutes the path to the state of God. There, the soul perfectly shines with infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss, and

infinite power. The liberated soul does not lose its individuality. Its individual existence is retained in that state as well.

UPAŚAMA ŚREṆI

At the end of the seventh stage of development, the soul ascends either *upaśama śreṇi* or *kṣapaka śreṇi*.¹ That *śreṇi* (series) in which the heaped-up species of *mohanīya* karma are suppressed so that they cannot manifest themselves, is called *upaśama śreṇi*. The species are not totally eradicated. They exist in a latent state and can break out again occasionally. If the suppression takes place in a regular and systematic way in a certain succession, the *upaśama śreṇi* ends in a complete suppression of all belief and conduct-obscuring karmas. This series reaches its end in the *upaśānta moha guṇasthāna* (11th stage), as then the suppressed passions break out again and the *jīva* descends from the series. The different stages of the development of the *upaśama śreṇi* consist in the following procedure :²

Firstly, the being suppresses the life-long passions. Thereupon he suppresses the three sub-species of belief-obscuring karma and through that, reaches *aupaśamika samyaktva* (right belief acquired through suppression). When this has happened, the being proceeds to the suppression of the still remaining *mohanīya* karmas. For this purpose he performs three processes : *yathā-pravṛtti karaṇa*, *apūrvā karaṇa*, and *anivṛtti karaṇa*. If a calculable part of the *anivṛtti karaṇa* has passed, the *jīva* performs an *antara-karaṇa* of the twenty-one remaining *mohanīya* karmas. Then he successively suppresses, within the fraction of a *muhūrta*, the third sex-passion, then the female sex-passion, then joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, and disgust ; then the male sex-passion, then simultaneously *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa* and *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* anger, then the *sañjvalana* anger. This process occurs in man. The succession in woman is : third sex-passion, male sex-passion, joking, etc.; in a *napuṃsaka*, female sex-passion, male sex-passion, joking, etc.³ Thereupon follows the suppression of the second and third kinds of deceit and of the *sañjvalana* deceit, and then that of the second and third kinds of greed. After that the *sañjvalana*

¹ Some writers start from the fourth stage also. See Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1291.

² Karma-grantha, V, 98.

³ Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 116 ; Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1288.

greed becomes divided into three parts: the first two of these, the being suppresses simultaneously, the third, again is divided into a measurable number of pieces, which are suppressed gradually piece by piece. Through this long process he becomes a *sūkṣma sampharāya* (10th stage). When the last piece of greed is suppressed, he is an *uṣāsānta moha* (11th stage). On this stage, the *jīva* remains, in the maximum for less than 48 minutes, in the minimum for one *samaya*. No sooner has this time passed than he falls down from this stage and sinks into even the second *guṇasthāna* under certain circumstances.

KṢĀPAKA ŚREṆI

The *kṣāpaka śreṇi* leads to the destruction of karmas. The person who has ascended it, annihilates successively the different species of karma that exist in *potentia*, becomes in the end quite free from karma, and thereby achieves the highest goal—salvation.

A person exceeding eight years of age, possessing the best firmness of the joints is capable of ascending this series. First of all, he annihilates the four life-long passions, then the three species of belief-obscuring karma. If he has bound *āyus* (age) and dies before wrong belief is completely annihilated, in his new existence, he can eventually bind anew the four life-long passions, since wrong belief which is their germ still exists. If, however, wrong belief is destroyed, this is impossible. If he has bound *āyus*, but does not die immediately after the annihilation of the seven *mohanīya* karmas, he is satisfied with what he has attained, and for the moment does not undertake any endeavour to annihilate the other karmas. He experiences still three or four births before he attains liberation. If he reaches the series without having bound *āyus*, he proceeds immediately to the destruction of the still remaining conduct-obscuring karmas. For this purpose, he performs three processes, of which the first falls into the seventh stage, the second into the eighth stage, and the third into the ninth stage. During the second process (*apūrva karaṇa*) he begins simultaneously with the annihilation of the four *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa* and *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* passions. When these have half disappeared, he meanwhile destroys three intuition-obscuring karmas and thirteen personality-determining karmas. Then he annihilates what still remains of the two species

of passions. Thereupon follows the annihilation of the third and female sex-passions, of joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, disgust, male sex-passion, and of *sañjvalana* anger, pride, and deceit.¹ After this, he leaves the ninth stage (*anivṛtti guṇasthāna*), and sinks into the tenth stage (*sūkṣma sampharāya guṇasthāna*), where he successively annihilates the *sañjvalana* greed, divided into pieces. As soon as the last piece of greed disappears, all passions are destroyed and the highest stage of the series is reached. The *jīva* is now, a *kṣīṇa kaṣāya* (12th stage). Then he annihilates the two kinds of sleep (*nidrā* and *pracalā*), thereupon the five veils of knowledge, the four veils of intuition, and the five species of power-hindering karma. Then he becomes a *sayogi kevalin* (13th stage)² who still wanders for some time on the earth and thereafter attains salvation.

¹ This process is for man, for woman and third sex—the same change as in the *upaśama śreṇi*.

² Karma-grantha, V, 99.

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